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Research Setting 
CHAPTER 1 
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION 
I studied a regional headquarters of the engineering 
division of a large company, ZY&Y. The location employed 
approximately 1100 supervisory, technical, professional, and 
clerical personnel, providing equipment engineering services 
and sales support to communications customers in five 
midwestern states. The unit had a functionally structured 
hierarchy, exhibiting many features of Weber's bureaucratic 
model of administration. The details of the structure are 
amplified in Chapter 4. 
Although the setting was a profit-oriented business, 
the researcher can argue that the evaluation problems, 
process, and consequences found here also apply to non-
profit settings like schools, colleges, and social welfare 
agencies. The study is informed by data from these settings 
to enlighten the research process. 
Research Problem 
During the past five years, I worked as the management 
contact for all issues relating to our local union. During 
this assignment, I continued to hear complaints about the 
evaluation system used to rate the group represented by our 
union, i.e., the Engineering Associates (EA). Surprisingly, 
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the criticisms came from both union representatives and the 
managers with the task of appraising the EAs. In fact, many 
managers griped about their own treatment in the evaluation 
process. The appraisal issues are so pervasive and 
persistent that they seemed a fitting topic for research. 
Thus the problem of this study was to describe and explain 
the construction and use of performance appraisals in the 
engineering unit of a large corporation. More specifically, 
I analyzed the evaluation process to determine: 
How an appraisal was produced? By Whom? Under 
what conditions? What impact did evaluations have 
for individuals and the organization? What did 
evaluations mean? What assumptions surrounded the 
evaluation process? 
The research produced data which described and 
explained the structure, process, and belief system of 
evaluation at the organizational and workplace levels and 
explored alternative evaluation structures to change the 
balance of power between worker and manager. 
Dueling Perspectives 
Performance appraisals were studied from two distinct 
perspectives: (1) a management (administrative) and (2) a 
sociological viewpoint. Management, as a group of power 
producing actors within organizations, define appraisals as 
tools to measure, develop, motivate, promote, measure, 
place, train, discipline, terminate, or reward employees. 
Evaluations are means to manage the organization and make a 
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profit for the company. Much of the mainstream management 
literature defines and accepts appraisals as a tool to 
provide fair rewards and to develop employees. (Gibb, 1985; 
Graves, 1982; Levine, 1986; Reed & Kroll, 1985). (The 
critical view, which concludes that appraisals are 
politically negotiated, subjective control devices, is not 
usually presented here (Fischer & Sirianni, 1984; Edwards, 
1984)). Management articles aimed to improve, not question, 
the basis of the existing practices. Performance evaluations 
are accepted as normal, ordinary factors of organizational 
life. The focus of articles is to find a better, i.e., more 
rational way to produce evaluations -- conduct interviews, 
write-up appraisals, and measure performance. The 
underlying assumptions of what appraisals represent are not 
considered. 
In contrast, sociologists see performance evaluations 
as products of social factors such as cooperation, 
negotiation, and conflict with layers of unexplained and 
implicit meanings. To sociologists, appraisals are cultural 
products that provide data to examine issues like power, 
inequality patterns, processes of labeling, legitimation, 
and decision-making; structures of opportunity and reward; 
construction of shared conceptions like efficiency or 
productivity, and conventions to produce a completed 
appraisal (Becker, 1986). A growing number of writers 
(Fischer & Sirianni, 1984; Goldman & Van Houten, 1977; 
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Hyman, 1975; Benson, 1977: smircich, 1983) have criticized 
the traditional, predominant approach to studying 
organizations where problems are framed as disruptions in 
the rational, taken-for-granted features of organizations. 
The critical view rejects Weber's rational model and 
proposed examining the forces that produce organizational 
realities like goals, technology, appraisals, and structure 
instead of accepting them as givens. In the new view 
organizations are not merely tools for efficiency, but the 
setting and means for obtaining personal, group or class 
interests (Fischer & Sirianni, 1984). 
Why a Problem? What's Wrong with Appraisals at ZY&Y? 
The essence of the problem is that managers' 
conceptions of evaluations are instrumental, political, and 
narrow and contain taken-for-granted assumptions, hidden 
agendas, and unexplained meanings, creating problems which 
sociologists can explain through research and theory 
construction. Management values are geared toward achieving 
greater efficiency and profits, while there are 
contradictions between the intentions and consequences of 
appraisals, between what people did and what they said. 
These points are developed in Chapters 6 and 7. The problem 
for the researcher is to go beyond the common sense 
explanations and examine the process that produced 
conceptions like "efficiency" or "performance appraisal" and 
explain which definitions the organization is using. The 
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following discussion is based on initial observations in the 
organization and highlight a number of significant issues 
and processes. 
objectivity -- Subjectivity 
Organizational actors assume that appraisals match 
performance. If someone performed well, they expect to have 
a higher appraisal than an employee who achieved less. 
Appraisals are also viewed as fair and objective, measuring 
concrete, observable behavior (Scott & Dornbusch, 1967). 
Yet a major complaint from subordinates is that the majority 
of appraisals are subjective and judgmental based on 
hunches, and personal feelings rather than observable 
behavior, measured against a recognized and publicly 
accepted standards. Appraisal write-ups do not match 
performance levels that members expect, based on activities 
stressed by the department (production and quality). 
System Limitations 
Appraisals tend not to reflect legitimate performance 
levels because management review systems arbitrarily impose 
bureaucratic constraints on the number of people who can be 
placed in each performance category. Managers decide, for 
example, that only 20% of the universe, based on a rank 
order of performance, can be rated as "outstanding". The 
definition of performance then becomes a statistic, in this 
case, the top 20% of the rank order list. Appraisals are 
more than tools to evaluate workers, but also a means to 
locate people in a hierarchy of value to the organization 
(Feldberg, 1984; Mahoney, 1983). 
visibility: 
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Evaluations tend to be inaccurate because not all 
behavior is seen or known by the supervisor. An employee 
may train new workers, facilitate information flow, and work 
toward meeting "team" goals, and yet receive only an average 
appraisal because the evaluator is not aware of all the 
person's activities. Contributions then exist only when 
they are recognized and noted. Kanter (1977) refers to a 
similar process when she explains organizational power to 
have power one has to do important tasks, but these 
activities must be visible to others in positions of 
authority. 
Evaluation Criteria 
Appraisals generate contradictions in rules and 
underlying values. Even though departments indicate through 
financial reports and results meetings that production and 
quality are key survival variables, appraisals are not based 
solely on these facts. When union reps "grieved" 
appraisals, managers stress the overall contribution of the 
employee (e.g., problem-solving, production, initiative, 
potential, etc.) to counter an argument that someone should 
be rated higher because he/she had high efficiency. At this 
point, efficiency becomes only one of many factors, while 
prior to this, production is the main driving value of the 
unit. 
The Engineering Associate (EA) position uses some 
precise measures of performance, like efficiency, quality, 
and cost reduction savings, yet managers decide to offset 
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these criteria with more subjective (i.e., less verifiable) 
variables, such as, relations with customers, problem-
solving, initiative, and relative contribution to 
organizational results. 
The appraisal decision can be explained by several 
arguments. Managers want to control evaluations and the 
resulting salary increases. It is like saying, "we shape 
the rules of the contest, so we can determine the rewards". 
Second, supervisors' contention and union representatives' 
comments support the argument that many uncontrollable facts ~ 
like inadequate resources, difficulty of work, and demanding 
customers result in a distorted and unfair account of 
performance through the use of solely objective measures 
like efficiency and quality. 
The Union reps frequently argue that appraisals are 
much too subjective and influenced by supervisor's 
prejudices and shifting values to be an accurate reflection 
of a worker's contribution. Managers acknowledge various 
I 
appraisal shortcomings, but hold that it provides the best 
available basis for rewarding performance through a merit-
based reward structure. 
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Hidden Beliefs 
Appraisals have been a taken-for-granted aspect of most 
jobs and the process of their construction is lost in the 
everyday life of organizations. They reflect the culture 
and ideology of the organization without usually being the 
subject of inquiry (Trice & Beyer, 1984). Employees accept 
appraisal systems, with discrete levels of performance, 
which reflect stratification system (structured inequality) 
of the organization. In this light, appraisals can be seen 
as control systems in all types of organizations. 
What's the Big Deal Over Appraisals? 
Performance evaluations have been used widely in 
organizations to measure performance, grant salary 
increases, promote, demote, or terminate employees, and to 
generate data for career development. 
Virtually all occupational categories of employees 
experience and are subject to appraisals. Some groups, like 
hourly workers, are more affected than others because they 
experience a constellation of factors known as ''blue-collar 
stress" (Shostak, 1980), which has an immediate effect on 
their job security status. Workers in routinized jobs are 
blamed for low motivation instead of inadequate job 
knowledge when there are performance problems. In addition 
their efforts are devalued because the technology they use 
makes their job functions routine. Supervisors tend to use 
harsh, direct orders instead of an "asking" style associated 
with non-routine work (Kipnis, 1984). Professional 
employees also have negative reactions to evaluations 
because autonomy and esteem are threatened rather than 
enhanced by the review process. 
Appraisals affect a number of reward aspects of 
organizational life. Annual salary increases are directly 
linked to one's appraisal a favorable review increases 
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the chance of receiving a large increase, while low or poor 
performance ratings reduce or eliminate the opportunity to 
participate in the distribution of rewards. 
Performance reviews also label the employee and 
establish an historical base, creating a reputational frame 
to decide lateral or upward movement into new jobs. 
Employees are classified as "strong" or "weak" in various 
job skills and this label remains with the person, making it 
difficult to alter future perception patterns. Individuals 
who do not conform to the set of organi~ational rules are 
seen as "deviant" as they vary from managers' norms and 
expectations (Becker, 1973). 
Building on an interactionist approach (Scott and 
Lyman, 1968), I argue that employees can be seen as 
resorting to two types of accounts in reacting to appraisal 
discussions: 
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1. Excuses -- employees acknowledge that some behavior 
or results are undesirable but deny responsibility. The 
person may explain how various organizational factors --
lack of information, conflicting goals -- reduced their 
responsibility for various performance outcome, such as, 
sales volume or the timeliness of reports. 
2. Justification -- the employee accepts 
responsibility for poor performance -- low productivity, 
inferior quality -- but denies that these behaviors should 
be seen as wrong or troublesome. They will claim that the 
department or customer was not harmed by their performance 
so no infraction occurred. The employee may go on to say 
that his/her actions -- taking risks, trying new techniques 
-- are in fact worthy of praise instead of blame. 
contributions to Theory and Methods 
The study investigates a seemingly rational product 
performance evaluations -- through an examination of the 
non-rational features of organizations. This approach uses 
a perspective that combines three models: power/conflict, 
open systems (contingency-dependency) and social 
construction. Each of these offers explanations that are 
more congruent with the reality of organizational life as 
experienced by actors at various levels in the hierarchy. 
The research shows the richer, more insightful power of the 
three models when compared to the efficacy of rational or 
"management" theory, the historically dominant 
organizational model which presented performance appraisals 
as a tool to make both the individual and organizational 
more effective. Chapter 8 concludes with an extended 
discussion of the application and integration of the above 
three theories. 
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The research method studies the appraisal process as a 
"unit of activity" that is socially produced by degrees of 
cooperative behavior with resulting consequences for actors 
and organizations. The research design is a case study to 
develop a theory of evaluation to account for the pattern of 
appraisal placement found in the Engineering unit of a 
complex organization. The design further adopts theories 
from other fields of sociology for use in analyzing 
organizational settings. For example, Becker's (1973) work 
on the nature and construction of deviance -- those in power 
make rules and define who has broken them -- is applied to 
organizations to explain why some employees are not rated 
very high they did not follow the rules of the dominant 
coalition management. Another example is Brunvand's 
(1981) collection of urban folk legends which show that 
stories about unverified events act as a channel for beliefs 
and sources of social control. Organizational stories 
create and reinforce the rewarding of one type of behavior -
- compliance -- and punish other activities (e.g., 
"cheating" on expense vouchers). Also included in Chapter 8 
is insight from Scott's (1985) analysis of peasant 
resistance. This comparison is used because my research 
documented an on-going conflict between managers and 
subordinates which shared features with Scott's study of 
peasant resistance to landlords' unilateral decisions. 
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Finally, the research offers managers alternative 
procedures to the existing methods for conducting 
performance evaluations and interviews. These new 
approaches are based on data from participant observation 
and the experiences of the subjects. Exposing the hidden 
values and processes of evaluation can lead to suggestions 
for new appraisal methods to lessen the inequality of power 
between the supervisor and employee, between the rater and 
ratee. 
Type of study 
The study uses a descriptive and exploratory research 
design, based in a field setting, to capture "the patterns 
of interaction in a particular context" (Golden, 1976). The 
strength of this approach is to chart the complex day-to-day 
behavior of actors in actual settings, which makes for a 
richer pool of data for interpretation and theory building. 
Even though the researcher is a participant in the setting, 
this approach provides the opportunity to explain the 
complex and ambiguous actions that define and constitute the 
evaluation process. Prior knowledge of the setting offers 
clues to guide the data collection, the explanations of 
organizational products (e.g., performance appraisals) and 
alternative evaluation approaches which the researcher 
developed as a result of the study. 
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Framework of Analysis 
My research began with the goal of describing and 
explaining the structure of the Engineering unit, its 
dominant belief systems, and the process used to construct 
performance appraisals. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 fulfill that 
purpose of the research. However, in the course of 
interviewing and analyzing, I formulated a new central 
conclusion about appraisals which incorporates the original 
objectives and functions as the main argument and framework 
for the dissertation. 
My argument is that performance appraisals are a myth 
of organizational life, revealed through several key 
variables: the structure of the organization, including the 
culture of control, which provided the context for 
appraisals; the unit's values or beliefs which explain and 
organize appraisal behavior; and the process or activities 
managers use to produce appraisals. The key question of my 
dissertation is: How do appraisals reflect organizational 
myths? I have concluded the following points from my 
research: 
* Appraisal placement does not match the "reported" 
contributions of employees. Inconsistencies exist between 
cell placement and verbalized judgments of performance 
those assigned low levels are often described as high 
performers. Employees expect larger rewards for their 
contribution; the "psychological contract" of the 
utilitarian model (Etzioni, 1961; Schein, 1980) is not 
upheld by the Company. 
* The managers' need for allocation of evaluation 
categories has priority over the talked-about need for 
accurately measuring contributions: bureaucratic methods, 
rather than performance, are used to slot or appraise 
employees. The culture places the managers' convenience in 
determining appraisals before the expressed concern for 
accuracy of cell assignment. 
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* Political and power issues rather than performance 
mediate or filter behavior into appraisal categories. This 
introduces the question: What do actors mean by performance? 
Cell placement reflects the interaction of other variables 
(e.g., allocation, conflict, power, bargaining, 
uncertainty), rather than just "behavior" or performance. 
Each of the key variables mentioned above -- structure, 
control, beliefs, and process -- are examined in a separate 
chapter to illustrate important issues, what actors said, 
and what this means for the organization. Figure 1 
illustrates the framework for analysis. 
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Figure 1 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
STRUCTURE 
CONTROL 
CONTEXT 
uncertainty/Variation Bureaucratic Methods size 
union-Management Conflict careers 
context Information/Knowledge 
VALUES and BELIEFS 
Safety Production, Quality, Achievement Equity 
Convenience Fatalism Work Habits Time Myth 
Feedback Qualities Rewards Limits 
PROCESS 
Power Political Tactics (Coalitions) uncertainty 
social Construction Decision-Making Games (Cue) 
Conventions, Practices and Special Language 
16 
For example under structure (Chapter 4), I discuss 
uncertainty, size, careers patterns, union-management 
conflict, and general bureaucratic features. The chapter on 
the culture of control (5) grew out of an analysis begun in 
the previous chapter. The chapter on beliefs (6) discusses 
the dominant values impacting on the Engineering unit. These 
include equity (fairness), production (achievement), safety 
(security), and convenience. The process chapter (7) 
examines a number of issues: uncertainty, and use of power 
and political tactics; decision-making models; the social 
construction of appraisals and the use of appraisal 
conventions and language. 
Chapter 8 includes a review of the theoretical issues 
so the findings can be applied to other organizational 
settings. These issues include: decision-making (Thompson, 
1967; Cohen and March, 1972); power and control (Pfeffer, 
1978; Kanter, 1977; Domhoff, 1979; Kipnis, 1984; Mechanic, 
1962); game-like quality of appraisals (Pugh and Hickson, 
1989; Buroway, 1979); uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1978; Scott, 
1981; Cohen & March, 1972); conflict (Edwards, 1979; Fischer 
and Sirianni, 1984; Hill, 1981; Hyman, 1975); social 
construction (Becker, 1973, 1982, 1986; Goffman, 1959; Blau, 
1967; Berger and Luckmann, 1967); career structure (Becker, 
1956; Kanter, 1977; Brass, 1984); and myths (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Brunvand, 1981; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Ouchi and Wilkins, 1985; Scott and Lyman, 1968; Smircich, 
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19a3; Trice and Beyer, 1984; Van Maanen, 1976). Each of the 
four main data analysis chapters (structure, control, 
beliefs, and process) contains an introduction to its key 
issues, actors' quotes, and charts to summarize findings. 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Two broad areas of literature are reviewed: 
organization theory to explain power and control issues and 
cultural or social construction material to examine values 
and perspectives. 
The purpose of this review is to show how previous 
studies on control and cultural topics raised new issues, 
defined problems, and acted as a stimulus and provided 
explanations for the study of performance evaluations. The 
literature offered a context for understanding the 
construction and use of evaluations as a social process and 
means of organizational control. Only a few of the many 
sources cited made a direct reference to a sociological 
study of performance appraisals. The literature review 
provided a link between studies on power, control, and 
cultural topics (like belief systems, perspectives, and 
social construction) and the issues of performance 
evaluations as a product of organizational life. 
The material on power and control explored topics like 
rewards, control, critical research approaches, bureaucratic 
structure, type of organization and hierarchical positions 
as they related to describing and understanding evaluations. 
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The material on cultural topics discussed areas like 
development of the field and variables such as: myths, 
legends, beliefs, and comparable worth; the impact of 
perceptions, definitions of the situation/position; the use 
of rites, stories, assumptions; and organizational products 
such as appraisals as outcomes of cooperation. 
The literature is organized along arbitrary dimensions 
of time: "classical" theories on organization from Weber, 
Marx and Michels precede a longer and more detailed section 
using "modern" theories from researchers like Edwards, 
Kanter, Becker, Goffman, Pfeffer, Scott, Deal and Kennedy, 
Smircich, Etzioni, and Fischer and Sirianni. A brief review 
of relevant segments of the classical theories is followed 
by Scott's 1981 historical integration of three theoretical 
time periods which incorporated many of the concepts found 
in the early works on organizations. 
The third section described features of the Power 
Paradigm, including critiques of the rational model; sources 
of organizational power such as position, structure, and 
resource use; and the impact of reward and technology 
systems on evaluation practices. 
The final section covered cultural dimensions affecting 
performance evaluations. This literature described recent 
developments in the field; the use of cultural variables 
from sociological and management perspectives such as 
stories, beliefs, rites, and language to explain appraisal 
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practices; and social construction explanations from authors 
like Becker and Goffman. 
A. Classical Perspectives 
Marx 
Marx wrote about the effect of capitalism on workers 
from the perspective of the material conditions that 
surrounded people where one's position in society is 
determined by his/her relation to the means of production. 
someone either owned and controlled the mode of production 
or worked for and is controlled by the production system. 
He described two factors to explain his concept of society. 
The substructure represented the economic base or current 
mode of production in a society and consisted of two 
elements: the means and the relations of production. The 
"means" of production are the technology used to produce 
goods and services, for example, some societies hunted, 
others farmed or used machines to produce needed items. The 
second element is the "relations" of production -- the 
specific relations developed because of the particular 
technology utilized by a society. Relations are created 
between workers, workers and authority, and workers and 
owners (Giddens and Held, 1982). 
The economic base influences the political 
organization, relations, family structure, and various 
ideologies or rationalizations for certain actions in 
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society. Marx referred to these products as the 
superstructure. In one particularly fitting comment, he 
notes that the class which "controls the material forces of 
society also rules the intellectual force". 
Marx saw class divisions based on man's relations to 
the mode of production. Those in control formed the ruling 
class and exploited the propertyless workers who have 
nothing but their labor to sell. One of the striking ways 
he described this exploitation is through his concepts of 
alienation and surplus value. The worker loses his ties to 
both the product and process of his labor because he has no 
control over these, forced into a position of remaining a 
wage laborer to maintain his existence. Work, in Marx's 
terms, "becomes another's activity." This form of labor 
produced by capitalism alienates man from nature, himself, 
and his very nature, which is to control his life. These 
conditions produce dominance by the owner and private 
property. 
Surplus value is a concept used by Marx to account for 
the reproduction of the worker as worker and the owner as 
owner. As mentioned above, the worker's labor power is sold 
as a commodity to produce goods which have a certain value. 
In Marx's view the value of labor is set by the time needed 
to produce something and this is equal to the means of 
subsistence required to maintain the worker. But the owner 
saw that he would extract more than the value of the product 
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__ the cost of material and wages. Any extra value 
remaining became surplus value or profits for the owner to 
produce more capital. Thus, the worker is exploited because 
of his relation to the mode of production and the owner. 
Marx saw three classes in society based on the capitalist 
mode of production: wage laborer, capitalist, and landowner. 
He believed that each class received a specific type of 
revenue from a differentiated source. The worker received 
wages from selling his labor power; the capitalist obtained 
surplus value (profits) from his capital (machinery); and 
the landowner received rent from his property. 
one of the important concepts Marx used to explain 
change, class struggle, and the transformation of capitalism 
into socialism is the notion of contradictions found in the 
capitalist economic system. He described a number of 
contradictions to explain change and predict the end of 
capitalism. Although capitalism is based on "private 
appropriation", it is the "most socialized form of order" 
found in society, because the structure of capitalism 
requires cooperation and dependence on one hand, as it 
attempts to steer itself, while dependent on the worker. 
The fluctuating nature of the capitalist economy results in 
large firms expanding during depressions at the expense of 
small firms. As capitalism expands, it produces more 
concentration, undermining individual business competition. 
Alongside these processes, we find workers developing an 
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awareness of their position and of the disparity between the 
material conditions and existing unequal relations. The 
very nature of capitalism creates common interests for 
workers, transforming them into a class for themselves, thus 
intensifying class struggles, and hastening the end of 
capitalism (Fischer and Sirianni, 1984). 
To briefly summarize Marx's view of inequality or who 
gets what and why, the main determinant is one's relation to 
the dominant mode of production. If one owns property and 
capital, he/she is on top in the capitalist structure. You 
control the means and relations of production and use the 
workers as a commodity bought by wages. Workers are in the 
bottom class with nothing to offer but their labor for a set 
wage, no longer controlling either the process or product of 
their work. Since the owners are the ruling class, their 
ideas are the dominant ones. This stratification system, 
created by capitalism, will be changed due to the internal 
contradictions of capitalism, producing greater worker 
solidarity and growing class struggle until capitalism is 
replaced by the classless society of socialism, placing the 
worker in power in a situation of collective ownership. He 
held that profits, created by surplus value, maintain the 
system until economic crisis strikes. 
Marx's work is important to organizational theory 
because it provided many of the original arguments used by 
many post-Weberian writers (Edwards, 1979,1984; Rothschild-
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Whitt, 1979; Fischer & Sirianni, 1984; Benson, 1977; Ouchi, 
1982) to attack the ideal-type, bureaucratic-rational model 
that Weber developed. Organizations represent microcosms of 
the inequality found in society. The bureaucratic model 
describes and uses concepts like hierarchy, authority, and 
rules, while Marx's critical view provides the basis for 
exposing the inequality of most organizations and the 
reasons for differences in power. His ideas provide a 
framework to understand that evaluation, although presented 
as a reward and developmental tool, is a device to control 
workers and maintain inequality because it is a process of 
judgment welded by the powerful over the less powerful. The 
dominant means of production -- capitalism -- produced the 
values and relations among workers to accept the management 
device of evaluations to decide who is contributing the most 
to company goals (e.g., profit-making). 
Weber 
Weber's contribution to understanding organizations is 
usually associated with his work on bureaucracy, but I 
placed this work in the broader framework he used to 
describe stratification or inequality in society. His model 
included the features of class, status, and party, which 
represent or are products of the distribution of power in 
society. For Weber, "class is an objective feature of 
economic relations based on property relations" (Giddens and 
Held, 1982). He informs us that classes are groups of 
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individuals who share similar life chances in work and other 
exchange relations. In his view people have skills that are 
treated like commodities and exchanged on the market. So 
competition in the market influences life chances -- access 
to and use of resources -- and favors owners over workers, 
who only have their labor to sell; although free in the 
legal sense, workers are forced to exchange skills in the 
market. As society requires more complex skills due to 
industrialization, one's life chances may improve if one 
possesses the required skills, or decline if these are 
missing. 
Weber saw status as a set of circumstances or 
opportunities affecting someone because of a group's or 
community's "social estimation of honor". Status does not 
have to be linked with class and both those with or without 
property could belong to the same status group. status was 
expressed in specific cultural "styles of life" expected of 
people in various positions and is usually based on 
education, heredity or occupational prestige. Under this 
variable, people are ranked according to honor or lifestyle. 
The leader of a community group might have prestige in his 
group, but little property or economic influence. 
For Weber classes are stratified according to their 
relations to production and acquisition of goods, whereas 
status groups are ranked by their consumption of goods, seen 
in various lifestyles. Even though status appears to hold a 
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powerful position in his model, the economic conditions, as 
with Marx, are the primary variables affecting life chances 
and status. Weber also recognized that technology and 
economic change threatened the status order and pushed the 
impact of class to the foreground. Kerbo (1983) pointed out 
that status is more important to the primitive, hunting and 
gathering societies who often honored the best hunter. As 
societies developed more complex modes of production, status 
took a back seat to economic conditions. 
The third element in Weber's model and more relevant to 
the present study is party or power for action created by 
the association of individuals into political groups or 
organizations. Parties are only possible in groups with 
rational order and members ready to enforce it. These 
political associations can present class, status, or mixed 
types of interests. Parties reflect the stratification 
formats of the communities they exist in or the structure of 
domination in society. The important features of party are 
law, power, and organization or rational order. Besides 
political parties, these elements most effectively reside in 
the bureaucratic form of organization as a form of control. 
Weber's discussion of bureaucracy is linked to his views on 
capitalism. For him the most important feature of 
capitalism is "the rationalized nature of capitalist 
production," which focuses on setting goals and using 
technology to control nature to meet goals and solve 
problems. 
weber saw the growth of bureaucracy as a unavoidable 
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aspect of the rationalized nature of capitalist society. He 
stressed that it is a means of domination and control which 
is almost impossible to stop. The structure of capitalism 
needed the bureaucratic form of organization to meet 
production goals and control workers. Weber saw the effects 
of bureaucratic form extending beyond industry into all 
types of organizations: schools, churches, banks, insurance 
companies. The result is the "expropriation of the worker" 
from his task -- he loses control over product and 
especially process. 
Also, Kerbo noted above that, historically, Weber's 
three variables had varying significance during different 
periods. Class is mores important in the early stages of 
capitalism; status is mores evident in caste societies; and 
power is most important in modern societies in the form of 
bureaucracy. According to Weber, one has various 
opportunities or life chances because of any or all of the 
following: class based on skills and exchange in market 
for use by dominant means of production in society; status -
- social honor due to occupation, education, or heredity 
which may conflict with market structure of class; and party 
-- the power generated by one's position in the dominant 
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organizational form, bureaucracy, which maintains capitalism 
bY controlling output and the worker. 
The implications of Weber's model for understanding 
evaluations is that economic factors, status judgments, and 
forms of organization affect the power, stratification, and 
life chances of individuals. People are not expected to 
have equal amounts of these variables in Weber's model, thus 
some means to determine individual or group variations in 
contributions becomes critical and problematic for 
organizations. 
Michels 
Michels, a Weber contemporary, provided a number of key 
insights into the factors that produced oligarchy -- a form 
of management produced by large organizations. He grounded 
his argument in historical conditions that led poor, 
working-class people to form unions as a way to protect 
themselves from difficult working conditions. Union 
organizations helped workers, but due to size, cannot 
adequately represent workers' interests without some form of 
delegation. As the duties of leaders become more 
complicated and the need for special skills and knowledge 
increased, leaders became more professional, are less likely 
to come from the rank and file, and produced a separation 
between leaders and followers. 
Michels contends that the very existence of large 
organizations produced oligarchy -- leadership by a few 
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and less democracy, a principle that provided the basis for 
equal representation of the union members. Once 
professional leaders become established, the "conservative 
tendencies" of organizations keep them in place. Leaders 
represent a closed caste; make special arrangements which 
exclude the masses from their former condition of self-
management; worry about being replaced; and develop 
strategies to keep new leaders out of office. Michels' main 
point about organizations is that they produced leaders to 
manage them and, in the process, leaders organize themselves 
and their own interests. The "masses" tolerate the 
arrangement and, being passive, allow the leaders' ideas to 
represent the concern of the workers. He argued that the 
main cause of oligarchy is the organization's need for 
leadership. The stages of the leadership process become 
progressively more rigid, so that which leaders who 
initially arose spontaneously, become professional and 
finally entrenched and irremovable. 
In a study of ways in which unions can become more 
democratic, Nyden {1985) offered Michels' views as one 
explanation for the forces operating against democracy in 
organizations. Leaders used self-serving practices that are 
contrary to the political interests of members. The 
structure of the organization and passivity among the masses 
are two reasons for leadership of many by a few. Michels' 
work highlights various sociological factors like 
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organizational size and the resulting specialization which 
also produces the need for special leader skills and 
knowledge. Michels also noted the means used by leaders to 
maintain their positions. This type of analysis gave 
researchers clues to look for the influence of structural 
conditions (size of unit) and arrangements to maintain 
practices, such as those used in performance evaluations. 
some questions flow from his theory: How does size of the 
organization influence methods to appraise performance? Are 
there arrangements that maintain features of evaluations 
while concealing employees' true performance or produce 
results that are contrary to stated organizational goals? 
B. Rational, Natural, and Open Models of Organizations 
Historically, attempts to explain organizations as 
instruments for attaining goals (Scott, 1981) by means of 
formalized rules and were independent of the individual's 
personal attributes. The idea is to make action predictable 
through a visible structure that reduces tensions between 
roles, and allows for orderly succession to jobs. 
The rational model is strongly identified with Weber's 
work on bureaucracy as an administrative model to control 
large and growing organizations. A number of features 
illustrate this model and signal it as an organizational 
form quite different from traditional types. The 
bureaucratic model has the following features: rules to 
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regulate activity; specific job qualifications; a hierarchy 
containing levels of graded authority tied to position; 
decisions based on goals and written documents; separation 
of an official's private and office lives; specialized 
knowledge; formal decision-making rules determined by rank; 
wages based on rank and service; and the use of paid, full-
time professionals who had technical competence to replace 
feudal and patrimonial privileges. Weber noted that 
bureaucracy is almost impossible to destroy because of its 
capacity to lock people into positions due to specialization 
of work, rules and regulations, and impersonality of the 
structure. 
In addition to Weber's contribution, Scott includes 
under the rational-closed era Taylor's Scientific Management 
paradigm in which tasks are analyzed (measured and timed) to 
achieve the maximum amount of production, and people are 
motivated strictly by economic incentives. In the rational 
perspective the structural features are tools to realize 
ends and give a good deal of attention to specification of 
goals and formal rules. The structure symbolizes order, 
with an emphasis on control, featuring centralized decision-
making, as the way to achieve goals. The rational model, 
however, ignores both the environment, stressed by Pfeffer's 
resource-dependency model (1978), and the actual behavior 
produced by the formal structure examined by the human 
relations paradigm. 
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The Human Relations model became popular following 
Mayo's research into the link between working conditions and 
productivity at Western Electric's Hawthorne Works during 
the 1920s and 1930s. What began as a "rational" study, 
produced the unanticipated finding that people do not act as 
rational economic actors, but are driven by feelings 
generated through work relations and settings. People 
behaved as members of social groups with informal (contrary 
to formal structure or rules) status hierarchies and 
leadership patterns (Scott, 1981). The organization is seen 
as a self-maintaining system which needed to satisfy both 
internal support goals, and output, rational goals. Under 
this model, Homans studied group process, while Likert 
examined leadership patterns. There is a emphasis on 
building a team to improve output and a movement to change 
the organization. A great deal of supervisory skills 
training is introduced to better understand the worker and 
reduce alienation. (Scott, 1981) 
Hill (1981) felt that the Human Relations school is a 
reaction to the effects of technology on social relations. 
Conflict would disappear if people would feel a part of the 
company community. Factors like specialization and 
restricted interaction on the assembly line led to low 
morale (Chinoy, 1952). Studies by the Tavistock Institute 
about the effects of technology on social relations 
indicated that people became more productive if tasks are 
satisfying and less fragmented (Trist, 1976). 
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The Human Relations school is linked to the Durkheimian 
tradition with its concern for community and attempt to end 
the anomic work conditions created by technology. But 
instead of changing the work organization, Human Relations 
writers made efforts to create a value system which fostered 
a sense of community, including building teams through group 
incentive programs and establishing employee counseling 
departments. This model fits into a larger framework called 
the Open Systems perspective, where the organization 
interacts with the environment, monitors boundaries and 
imports resources from the environment (Scott, 1981). There 
is a close connection between the state of the environment 
and that of the organization. In fact Lawrence and Lorsch 
argue in their Contingency Theory Model (Daft, 1986) that 
the best way to organize departments depended on the 
environment. Because the environment varies so much, 
organizations develop departments with differentiated 
features, resulting in a greater effort to integrate the 
parts. A variation of the Open Systems framework, Population 
Ecology, explains the success or failure of organizations on 
how well they find a "niche" in the environment and meet a 
need through its present form (Daft, 1986; Scott, 1981). 
This model offered a sharp contrast to the rational 
model because goals are generated by the environment and not 
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by the organization's objectives and desires for efficiency. 
oecision-making is no longer as rational and quantified as 
previously thought. Decisions are now better explained 
they match organizational realities -- by the "garbage can 
model" where problems, solutions, and resources float freely 
within the organization. Some problems will eventually link 
with resources to solve them, but others never will be 
solved. Resources are wasted waiting for a special problem 
to benefit from them (Cohen & March, 1972). This concept 
questions the myth, generated by the rational model, that 
any problem is solvable given enough time and resources. 
c. Power Paradigm 
Critical View 
From the mid-1970s to the present, researchers looked 
critically at the rational model. Their attacks pointed out 
what is missing in the rational perspective and what the 
power or "critical" approach offered as an alternative. 
Benson's (1977) new approach to organizational analysis 
questioned the production of organizational "realities" like 
goals, technology, and structure instead of taking them for 
granted. Researchers are not to ignore the processes (e.g., 
conflict, negotiations) that produced variables like an 
organization chart. Benson also saw power as an essential 
issue which produced other organizational features. He 
agreed with Pfeffer that the structure is an expression of 
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power, both inside and outside the organization. The 
rational model studied the orderly patterning of structural 
features like specialization, centralization, and 
formalization, as subject, while the power perspective 
viewed these same elements as a means of social control and 
not a neutral method for goal attainment as the rational 
model argued. 
In rejecting the Weberian model, Goldman & Van Heuten 
(1977), described five deficiencies of the rational model 
addressed in the power paradigm. studies discuss the 
history or the ways an organization has changed. Variables 
like social class {inequality) and conflict are not 
excluded. A political-economy perspective is used instead 
of emphasizing micro-analysis, which focused only on the 
work unit. Studies take a working-class instead of a 
capitalist perspective, and finally analysis is dialectical, 
revealing change through conflict and struggle. 
Another recent attack on the current state of 
organizational theory (Fischer and Sirianni, 1984) offered 
the "critical" or power paradigm as a viable research 
alternative. Organizations are more than instruments for 
getting work done, but are means for seeking personal, 
group, or class interests. Managers set the conditions where 
production is controlled and distributed to determine what 
is made and who receives it to meet economic and social 
interests. According to the authors, Braverman argued that 
36 
production wasn't arranged to achieve efficiency, but to 
help managers prevent workers from controlling their own 
work. Fischer and Sirianni contend that a number of themes 
divided the critical perspective from the rational theories. 
They opposed an elitist theory of organizations which 
defined managers as the most valuable members of the unit 
and devalued workers. Next they called attention to class 
conflict because the rational model assumed that 
corporations and workers shared similar interests which 
maintained the status quo. The third area involved the 
limited analysis the rational model afforded to power. 
Rarely is this topic seen as "domination or coercion", but 
that's what a hierarchy of positions, control by rules, and 
a monopoly of knowledge produced. Their fourth factor called 
for examining power, conflict, and control in their specific 
social, political, and historical contexts. In the rational 
models, organizations seemed to evolve by a gradual, natural 
process of technological and managerial forces, concealing 
the decisions of the dominant coalitions, generally the 
managers. The final area called for a new research 
methodology, using case studies, historical analysis, action 
research, and participant observation to move from the 
belief that there is one best structure or process for all 
organizations. 
The comments of the above three groups illustrates the 
contributions of the power paradigm. Attention is focused 
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on the social and historical context, the political-economy, 
class interests, and research methods, which are areas not 
taken seriously before. The power approach has opened up 
organizational research and questioned many taken-for-
granted assumptions of the rational model. 
The power paradigm complements the human relations 
school, but tends to greatly limit the rational model by 
pointing out major shortcomings. Power and human relations 
positions share a number of core values which allows them to 
support each other. In neither case are people seen as 
purely rational and autonomous, economic actors, but as 
influenced by internal and external forces. The human 
relations school accounted for members creating and then 
reacting to an informal system. Similarly environmental 
forces cause realignment of structure to match changes in 
dominant coalitions (Pfeffer, 1978). Also both models are 
concerned with survival: the human relations school reveals 
employees forming cliques and informal leaders, using work-
saving methods to survive the formal, rational system; the 
power school demands knowledge of the environment 
(political-economy) to alter structures to adapt to change 
and survive. Both of these paradigms used a variety of 
research methods including case studies, document review, 
observation, and interviews. Mayo's Hawthorne studies and 
Salancik and Pfeffer's (1974) study of resource allocation 
and power at a university used similar methods. Finally 
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both perspectives, based on empirical data, seem to reflect 
organizational realities better than the rational model . 
.a_tructural Influences 
using rational approaches, structures are patterns of 
relations among positions, used to produce certain goals. 
For Pfeffer (1978), structure reflected the outcome of power 
struggles and conflict resolutions. Power comes from the 
formal authority of one's position; control over resources; 
access to key information; and the ability to cope with 
critical organizational needs and reduce uncertainty from 
environmental factors like competitors and government 
regulations. In explaining structures, Pfeffer argued that, 
unlike the rational model where structures and subunits are 
designed to meet certain goals, power struggles and conflict 
resolutions involving coalitions produce a particular 
structure. For him structure is clearly the result of a 
political process and not the result of a rational goal-
setting process (Pfeffer, 1978). It shows the pattern of 
control over resources, authority, and decision-making. 
Pfeffer {1978) also addressed the organization's 
requirement to manage interdependence -- the need for 
workers with different jobs to work together. For him 
structure -- the product of political contests -- managed 
interdependence through several means of organizational 
design. 
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1 Tasks and Role Specialization -- performing a n~rrow range of duties makes replacement easier and 
produces less power. Unique skills increases the power 
of a position. 
2. vertical Differentiation -- the number of levels or 
positions affects control because with fewer ranks, 
people have more control, where with more levels, 
control is lessened through information distortion. 
3. Horizontal Differentiation -- this concerns the 
number of departments where diffusion creates less 
power. 
4. Rules -- avoids conflict, builds patterns, makes 
actions legitimate and reflects past compromises. 
5. centralization -- refers to the degree that 
decision-making is concentrated in unit. In a cen-
tralized arrangement, problems are pushed up the 
organization to be handled by a higher rank. 
6. Recruitment -- control attained by selecting 
people who share similar values (Rothschild-Whitt, 
1979) . 
7. Socialization -- devices like training programs, 
and media are used to teach new employees the organ-
ization's values and expected ways of behaving. 
(Pascale, 1984) 
Mills (1959) took a macro-level view of power when he 
defined the "Power Elite" as the top leaders from the 
corporate, military, and political spheres who interacted to 
maintain the status quo. One process he noted is the common 
nature of executive skills which allowed the elites to 
transfer between spheres. An admiral can also be a banker, 
linking two of the three elite groups. 
Brass (1984) used a structural analysis to study the 
relation between position and influence. He defined power 
using earlier research: control of resources (Salancik & 
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pfeffer, 1977); centrality -- access to resources; 
criticality -- being irreplaceable (Mechanic, 1962; Pfeffer, 
197s), and found that criticality is strongly related to 
influence. 
Kanter's (1977) study of the impact of structures on 
variables like attitude, mobility, and power illustrated 
some key features of organizations. An individual's power 
is a function of his/her position in the system, and the 
level of opportunity the positions commands. Those in 
opportunity positions with upward mobility are motivated to 
succeed, while those without opportunity withdraw and have 
lower aspirations. Her analysis confirmed that power rests 
on the ability to handle environmental domain problems, 
i.e., solve dependency problems and control relevant sources 
of uncertainty. Internally, power comes from doing 
something extraordinary, like taking a major marketing risk. 
Activities build power when they are visible and noticed by 
powerful people. Also the special, visible activity must be 
important or critical to the organization. 
Inequality Factors 
In describing his interactionist theory of deviance 
(also known as labeling theory) Becker (1973), commented on 
the effects of class differences. He contends that groups 
make rules which define situations, and determining what 
rules to enforce, what behavior is deviant, and who's 
labeled as an "outsider" are political decisions. Deviance 
41 
is then the infraction of some rule created by a dominant 
group in society. He notes there are variances in the 
application of the rules along class, ethnic, occupational 
and cultural lines. Who defines the situation is a question 
of political and economic power. For example, adults make 
rules for children; men make them for women; whites for 
blacks; the middle class for the lower class; and managers 
for subordinates. Rule-making and application reflect power 
differences between groups and between individuals. 
Kanter (1977) developed a structural explanation for 
the inequality women experience in her study. The small 
number of women in certain professional jobs produced a 
"token" status for women, causing them to be perceived 
mainly in their ascribed statuses of race, sex, and age. 
Since they are more visible due to small numbers, they held 
a larger share of attention during interactions. 
Differences are exaggerated and extremes emphasized. They 
are assimilated into the group through stereotypes, leading 
to further distortions. This visibility created a number of 
consequences. There are performance pressures due to less 
privacy, a belief that this particular woman represented all 
women, and undue attention to physical appearances instead 
of ability. Secondly, dominants exaggerated differences by 
teasing, making sexual innuendos, reacting to the content of 
jokes, and maintaining secrets about job performance to keep 
women isolated. Finally tokenism produced role entrapment, 
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distorting features to fit generalizations. Women are given 
the wrong identities and treated like secretaries, dates, or 
wives. They are often trapped in roles that men, the 
dominant group, can respond to, such as mother, seductress, 
pet and iron maiden. Kanter also noted that secretaries 
derived their status from their bosses, who often interacted 
with them as though they are husband and wife. All of these 
factors placed women in less powerful positions, but more 
stressful circumstances. 
Resource Allocation Impact 
In 1974 Salancik and Pfeffer conducted a study to 
determine which factors explained the funding allocation for 
graduate fellowships at the University of Illinois. They 
wanted to know why some departments had more money to spend. 
In brief they found the department's ability to provide 
resources to the larger organization accounted for its 
power. The most highly correlated resource for power is the 
department's ability to allocate resources such as acquiring 
grants and contracts. Power is based on the group's ability 
to provide resources for the organization, which are 
critical, important, and scarce. Their research also found 
that the department is willing to use more power to obtain a 
scarce and critical resource. Since the group's power 
increased when it acquired resources, success led to even 
more power resource delivery. Finally power increased when 
departments coped with environmental problems like 
investigations into research proposals. 
Rewards, Incentives, and Evaluations 
A number of studies described how individual rewards 
are allocated in a bureaucratic setting (Edwards, 1984). 
Edwards argued that the organization rewarded workers who 
showed three types of compliance behaviors: 
1. work rules orientation like concern with time, 
and attendance 
2. habits of predictability and dependability like 
self-control 
3. internalization of units goals and values, 
exhibiting leadership and commitment to culture 
Compliance with these criteria is enforced through 
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unequal distributions of rewards, because those who followed 
the rules are valuable. Edwards found that the incentive 
structure rewarded the above three control relevant factors 
and the traits fit different employee levels. Work at the 
lowest level (hourly) is controlled by explicit rules, while 
the middle group (white-collar clerical) is controlled by 
mutual expectations and self-control. The highest level 
(professionals, managers) is controlled by the lure of 
accepting the unit's values, "becoming one of them". 
Rewards are given to those who obeyed the rules. 
Other researchers have commented on evaluations, 
including Rothschild-Whitt (1979) who argued that 
collectivist units offered a larger variety of rewards than 
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bureaucratic organizations. There are flexible hours, 
personal use of company cars, and a chance to make decisions 
that affected them. Evaluations are influenced by 
supporting the value of community and rejecting the value of 
confrontation. 
Clark and Wilson (1961) argued that organizations 
distributed incentives to induce members to contribute 
activity. Cooperation and conflict are explained as 
competition for autonomy and resources, and all units use 
incentives as exchanges for contributions. There are three 
types of incentives available, which vary and fit different 
types of organizations: material -- money (e.g., business), 
solitary -- status (e.g., service oriented -- colleges), and 
purposive -- producing a good (e.g., protest, civil rights). 
Kipnis (1984) reported about the impact that 
routinizing technology has on managers' perceptions of 
workers. When technology routinized work, control of 
skilled activities and decision-making are transferred from 
people to machines. The worker loses bargaining power and 
skills, while managers control the work flow and become less 
dependent on the worker's skills. But an even larger 
consequence is that managers devalue the efforts of those 
doing routine jobs. Bosses directing these people saw them 
as less hard-working, loyal, and with less pride. They 
blamed ineffective performance on the worker's lack of 
motivation rather than a lack of ability. As the manager 
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gains power, influence tactics shift from request to 
demands. Bosses of non-routine employees rated themselves 
as having more influence than supervisors of those with 
routine tasks. Also the effective worker in a non-routine 
job gets higher ratings than his routine job based worker. 
success is credited to talent and skills more in non-routine 
settings. Kipnis argued that human adaptation to technology 
created new situations which shape social relations. 
Technology changed manager's perceptions about worker's 
contributions and in turn altered the manager-employee 
relationships. 
Another example of how the power paradigm affects 
evaluations comes from Etzioni's (1961) work on the link 
between organizational type and method of employee 
involvement. Coercive units like prisons force inmates to 
remain through control of rewards and punishments (Goffman, 
1961). Utilitarian types, such as corporations, use 
contract arrangements and normative units, like religious 
groups or political parties, use the person's identification 
with group's values. Each of these organizational types 
creates a unique set of manager-subordinate feelings. The 
coercive type produces reactions of dependence, anger, or 
loyalty; the utilitarian form engenders caution, concern 
with equity; and the normative type produces involvement, 
commitment, and dedication. 
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Scott and Dornbusch (1967) analyzed authority systems 
by evaluating actors' performance. Problems in the 
evaluation process make the authority system incompatible 
with actor's goal attainment, where evaluations are used to 
distribute unequal rewards. Performance is tied to the 
raters use of evaluations, and actors valued evaluations 
because they are linked to rewards. 
Evaluators have 4 tasks and 11 rights 11 in the process: 
1. allocate goals -- determine what should be done. 
2. set criteria -- specify desired performance, and 
which standards to use. 
3. sampling -- right to select segments of performance 
for evaluation. 
4. appraising -- right to decide how performance can 
be judged from sample; apply criteria to reach 
evaluation. 
The evaluation process supported the authority 
structure because authority (i.e., legitimated power) comes 
from the position of significant evaluators, whose actions, 
decisions, and judgments influence the distribution of 
rewards. They are "authorized" to make these decisions. 
An earlier study of bureaucracy (Blau, 1967) provided a 
functional analysis of the impact of statistical records, as 
a evaluation device, on behavior and relationships. Blau 
reported that written performance reports had a number of 
consequences. On the positive side from management's 
perspective, he noted that reports control behavior and 
improve performances as workers receive feedback and then 
seek to improve to obtain rewards; and improved the boss-
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subordinate relationship due to the written, visible nature 
of performance which is measured against bureaucratic 
standards and not the personal opinions of various 
supervisors. 
Blau noted a number of unexpected consequences from 
written records. Social relations between interviewers 
changed from cooperation to competition in making job 
placements, lowering productivity. The unit experienced 
"goal-displacement" where the means to improved performance 
(i.e., appraisals based on written records) became an end 
itself. Getting a good appraisal is more important than 
meeting the organization's goals of client placement. 
Emphasis is now on establishing a good set of performance 
records than in performing well. Blau found the behavior 
measured became the important behavior, so what is visible 
and easy to measure became what the agency treated as 
important behavior. Also interviewers did not like 
unrestricted observation of their work and they became 
afraid to try some techniques, which could aid placements, 
because they are afraid to fail and hurt their performance 
status. He also found that new supervisors are more lenient 
in applying standards because they hoped to establish a set 
of reciprocal, social obligations which could later 
effectively control workers. Blau's work illustrates the 
unexpected consequences of evaluation techniques and the 
methods workers used to handle this organizational force. He 
also demonstrated the importance of the variable of 
visibility, as others have (Kanter, 1977), in determining 
evaluation ratings. 
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Kanter's (1977) previously cited work on the impact of 
the numerical make-up of organizations on groups which are 
vastly under-represented "tokens" -- provided additional 
insight into the process of evaluations. She argued that 
the relative rarity of tokens is linked to various problems. 
Tokens got attention because they are noticed for being 
"different" from the dominants, resulting in polarization 
between tokens and dominants and the exaggeration of 
differences. It is more problematic for tokens to fit in 
because dominants employed stereotypes related to their 
social status. These perceptual factors caused a number of 
problems especially those related to performance pressures. 
Since their performances are more public, they had less 
privacy and mistakes became more widely known than those 
committed by dominants. Secondly, there is undue attention 
to their physical appearance (e.g., style of dress) rather 
than their ability. Tokens did not want to succeed too much 
because dominants looked bad. Faced with these conditions, 
tokens either try harder or limited their visibility, 
avoided events, kept a low profile, and avoided risks. The 
imbalance of numerical proportions in personnel 
configurations affected the appraisal outcomes for tokens. 
Their behavior is exaggerated, they are more visible, and as 
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a result their performance is misjudged or they changed 
behavior patterns to cope with the situation, took a low 
profile, and received a poorer evaluation because they are 
not meeting the unit's standards. Kanter effectively argued 
that structure influenced the interactions of the 
organization's members, producing negative consequences for 
some members' performance evaluations. 
Another attempt to explain evaluations (Caplow, 1964) 
compared different occupational groups on the basis of who 
evaluates, how evaluation occurs, and what is appraised. 
caplow pointed out that evaluations are done primarily by 
peers (professionals) , supervisors (bureaucratic 
organizations), and the public (bankers, political 
candidates). But he noted that in all jobs co-workers 
either directly evaluate or affect performance by imposing 
norms on acceptable performance, as in the Hawthorne studies 
where the work group decided how much skill workers could 
demonstrate. He also noted that some work (professionals) 
is performed by those whose contributions are seen as not 
interchangeable, while others (machine operators) used 
routine skills and are highly interchangeable. In the 
latter group, factors such as seniority, union activity, 
personal relations, and education played a more significant 
role in evaluation. Caplow's main point is that in no 
situations are evaluations based on skill or performance 
alone. Factors such as peers, social relations, ancestry, 
appearance, and age affected the objective judgement of a 
person's work performance and subsequent appraisal. 
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D· cultural Dimensions 
H.istorical Development of the Field 
corporate culture is a relatively new term that may 
have been coined by Ouchi (1982) when he compared the 
Japanese and American cultures and offered his Theory Z as 
an alternative. A number of journal articles referred to 
this field as "Organizational Culture" which broadens its 
application to all types of organizations. 
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An especially helpful article by Ouchi and Wilkins 
(1985), provided a historical framework to understand the 
development, major themes, and research trends of the field. 
They saw organization culture as a continuation of the main 
line of organizational sociology which focused on the 
normative bases and shared understandings that regulate 
social life. Studies revealed the tension over work 
examined explicit, i.e., prone to measurement, variables 
versus studies concerned with implicit, i.e., interpretive 
phenomenon. 
The field has its roots in anthropology following both 
the work of Radcliffe-Brown for his functionalist view and 
Geertz for his focus on language and symbols. The popular 
works (Ouchi, Deal and Kennedy) used the functionalist 
tradition, while Pandy, Smircich (1983), and Van Maanen 
(1976) are tied to the "semiotic" or language approach. 
Ouchi and Wilkins felt that several streams of 
sociological work influenced organizational culture. Under 
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the explicit vs implicit tension, a number of sociologists 
emphasized the everyday life aspect of organizations. 
Goffman felt there is more meaning here; Durkheim held that 
we know symbolic structure through myths and rituals; and 
Berger and Luckmann (1967) in describing the social 
construction of knowledge, supported the use of 
observational methods rather than statistics. 
studies of the 1950s and 1960s described the impact of 
informal relations on the formal structure. Although 
mainstream studies supported themes of rationality, symbolic 
interactionists focused on non-rational aspects. During the 
mid-1940s, Simon combined a belief in rationality with 
observations of "non-rationality" in a school system by 
stressing the limited information processing ability of 
people. For the next 20 years, from 1945-1965, the authors 
found the research continued to reveal tensions between both 
formal vs informal and explicit vs implicit issues. Case 
studies now took the researcher's point of view to explain 
how "irrational" behavior is rational. The beginnings of 
what would become organizational culture is forming in the 
non-rational, implied camp. The rational model is incapable 
of explaining all that occurred. During this period the 
growing use of computers and increasing popularity of 
multivariate analysis supported the view of organizations as 
rational. However, ethnographers and symbolic 
interactionists (Becker, Roy, Janowitz) produced some 
notable work in the sociology of occupations during the 
l950s and 1960s. 
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A major break occurred when Cohen & March (1972) 
observed the resistance of school systems to bureaucratic 
interpretations, including the idea that Simon's "bounded 
rationality" concept didn't capture the low level of 
rational features of school systems. They referred to this 
condition as "organized anarchies", naming the decision-
making process the "garbage can model". 
other studies followed (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) which 
described formal structure as nothing more than "myth and 
ceremony" detached from the real activities of actors. 
According to these researchers, organizations acted in 
conflict with the technical goals of efficiency. Various 
myths or unverified beliefs, reflecting environmental 
conditions, created organizational procedures and 
structures. This position is contrary to one that 
attributes causality to factors like the demands of the 
task, resulting in organizations that do not work like the 
blueprints used to design them. The authors argued that a 
number of conditions characterized large organizations: 
structure did not produce the desired activities; rules are 
often violated; inefficient methods continued to be used; 
and inspection and evaluation efforts are subverted. 
Structures reflected myths, i.e., the understanding of 
social life, which identified social purposes as technical 
54 
goals. Myths defined the appropriate functions, certified 
professionals, and established rules of practice. They made 
organizational programs, like appraisals, seem rational and 
necessary for efficiency goals. Structures are made to fit 
and accept the myths from the environment, and they 
explained work activities to internal and external actors, 
while myths revealed the shared understandings of the unit. 
Because organizations are closely linked the to 
environmental domains, they used external criteria of 
"worth" as a basis to determine the value of contributions 
to the production of the organization's goods and services. 
Success depended on factors beyond efficiency and Meyer 
and Rowan argued that if organizations match their 
environment, they had legitimacy and are successful. 
Another factor is the use of rules to promote trust and 
confidence in output and to buffer organizations from 
inspection. Rules can be in conflict with each other and 
the goals of efficiency, but their value comes from the 
appearances they generated for internal actors and external 
constituents. The gain in positive image from using a 
consultant, for example, counted more toward success than 
any real measurable gain in efficiency that the consultant 
could produce. 
The authors suggested that successful organizations 
handle conflicts by "decoupling" structure from activity 
where managers didn't see or make much of the performance of 
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professionals. There is also less emphasis on the 
measurement of results and evaluation practices are more of 
a ceremony than a device to measure efficiency. Goals are 
achieved through informal activities, and the willingness of 
actors, trying to make things work out. These last points 
are similar to other arguments for the utility of 
cooperative actions in organizations (Becker, 1982,1986). 
conflict between goals of efficiency and institutionalized 
myths are also resolved through building "confidence and 
good faith" among members. This is achieved through 
"ceremonial" management which used avoidance, discretion, 
and the overlooking of contradictions. Evaluation practices 
are minimized and inspection became a ceremony in order to 
protect the unit's ability to remain legitimate in terms of 
the environment's needs. 
Meyer and Rowan concluded that the drive toward 
organizational survival produced decoupling, rituals of 
confidence, and avoidances of inspection. Organizational 
actions and programs (e.g., like evaluations) must support 
environmental myths. To help achieve this, departments 
remained loosely coupled. 
Organizations are now seen as social phenomenon with 
its own features separate from the environment and desires 
of individual actors. Some researchers in schools of 
management moved away from statistics and sought new 
perspectives and techniques in studying community and 
occupational structures. According to Ouchi and Wilkins 
(l985), this break produced the study of organizational 
cultures around the 1970s. The study of informal 
organizations, initially a reaction to rationality, is 
transformed into the study of organizational culture. 
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Ouchi and Wilkins then addressed the contribution of 
social psychology to organizational culture. Studies in 
persuasion, the non-rational features of people, and the 
impact of stories in decision-making, supported the need for 
a new paradigm. The authors reviewed the current theory and 
research in organizational culture. The first body of 
theory is macro-analytic, which examined the functions of 
culture in maintaining the group. An example is the 
typology of rites used to fulfill social functions (Trice & 
Beyer, 1984). Researchers described the function of the 
pattern of beliefs, language and symbols in keeping order. 
The second body of theory, micro-analytic, saw culture as 
resident in each person and which is understood through 
sense-making processes. Under this more psychological 
approach, Schein (1984) viewed culture as the sum of what 
individuals have learned. 
The final section described empirical studies of 
culture, using a variety of methods, including: survey 
research, participant observation, ethnomethodology and 
symbolic interaction. Holistic studies include Van Maanen's 
work in the socialization of police recruits; semiotic 
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studies, focusing on language and symbolism, are represented 
by Barley's research of funeral directors efforts to make 
sense of their work; and quantitative studies, represented 
by ouchi & Johnson's work which used questionnaires to 
describe the differences in the cultures of companies "A" 
and "Z". 
Another attempt to define the theories of 
organizational culture is offered by Allaire and Firsirotu 
(1984) who argued that culture is a sociocultural and 
ideational system. The first system had four branches of 
emphasis which the authors linked to various organizational 
theories. In the functionalist branch, culture is a means 
for a person to cope with the unit's problems. In the Human 
Relations tradition, it is concerned with the fit between 
the organization's and member's needs. 
The structural-functionalist branch provided an 
adaptive means for people to live a social life as an 
ordered community. Organizations are systems with goals and 
needs. The ecological branch saw culture as a system of 
socially transmitted behavior relating groups to their 
settings. Organizations took varied forms as they adapted 
to the environment and are selected in or out of existence 
by ecological circumstances. Here we find use of 
contingency and population ecology theories. The last 
branch is the historical where culture is produced by the 
time, circumstances and place of the unit's birth. 
stinchcombe's work on the permanent nature of some 
organizations fits here, as well as Pettigrew's (1979) 
description of the origin and development of an 
organization's culture due to the impact of its founder. 
The notion of culture as a system of ideas also has 
four parts, and this set of theories locates culture in 
shared meanings, symbols, values and organizational 
knowledge. These variables are seen as separate from and 
not in agreement with the social system's structure. 
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The first branch is the cognitive, where culture is a 
system of knowledge, containing what one has to know and 
believe in to operate in an acceptable manner. studies on 
organizational climate and learning are found here. The 
structuralist branch is the second part and held that 
organizational forms and processes are social manifestations 
of widespread and unconscious processes of the mind. Schein 
(1984) touched on this area when he wrote about the degrees 
of knowing a culture based on artifacts and assumptions. 
The third branch of ideational theories saw culture as a 
mutual-equivalence structure -- systems of cognitions 
(knowing) which allowed people with different orientations 
to organize and participate in the community. Weick's 
position that interrelated behavior produced collective 
structures to meet personal needs and Etzioni's (1961) 
identification of participant's commitments to the 
organization fit here. 
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The symbolic school is the final branch, taking an 
interpretive view of culture as a system of shared meanings 
and symbols, where humans act in "webs of significance" they 
created. Symbols are the raw material for interpreting the 
ordered system of meaning in interactions. This branch is 
further divided into three perspectives. The action 
perspective held that organizations are the result of a mix 
of variables including their birth, history, context, and 
technology. Pettigrew (1979), as mentioned before, 
contended that the organization's founder and its history 
created culture in the form of symbols, language, beliefs, 
and myths. The interpretive action perspective emphasized 
the unit's history, the dominant actor's definition of the 
situation, and sense-making activities. The last 
perspective is ethnomethodology where organizations had no 
external reality, but are "social creations emerging from 
actors making sense out of ongoing streams of actions". The 
focus is on how individual actors made sense out of events 
in the organizational setting. 
An interesting note on the symbolic branch is that this 
dimension is "not necessarily coordinated, consonant, or 
synchronized with the formal structures, goals, or 
management processes" (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984). 
The authors found three contributing to culture: 
1. Ambient society's values 
2. Organization's history and leadership 
3. Contingency factors like environment and 
technology. 
The theories they reviewed focused on different parts 
of the social system. First, culture as a construct found 
in values, myths, and artifacts. Secondly, culture as a 
study of individual actors, defining situations and 
constructing reality, Finally, culture as a set of shared 
constructions about an organization and how to act in it. 
Their view of the field pointed out an often ignored 
aspect: there may be a tension between the formal, 
structural part of a unit and its symbolic, cultured side. 
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When markets or technology changed, the organization adapted 
by altering goals and structures, but these efforts are 
unsuccessful because the unit's cultural system (e.g., 
values, and myths) are not congruent with the revised 
social-structural system, producing coping problems. 
Trist's study of the social effects of changing coal-mining 
technology illustrated this point (Trist, 1976). 
The conceptual framework presented contained 3 parts: 
the sociocultural, dealing with structure, policies, control 
and rewards; the cultural, covering the expressive and 
affective dimensions in shared symbols found in myths, 
values and artifacts (e.g., rites, stories); the actors, who 
experienced the organization and made sense of the events. 
In their conclusions, Allaire and Firsirotu distilled 
the theoretical considerations into a few definitive 
concepts. Organizations are social creations and at the 
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same time, creators of social meaning. The classical 
literature defined organizations as mainly sociocultural 
with the cultural part assumed to agree with the structure. 
In the final view, culture is a system of symbols, shaped by 
society, the organization's history, its leaders, and 
modified by actors making sense of events. This statement 
succinctly linked the elements of the authors' three part 
framework. 
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~ultural Variables 
corporate culture is useful in the study of 
organizations because it focused on factors usually 
overlooked, taken-for-granted, considered unimportant, or 
not seen as legitimate areas of research. The relatively 
new field looked at implied, interpretative, non-rational 
features like decision-making and found new explanations: 
assumptions and stories are used more than measurable, hard 
data. Through the concept of culture, the life of an 
organization became an appropriate research topic. This 
produced new data concerning symbols, rites, stories, and 
beliefs, and led to questioning the underlying assumptions 
of bureaucratic groups to uncover how processes really 
occurred, instead of taking events for granted. The field 
introduced new metaphors to replace those of the 
organization as merely a machine or organism, leading to 
deeper research insights into the meaning of myths, 
language, and stories. The field has also helped legitimate 
and validate symbolic interaction and ethnomethodology as 
research approaches. One of the most significant 
contributions is its ability to organize and integrate a 
variety of other paradigms, such as power, ecological, and 
human relations. These seemingly diverse schools appeared 
relatively comfortable under the organizational culture 
umbrella. 
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ftociological Perspectives 
Smircich (1983) discussed how the concept of culture is 
significant for studying organizations, concluding that 
various concepts of culture carried different assumptions 
and produced diverse research agendas. She held that the 
use of metaphors -- seeing one variable in terms of another 
-- in researching organizations frame and separate 
experience. Organizations are described as : machines 
instruments for tasks; organisms -- life-like bodies 
struggling for survival in changing environments; theaters -
- settings to perform roles and dramas, like union-
management negotiations; and political arenas -- settings to 
pursue and display power (Pfeffer, 1978). Each approached 
offered a different way of knowing the organization. 
She proposed 5 different "programs" of research to 
study organizational cultures. The first is comparative 
management where culture influenced beliefs in different 
countries. (Ouchi, 1982) The second program is corporate 
culture where the organization created a culture (i.e., 
rituals, beliefs), as a by-product, along with its formal 
goods and services (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Culture is viewed 
as social glue that kept the parts together, in which myths, 
stories, and language expressed beliefs. Here we find the 
popular notion, and a value of management, that culture is a 
tool to manage and change the organization to achieve 
rational goals. The third program saw culture as a metaphor 
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for seeing organizations, four of these comparisons are 
described above. The idea is to go beyond the traditional 
instrumental view and see organizations as systems of shared 
knowledge and beliefs. The task is to find rules, and 
research how members saw events. The symbolic perspective, 
the third part, depicted culture as a system of shared 
symbols and meanings where the task is to identify shared 
understandings that oriented social activity. The focus of 
research is on the way experience became meaningful. 
Manning's (1977) work on the world of police officers is 
offered as an example, and he showed how people interpreted 
their experiences and how this understanding is used to act. 
The structural and psychodynamic program is the final one in 
which culture is the expression of unconscious psychological 
processes, and organizational forms and practices are 
projections of unconscious processes. As noted earlier, 
Schein (1984) made a similar point in discussing levels of 
awareness in knowing culture. Smircich's point is that 
culture provided researchers with a device to frame the 
study of organizations differently from the machine and 
organism metaphors, focusing attention on subjective, 
interpretive aspects such as, language, and myths. 
In related research Pettigrew (1979) examined how 
organizations created and used culture. He employed a 
historical approach and found that a strong founder created 
symbols, beliefs and rituals which changed during "social 
As noted earlier, the concept of culture is applied to 
explain apparently irrational, unproductive behaviors. The 
authors described six rites used to research corporate 
culture. 
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1. Passage -- events that lead to change in role and 
status. The rite helps a person reestablish social 
relations. Army induction illustrates the stages of 
separation (haircuts), transition (new skills -- guns), and 
incorporation (awards). These activities socialize the 
recruit into new procedures and language (Goffman, 1961, 
1959) • 
2. Degradation -- used to remove high status people by 
focusing attention on person, discrediting by use of so-
called objective analysis, and public removal. This rite 
dissolves identities and power. 
3. Enhancement builds status and motivates through 
recognition and awards. 
4. Renewal -- energize existing social structure 
through meetings, team building, and QWL (Quality of 
Worklife) programs. It makes members feel something is 
being done about the problem, but in cases like QWL, more 
conflict is generated over union reactions (Rinehart, 1984; 
Parker & Hansen, 1983). 
5. Conflict Reduction -- inequalities in authority and 
resources produce conflicts which can be disruptive. 
Bargaining and arbitration present demands used to disguise 
parties' real position. Fights and late sessions symbolizes 
resistance, but they actually reflect cooperation. Another 
rite is to form a committee or task force to hear problems. 
Use of agendas and minutes bring sense of order to 
proceedings. 
6. Integration -- use of parties, picnics to lessen 
social distance, and professional conferences to support the 
myth that people are learning important concepts, provide 
opportunities for divergent groups to interact more. 
Trice and Beyer thought rites led to a "web of meaning" 
about organizations because cultural variables are linked to 
other organizational variables. They had clear beginning 
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and ending points and are observable, making them easy to 
study. Rites also aided the study of change because they 
worked to block change by preserving social life; remained 
operative where there is agreement on values; and expressed 
the beliefs of dominant elites. The authors made a clear 
and convincing case for using rites to study organizations. 
As the discussion showed, researchers studied 
organizational culture from two main approaches: 
sociological which dealt with the purpose of structures and 
processes, and symbolic which focused on shared meanings and 
attempts to interpret the organization's activities. 
Methods tended to be qualitative (e.g., interviews, and 
observation). Some approaches saw culture as a tool to 
manage the unit as it dealt with the environment. Of all 
the contributions the field of organizational culture made, 
one stood out in sharp contrast to the rational model: the 
exposure of non-rational, implied, everyday life occurrences 
that proved interesting and brought the field of 
organizational studies to life. 
Management Perspectives 
A number of researchers produced works which received 
wide acclaim from business leaders. These studies usually 
did not meet the demands of more rigorous academic journals. 
They fall into the area of "pop" sociology because they 
treated current issues in a popular, easy-to-read style 
without technical jargon or a strong theoretical base. 
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Another feature distinguished them: they framed cultural 
concepts, rationally, as tools to manage the business, solve 
problems, and cope with the environment. 
A number of recent books appealed to business leaders 
for their practical advice. Peters and Waterman (1982) 
described traits discovered when they compared successful to 
less successful U.S. companies. One of the factors 
responsible for successful companies is their unique set of 
cultural attributes which adapted values and practices of 
leaders whose role is to manage these values. The authors 
faulted rational models for using too much planning and too 
little action. People are influenced by stories, a cultural 
variable, more than empirical data. Leaders defined 
situations, explained and changed symbols, and gained 
employee commitment. Strong cultures are associated with 
successful companies where stories, slogans, and legends are 
employed to convey the organization's shared values, which 
then guided action in the unit. The organization is 
conceived of as "a body of meaning" that must be managed. 
Culture is seen as a management tool to regulate variables 
and provide meaning for core business purposes. These 
notions fit the functional approach of the sociocultural 
perspective, although this framework is not employed for 
business leaders who, surely after reading In Search of 
Excellence, are oriented toward practical action plans. 
Successful companies had clear values that are known to 
members through leaders and heroes. Corporate culture 
called for risk-taking and accepted some failure, thus 
promoting innovation and creativity. 
Pascale (1984) wrote about the need to assimilate new 
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employees into the organization's culture, describing steps 
of socialization as a "how to" guide. He felt the process 
produced cooperation and conformity, allowing the 
organization to work effectively. Some of these steps 
included: 
1. Use of a rigorous selection process so candidates 
would know the unit's values. 
2. Experiences to induce humility, question old 
values, and accept new norms. 
3. Measure results and reward accordingly to promote 
the group's values. 
4. Use of stories to teach code of conduct. 
5. Role models to teach promising people successful 
behavior. 
Pascale said that U.S. companies used formal controls 
to obtain order and culture to manage ambiguity, reduce 
anxiety, and guard against outside threats. A clear culture 
helped in the formation of rules and understanding, and 
career paths revealed what is important and required to 
succeed. Culture is again conceptualized as a tool to 
manage, and this time it is anxiety which had to be 
controlled. Its existence is assumed and its purpose is 
taken-for-granted. Although no broad framework is 
described, culture served a functional purpose. 
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In the past several years a number of Business Week 
articles dealt with corporate culture. In Byrne's (1985) 
article about the shift in management approaches at People 
Airlines by the top man, Burr, due to economic problems, 
there is only a brief reference to the "family culture" that 
People had before environmental conditions forced change. 
The culture at People used a participatory management style, 
employee-ownership, a flat structure, and job rotation, 
which all changed when traffic growth failed to keep up with 
Burr's projected growth in routes and schedules. Culture is 
presented as an invisible, taken-for-granted factor that is 
changed by the leader's reaction to the environment. 
A second article, "Changing a Corporate Culture" (1984) 
dealt with Johnson and Johnson's move to more sophisticated 
technology markets and desire to change its management style 
and culture. The arrangement required more autonomy, 
willingness to make mistakes, and more cooperation between 
units. The company's tradition called for independence but 
now cooperation is needed. To change this, more employees 
are moved between companies (cooperation) and information is 
now exchanged. The article pointed out the need to change 
the culture when markets or products changed. In this case 
culture is viewed as a set of procedures for doing business. 
As discussed earlier, structures may change but cultural 
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practices may not match, causing coping difficulties and the 
inability to support the system. The article is presented 
as a successful case of change, but no information on the 
cultural aspect is developed (Trist, 1976). 
The final article described efforts by General Motor's 
chairman, Roger smith, to change GM's culture where there is 
a need to merge Hughes Aircraft with GM. Smith wanted to 
cut GM's hierarchy and push decision-making down, while 
using participatory management. There is a conflict between 
the two cultures because GM is not a dynamic or risk-
oriented. Managers felt tension trying to cope with 
changes, again indicating that cultural values are not 
necessarily consonant with new structures. The Engineering 
group at my location is in a similar situation. There are a 
number of structural and hierarchical changes, but people 
still related to supervisors as though they occupied their 
former ranks. Also decision-making did not take place any 
lower in the group than before because the reward structure 
still valued success and not failure. Risk-taking is not 
rewarded and decisions are still pushed to the top. The 
article did not adequately explain the concept of corporate 
culture. It is a way of doing business, found in the 
reporting structure while culture represented a wider 
reality. 
Deal and Kennedy (1982) wrote a popular, readable and 
useful book on Corporate Culture. They stressed the impact 
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of strong cultures (i.e., values) on high performance, and 
the uses of heroes and rituals to pass on beliefs and build 
conunitment. A clear indication that this book is intended 
to help management included the authors four reasons why it 
is important to understand culture: 
1. It provided ways to manage 
2. Systems of informal rules saved time 
3. People understood the setting, felt better and 
worked harder 
4. Culture provided standards, so people saw what 
skills are needed to succeed. 
They also described four kinds of cultures which had no 
relevance to anything in the academic literature cited 
above. Their categories described "ideal" types of people 
and ways of coping that did not seem transferable to other 
organizations. Their groupings might work as a checklist of 
qualities to start a problem-solving discussion, but not for 
any serious organizational analysis. Managers had the 
responsibility of shaping culture, balancing conflicts, and 
teaching others about the uses of culture, which helped the 
organization respond to the environment. 
Shared Understandings 
Some perspectives took a cultural approach to 
explaining behavior such as problem-solving and decision-
making (Becker, 1986). Becker's views on what culture is 
and how it worked can easily be applied to organizations and 
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evaluations as a cultural product. For him, institutions and 
0 rganizations are the product of people doing things 
together. Shared understanding allows the concerted 
activity needed to do various tasks, including evaluations. 
These understandings are socially constructed, based on the 
consensus among participants. Members of the unit agree on 
the "rules" of the game, and this knowledge becomes a 
resource to coordinate action. It guides members to do 
"things" in line with their understanding of shared ideas, 
which result from interaction, persist and are reproduced 
after interactions as participants constantly refer to what 
is known as they solve problems. 
To work on organizational tasks, people must know 
procedures, and common ways to conceive of and respond to 
situations (Becker, 1986). This exact process can be applied 
to evaluations as a product. Managers know and use 
appraisal procedures from the past; they share a common body 
of knowledge regarding what is "good", "outstanding", or 
"poor" performance; and they use practices to obtain 
evaluation levels and communicate them to their 
subordinates. Becker also contributed to our understanding 
of evaluations as products of joint activity through his 
work on art worlds (Becker, 1982). He argued that art or, 
for my purposes, performance evaluations are the result of 
joint activity, involving the agreement of actors in a 
cooperative network. Art worlds or organizations use a 
division of labor involving the use of shared ideas, time, 
materials, conventions, and "rules of the game" to produce 
"art", or in my argument, performance appraisals. 
A key to this construction process is the use of 
"conventions" norms, rules, or agreements on how to do 
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things developed through interactions. These agreements 
guided actors (managers and subordinates) on how to produce 
an evaluation, its form (e.g., verbal or written with a 
number of variations), and the typical problems encountered. 
conventions also placed constraints on evaluations and 
indicate when the process is over (Becker, 1982). Just as 
moviegoers know when a film is over by various visual cues, 
subordinates know when an appraisal interview terminated by 
the summary remarks and body movements of the supervisor. 
Other aspects of culture involve language which is both 
a process within and a product of the culture which framed 
or constructed the world for the actors. Interactions 
produced and conveyed meanings of situations through the 
type of language used (Becker, 1982, 1986; Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967). Specialized types of talk -- accounts 
are ways to bridge the gap between expected and actual, 
unanticipated behavior (Scott & Lyman, 1968). Justifications 
are devices that described the act as less wrong than 
initial appearances, while excuses tried to convince the 
listener that the act is not completely the fault of the 
actor. Accounts depended on "background expectancies" or 
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socially distributed knowledge for their acceptability. 
These shared expectations allowed the development of a 
"vocabulary of accounts" which became routine within 
cultures. For example, organizations developed accounts to 
explain why certain members advanced while others remained 
at the same level. These accounts included blaming others 
in the unit, denying that anyone is hurt by an evaluation, 
and appealing the "fatalistic" nature of the appraisal 
system. 
Two other interesting aspects of accounts to control 
organizational settings are the status of the account-giver 
and the change in role identities caused by the process of 
producing accounts. Accounts worked if they are accepted 
but one's status mediated that acceptability. If one is in 
a superior position in the hierarchy, his/her account is 
less likely questioned by a subordinate, resulting in 
greater legitimacy for evaluation programs. Also for 
accounts to function, the actor is in some role recognized 
by each party. As the account process unfolded, the 
identities of actors are negotiated as they tried to 
maximize their gains and minimize their losses through the 
encounter. (Scott & Lyman, 1968) Accounts are used by both 
managers and workers to protect themselves -- save face --
and to maintain the system of shared expectations operating 
the organization. 
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Goffman (1959) contended that people are aware of the 
demands of the situation and attempt to manage how they 
presented themselves to favor their definition of the 
situation. Organizations are systems of constraint where 
actors manage or create their image to gain rewards in the 
system. Earlier Goffman (1952) explained the use of "face-
saving" or defensive strategies that individuals used to 
protect themselves from a loss of status, value, or a change 
in their image. This action is often necessary when an 
employee received an unfavorable performance evaluation, or 
a downgrade into a lower level job. The affected individual 
could assume a new role such as a medical student becoming a 
dental student. The person could also tell off the boss or 
present the situation to the grievance committee. It is 
also possible to withdraw commitment to goals, conceal 
information, "play it safe", or keep 11 2 irons in the fire" 
to lessen the impact of the loss. Goffman noted that some 
individuals refused to be "cooled" and continued to 
complain, performed less of the job, and sought to establish 
their own status. Organizations exhibited a range of 
acceptable "cooling out" techniques, similar to those 
developed by individuals, based on shared understandings of 
organizational practices, a series of strategies to save 
face in situations of failure. (Scott & Lyman, 1968) 
Turner (1960) noted that cultures stressed either 
"sponsored" (i.e., pre-selected, closed) or "contested" 
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(i.e., open) mobility rules in selecting candidates for 
admissions to schools. I applied the concept to 
organizations and how actors are selected for participation 
in the distribution of rewards, including promotions. 
Evaluation conventions (e.g., forms, meeting, lists, cells, 
and appraisal write-ups) are used to select workers, 
especially in "contested" mobility structures. 
The concept of "comparable worth" extended our 
understanding of the evaluation process by examining the 
relation between work or effort and income produced by that 
work. Mahoney (1983) looked at three schools of thought to 
develop the idea of comparable worth "a measure of 
individuals and work, a measure that in some way ought to 
dictate income". The first source is social philosophy 
which generated related concepts like "social comparison" 
and "distributive justice". Here people that are "equal in 
some critical sense ought to be treated equally", and 
earnings should equal contributions. The second background 
source is economics which defined comparable worth of people 
in terms of their value derived through marketplace 
exchanges. Buyers and sellers assessed the worth of 
exchanges, based on opportunity costs, and placed different 
values on the exchange. Mahoney noted disagreement in this 
theory, contending that the exchange process is not 
attainable because of political-economy barriers to 
"mobility, competition, and freedom of access and exchange". 
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certain groups like women and minorities may be denied entry 
to occupations, thus reducing competition in those jobs and 
increasing competition in other occupations. The third 
source to explain comparable worth came from administrative 
practices in organizations. Job evaluation techniques are 
the primary method to determine relative worth of different 
jobs within an organization. The job is studied to decide 
the relative worth of that position to the employer. The 
criteria are arbitrary and based on work inputs like needed 
skills, responsibility, and physical/mental demands. Work 
output is minimized in the analysis. 
Mahoney argued that the subjective social norms of 
justice, taste, and preference appear in all attempts to 
define worth. In his attempt to explain the concept, he 
mentioned the process of social consensus, which is related 
to the shared understanding or social construction 
approaches in explaining behavior or the way activities 
acquired meaning. From a power perspective, it is critical 
to note that the worth of a class of jobs or workers is 
defined by those in power positions, such as personnel 
specialists or managers who request certain types of jobs 
for their organizations. 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter addresses the issue of how the research 
problem was approached and the perspective used to study the 
myth and construction of performance evaluation. Below I 
describe my theoretical position, beliefs, and methods 
employed to produce the best results considering questions 
such as the research problem, purpose, type of 
organizational unit under study, and specific setting. In 
other words, this chapter addresses how I saw the social 
world and planned to collect and analyze data from this 
world. My theoretical approach to performance evaluations 
encompasses complimentary features from the following 
sociological perspectives: power/critical, social 
construction, and open systems. 
Power/Critical 
This view, described at length in the preceding 
literature review chapter, rejects the rational model, which 
has dominated much of the mainstream management literature, 
and seeks to examine the social forces that produce 
organizational variables like goals, technology, structure, 
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and appraisals instead of accepting them as givens (Benson, 
1977) . 
In rejecting the Weberian model, Goldman & Van Heuten 
(1977), describe five deficiencies of the rational model 
which would be addressed in the power paradigm. Studies 
discussed the history or the ways an organization changed 
where variables like social class (e.g., inequality) and 
conflict are now included. A political-economy perspective 
is used in place of an emphasis on micro-analysis which 
focuses only on the work unit. Studies take a working-class 
instead of capitalist perspective, and analysis is 
dialectical, revealing change through conflict and struggle. 
Another recent attack on the current state of 
organizational theory (Fischer and Sirianni, 1984) offered 
the "critical" or power paradigm as a viable research 
alternative. Organizations are viewed as more than 
instruments for getting work done and are means for seeking 
personal, group, or class interests. Managers set the 
conditions for the control and distribution of production to 
determine what is created and who receives it to meet 
economic and social interests. According to the authors, 
Braverman argued that production was not arranged to achieve 
efficiency, but to prevent subordinates from controlling 
their own work. 
Fischer and Sirianni contend that a number of themes 
divide the critical perspective from the rational theories. 
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These authors oppose an elitist theory of organizations 
which define managers as the most valuable members of the 
unit and devalue workers. Next, they call attention to class 
conflict because the rational model assumes corporations and 
workers share similar interests which maintain the status 
quo. The third area involves the limited analysis the 
rational model affords to the concept of power. Rarely was 
this topic defined as "domination or coercion", but that is 
the result of a hierarchy of positions, control by rules, 
and a monopoly of knowledge. Their fourth factor calls for 
examining power, conflict, and control in their specific 
social, political and historical contexts. In the rational 
models, organizations seem to evolve by a gradual process of 
technological and managerial forces, concealing the 
decisions of the dominant coalitions. The final area calls 
for a new research methodology, using case studies, 
historical analysis, action research, and participant 
observation to move from the belief that there is one best 
structure or process for all organizations. 
Social Construction 
This approach also includes and emphasizes concepts 
like definition of the situation, rule making, analysis of 
events and accounts, labeling, and cultural concepts such as 
shared meaning, and "patterns of cooperation, using shared 
knowledge of conventional means of doing things" (Becker, 
1982). For Becker, institutions and organizations are the 
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product of people doing things together. Shared 
understanding allows the concerted activity to do various 
tasks, including evaluations. These understandings are 
socially constructed, based on the consensus among 
participants. Members of the unit agree on the "rules" of 
the game. This knowledge then becomes a resource to 
coordinate action. It guides members to do "things" in line 
with their understanding of shared ideas, which result from 
interaction, persist and are remade after interactions, as 
participants constantly refer to what is known as they solve 
problems. 
To work on organizational tasks, people have to know 
procedures and common ways to conceive of and respond to 
situations (Becker, 1986). This exact process is applied to 
evaluations as a product. Managers know and use appraisal 
procedures from the past; they share a common body of 
knowledge regarding what is "good", "outstanding", or "poor" 
performance; and they use practices to obtain evaluation 
levels and communicate them to their subordinates. It is 
essential to determine whose point of view defines the 
situation. 
Pettigrew (1979) examined how organizations create and 
use culture. He employes an historical approach and found 
that a strong founder creates symbols, beliefs, and rituals 
which changed during "social dramas", points of leadership 
succession when new beliefs or power relations are 
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introduced. His point is that symbols, rituals, and myths, 
which promote action, carry meaning, and establish and 
maintain what is legitimate, are socially constructed. The 
founder's vision, representing values, becomes the 
organization's culture. 
Goffman (1959) contends that people are aware of the 
demands of the situation and manage how they present 
themselves to favor their definition of the situation. 
organizations are systems of constraint where actors manage 
or create their image to gain rewards in the system. 
Earlier Goffman (1952) explained the use of "face-saving" or 
defensive strategies individuals use to protect themselves 
from a loss of status, value, or a change in their image. 
This action is often necessary when an employee receives an 
unfavorable performance evaluation or downgrade into a lower 
level job. 
Open Systems 
In this perspective (Scott, 1981) , the organization 
interacts with the environment, monitors boundaries and 
imports resources from the environment. There is a close 
connection between the state of the environment and that of 
the organization. In fact, Lawrence and Lorsch argued in 
their Contingency Theory Model (Daft, 1986) that the best 
way to organize subunits depends on the environment. 
Because the environment varies so much, organizations 
develop departments with differentiated features, resulting 
in a larger effort to integrate the parts. The Population 
Ecology model, a variation of the Open Systems framework, 
explains the success or failure of organizations based on 
how well they find a niche in the environment and meet a 
need through its present form (Daft, 1986: Scott, 1981). 
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This paradigm offers a sharp contrast to the rational 
model because goals are generated by the environment and not 
by the organizations' objectives and desires for efficiency. 
Decision-making is no longer as rational and quantified as 
previously thought. This perspective, follows the theories 
of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Pfeffer (1978) contending that 
events, resources, and social factors in the environment, 
influence and account for the structure and processes inside 
an organization. This relates to the Critical and Social 
Construction views because power is dependent on the 
organization's ability to meet critical contingencies 
(Scott, 1981) and formal structure results from the outcomes 
of various struggles among coalitions, seeking to influence 
the organization with their definitions of the situation 
(Pfeffer, 1978). 
I have used the above theoretical positions and studied 
performance evaluations from the actor's perspective, using 
their various positions in the organization. The final 
section of Chapter 8 contains an expanded discussion of the 
combination of these paradigms. 
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lli!search Questions 
This study describes and explains the construction and 
use of performance evaluations from the different 
hierarchical positions of the actors. Since my research does 
not explicitly test hypotheses, I have stated a number of 
research questions and related "hunches" that could answer 
each question. This acted as a guide to direct, but not 
constrain, the investigation. 
I asked a series of questions (Appendix 1) which 
exposes the process that creates evaluations, how they 
acquire meaning, and how they are used within the 
organization. My inquiry is informed by participant 
observation and previous research, but I gathered data and 
constructed explanations from the experience and comments of 
the actors. 
1. How do organizations' beliefs and values shape 
evaluation programs? What explains the use and acceptance of 
appraisals? 
la. Related Hypothesis: Belief and value systems 
(e.g., distributive justice, comparable worth, and equity 
theory), supporting dominant institutions, build and support 
evaluations structures within the organization. The goal is 
to examine myths, culture, perceptions, traditions, and 
language. 
2. How do organizational types and control structures shape 
the nature of evaluation programs? 
Related Hypothesis: Control structures vary by 
type of organization and environment. Structures are 
developed to control workers, reduce uncertainty, and 
increase profits. The task is to examine dominant groups, 
the environment, evaluation and salary opportunity 
structures, information sources, hierarchical position, 
stratification and the impact of unions. 
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3 • How do cultural variables affect and explain evaluation 
systems? 
Ja. Related Hypothesis: Organizations are more 
accurately described as open systems where daily 
negotiations and interpretation shape and control the 
behavior of members. The goal is to examine labeling, 
legitimation, media, norms, problem-solving, decision-
making, socialization, participation, social construction of 
the situation, and shared understandings. 
The questions ask how the organizations' beliefs, 
structures, and processes produce the appraisal system, with 
the latter two variables having an interactive effect on 
each other. 
variables/Concepts 
A number of variables and terms used in the setting are 
studied to explain their construction, meaning, and use as 
products of social cooperation. These specialized terms 
include efficiency, quality, on-time delivery of "specs", 
appraisal form (APs), performance levels (cells), appraisal 
balancing point, cost reduction cases, union activity, and 
salary increases. These constructs are defined throughout 
the dissertation. 
Research Design - Data Collection and Analysis 
This research is a case study of the process of 
evaluation in a 600-plus member engineering organization of 
a large corporation. Since I was situated in the 
organization, I used a participant observation methodology 
to examine how activities within the setting became an 
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"evaluation o Jee • The unit of activity was the appraisal 
process, from setting and communicating standards, deciding 
relative performance ranks, to discussing performance with 
employees. 
In addition to learning about the natural functioning 
of the Engineering Organization from daily participation, I 
interviewed 22 employees at various occupational levels 
(e.g., clerical, union-represented engineering associates, 
engineers, professionals, and managers). Comparisons between 
the different levels were examined to see if evaluation 
practices differed by occupational level. The interview 
questions (Appendix 1) served as a guide and were modified 
after the first 2 interviews because, for example, data on 
values have to be interpreted from comments and not asked 
directly. 
Since I knew a large number of employees in the 
organization, I initially selected those who expressed an 
interest in my study and who are likely to provide good data 
based on our previous interaction. I protected the subjects' 
anonymity by using only first names and the first letter of 
the surname and by not identifying the interviewees at a 
later time. 
The interviews were conducted on-site with notes 
written during each session without the use of a tape 
recorder. Later, the notes were transcribed and expanded 
into field notes, based on the probable categories of 
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significant themes, problems, accounts (e.g., excuses and 
justifications), cooperative processes, beliefs, evaluation 
conventions, and special vocabularies of evaluations. At 
the end of the interviews, I asked the managers to identify 
subordinates who would be a good source of data for an 
appraisal biography (Appendix 2), which was distributed to a 
sample of 15 engineers and engineering associates identified 
through managers' referrals. This instrument asked the 
subject to write a personal history or biography of their 
evaluation experiences during the iast 2-3 years in the 
engineering unit. This provided data from those unavailable 
for interviews and saved time. Content analysis techniques 
were used to look for common stories, problems, 
vocabularies, and explanations for events. The questions or 
categories are a generalized, open-ended version of the 
interview guide, geared to determining specific appraisal 
actions affecting employees. I also used the "snowball" 
technique, a non-random process, based on previous contacts, 
to identify new subjects for interviews and document 
collection. 
The attached "observational guide" (Appendix 3) was 
used to supplement data from interviews and prior 
observation. The guide helped record themes, special 
language, stories, problems, possible meanings, and 
frequency of events during a specific time period. The major 
use of this tool was to form categories for analysis of the 
large of data and was not used to record events daily. 
However, I occasionally wrote notes about uncommon events. 
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Finally, available data such as company instructions, 
memos, bargaining minutes, and publications were analyzed 
for their meaning and impact on the evaluation process. In 
summary, the data collection design used observation, 
interviews, self-reports, and available data to provide 
multiple sources of qualitative information for analysis. 
The qualitative data were further analyzed through the 
construction of categories which I saw in the interviews, 
supervisory meetings, bargaining sessions, surveys, informal 
conversations, and observations. For example, I constantly 
heard managers mention a number of common themes such as 
performance attributes, appraisal standards, rewards, 
variation, and individual change. These categories were 
constructed by listing comments and expressions actors used, 
sorting them alphabetically with word processing software, 
and then "looking" for recurrent and persistent themes. I 
also calculated three sets of Chi-square to evaluate and 
draw conclusions about appraisal category placement based on 
work group, service and gender. In Chapter 6, 
"Organizational Beliefs and Values", I include a series of 
tables which compare two groups' perceptions (managers and 
subordinates) of the relative importance of a number of 
behaviors on performance appraisal construction. 
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The thrust of the data analysis is to employ 
qualitative methods, supplemented by a minimum of 
descriptive statistics because this is the most appropriate 
way to examine a real, functioning organization. This 
perspective has allowed me to explain and interpret the 
history, structures, and processes active in the engineering 
organization by providing a "feel" for what it is like to 
"live" in this setting. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE CONTEXT OF THE ORGANIZATION 
It is important to begin the data analysis Chapters 
(4,5,6, and 7) with a description of the context and history 
of the organization because this approach fits the newer 
"critical theory" perspective which several articles suggest 
in place of the dominant rational model (Benson, 1977; 
Fischer and Sirianni, 1984). I include historical and 
contextual material to offer a deeper explanation of how and 
why members act as they do. This also resists the tendency 
to accept for granted descriptions not grounded in recent 
organizational history. Without such information the reader 
will have an incomplete picture of the complex organization. 
This chapter will describe the setting of the 
engineering unit to illustrate where the actors' beliefs and 
appraisal procedures are situated. A detailed description 
and analysis of beliefs follow in Chapter 6. I will discuss 
various situational aspects such as mission, occupational 
and opportunity structures, restructuring of 1986, and 
union-management relations; and I will provide a brief 
history of changes, including the formation of the union. A 
major theme of this section is the uncertainty the members 
encounter as they try to meet their goals (Thompson, 1967). 
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The appraisal system is another dimension of this 
uncertainty which the unit dealt with using a variety of 
bureaucratic methods to make the uncertain more rational and 
manageable. 
Realignment -- 1984 to 1986 
z Y & Y experienced a major change in 1984 when a 
government lawsuit resulted in the break-up of its giant 
telecommunications system, which produced a number of 
significant and culture-centered changes within the "new" 
company. Job security was replaced by profitability; 
compensation plans are redesigned to match the market 
structure with greater emphasis on tying increases to 
profits. One major force in this new world came from the 
environmental domain and is specifically located in the 
competition (Thompson, 1967). 
Divestiture pushed the company face-to-face with 
competition and the need to satisfy customers. Since the 
former clients are no longer bound to purchase solely from 
the company, it shifted from an "order-taking" style to one 
focused on the needs of the customer. In effect the unit 
moved from a relatively closed, rational unit to a rational, 
open organization (Scott, 1981; Thompson, 1967). A direct 
result of this shift has been the heightened importance of 
customer relations, noted in the evaluation procedures of 
management. This change greatly increased the impact of the 
environment in the form of competition, significantly 
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amplifying the degree of uncertainty. Who is the customer? 
How should we relate to the customer? What are the 
dimensions of this new relationship? Along with greater 
uncertainty came the second variable Thompson talked about -
- the increase of dependence on environmental resources. In 
this case the dependence took the form of making the 
customer the driving and defining force in structuring the 
unit's activities. 
During 1986 changes in the management structure 
occurred throughout the Engineering division, realigning the 
field organizations. The purpose was to establish a standard 
structure in the four Engineering centers and to make it 
easier for the customer to deal with the organization. Prior 
to this time, EAs reported to a level called section chief, 
while engineers reported to a level above section chief, 
called department chief. As the first level of manager, 
section chiefs are considered the equivalent to engineers, 
although the latter had very few administrative duties, 
focusing mainly on the technical work. Figure 2 compares the 
pre-1986 and post-1986 reporting structures. 
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COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN ENGINEERING STRUCTURES 
PRE-1986 STRUCTURE POST-1986 STRUCTURE 
Director, Engineering General Manager, 
Engineering 
Engineering Director 
Manager, Engineering 
Assistant Manager Business Line Manager 
Department Chief Operations Manager 
Engineer Section Engineer 
Chief 
I 
Engineering Engineering Associate 
Associate 
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The 1986 change was due, in part, to divestiture, with 
the resulting need to be more customer-focused. The 
"restructuring" sought to eliminate one layer of management 
to streamline the decision-making process and improve 
customer responsiveness. The Contingency Model developed by 
Lawrence and Lorsch (Daft, 1986) argued that the environment 
dictated the structure of internal departments if the unit 
are going to survive. As a result, the section chiefs' jobs 
were eliminated and converted to department-level 
assignments and renamed "operations managers". Engineers and 
EAs now reported to operations managers who previously were 
on par with engineers. As a result of the change however, 
the first line supervisor no longer had direct contact with 
EAs, who now received work from engineers but worked through 
engineers to arrive at an appraisal recommendation. This 
move was aimed at removing the assignment of technical work 
("loading") from the manager and shifting it to the 
technical expert, who knew the difficulty of jobs so they 
could be more appropriately assigned. The manager is now 
supposed to concentrate on customer relations, financial 
controls, and other administrative tasks. 
Pieces of a Puzzle -- The Arrangements to Do Work 
The Engineering organization of the Z Y & Y company has 
approximately 600 employees working in four major job 
categories. The mission of the unit is to engineer the 
equipment needed to install, update, and maintain 
telecommunications offices in 5 midwestern states. The 
group provides services rather than products. The only 
physical outcomes of this activity are drawings, floor 
plans, lists of equipment specifications (specs), and 
written instructions. 
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Historically, the Engineering unit has been a rational, 
bureaucratic structure reflected in a number of key 
variables. It relied on written rules, procedures, and 
policies -- 21 binders containing company instructions 
which are continually interpreted by all actors. For 
example, there is a company policy on absences, listing 
approximately 25 different codes and reasons for absences. 
The instructions defined who are considered "immediate" 
family in case of death. In addition, there is a strong 
informal structure which communicated, processed data, and 
solved problems alongside the written guidelines. Here you 
would find examples about handling information in the form 
of rumors about promotions, downgrades, and benefits and 
pension changes. 
The level of standardization is also relatively high, 
since the employees wanted the application of a common set 
of procedures across all departments. This is a strong norm 
of the unit, closely monitored by a white-collar union. Last 
year during the Christmas season, managers wanted to buy 
small gifts for their employees or take them to lunch. This 
was new since the company was a regulated monopoly until 
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198 4 and such practices were never done, because they would 
not look good to customers and the public. Managers 
discussed what would be the appropriate thing to do. Some 
decided to act independently, causing others to worry about 
consistency and how they would look to their subordinates. 
I attended a meeting where this question became the 
issue for 30 minutes. There is a tug-of-war between those 
who wanted to do what they felt is right and those who 
sought consistency; and it surfaced again when I conducted a 
one-day Labor Relations Seminar, and managers debated the 
pay treatment of EAs who travelled "on their time" for the 
company. The strong sense I had is that a standard policy 
is needed and would be seen as desirable by many managers 
because it would reduce uncertainty. 
During this discussion a curious aspect of how time was 
defined in this unit surfaced. The expression "on their own 
time" points out a conception of time with rigid boundaries 
reflective of large organizations concerned with efficiency 
and production. Even though the organization recently 
introduced "flex-hours'', a major concern is the 8-hour day, 
because people are very aware of when they started and 
stoped work. Managers told me they are impressed with 
employees who are late "but very willing to make up the 
time". 
The unit was highly specialized due to the size of the 
organization and the technical nature of its work, where 
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assignments varied by type of equipment installed and the 
complexity of the order. Engineers and EAs concentrated on a 
narrow range of assignments, developing their expertise and 
efficiency. Specialization could occur in the major 
functional business areas of Power, Switching, Transmission, 
and Software. Managers told me it is common for their 
technical people to work within one of the four areas for 
15-25 years or what could be seen as an entire work 
"career." (This specialization factor will be more fully 
developed in a forthcoming section on occupational 
structure) . 
There are 4 levels of management in the hierarchy of 
authority. The first level is the section chief; the second 
is the operations manager (OM) ; the third is the business 
line manager (BLM); and the fourth level is the Engineering 
Director. During the last several years, upper management 
talked a good deal about pushing decision-making to lower 
levels, but most members are accustomed to directions corning 
from the top and are uncomfortable with decentralization. In 
an attempt to make this change in philosophy a reality, the 
company recently introduced an enhanced pension plan for 
managers, allowing more to retire sooner, thus easing the 
introduction of fewer management levels to empower employees 
and to save money and increase profits for stockholders. 
In contrast to the myth of empowerment is a different 
reality. I attended a meeting where one topic was the 
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creation of a flatter structure and its capacity to "push 
decision-making to lower levels". After some time, several 
managers said they needed to add or replace engineers who 
retired. Larry said: "Several months ago, I selected 2 EAs 
for sales jobs, but because of 'the (promotion) freeze', 
these people have not available. When will their papers be 
signed?" George, Director of Engineering said, "I'll do all 
I can to get those 30 requisitions approved. I know you 
need people to run your business." Regina, the former 
staffing manager, asked a pointed question: "George, why 
don't you delegate someone locally to be final approval on 
additions or hires?" George's response told me the new 
philosophy to push decisions to lower levels is not 
practiced yet: "We want to speed the paper work up, but we 
still need to follow the procedures in place and get Dave's 
[his supervisor] signature." 
This issue of hiring approvals seemed like a clear 
situation where the organization having the need for people 
should decide what to do. But an apparent contradiction 
existed. Executives at a vice-president level must approve 
decisions too specific for their level of knowledge and 
pointed to the difficulty upper management, which imposed 
decentralized decision-making, had in allowing the field 
location to exercise more authority. 
Although the organization used a complex technology, 
requiring specialized skills and a lengthy learning period 
(Daft, 1986), the unit did not possess a high degree of 
Brofessionalism as measured by formal education. In 
contrast, the Engineering unit defined someone as a 
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professional because he/she held a job level which managers 
considered as "professional". Thus position, not education, 
defined one's classification. 
The following table summarizes the general structural 
makeup of the unit. 
Table 1 
Summary of Structural Features 
of ZY&Y Engineering Unit 
Organizational Form 
Standardization 
Specialization 
Hierarchy 
Complexity 
Professionalism 
Personnel configuration 
Bureaucratic, Rational-
Open 
High - many routine procedures 
High - many specialists 
Moderate - 4 levels 
High - tasks, departments 
varied 
Low - experience, rather than 
formal education 
35 managers; 93 professional 
engineers; 7 administrative; 
300 EAs; 165 clerical workers 
Source of Categories: Daft, 1986 
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.![hO Does What Here? 
All managers formally evaluated the work and 
contributions of all members within the hierarchy. The 
Engineering Unit contained 3 main occupational groups: 
supervisory/management, technical-professionals, and 
salaried-graded or clerical support, now called occupational 
employees. Each of these groups supplied a unique resource 
to the overall mission of engineering, although a good deal 
of task overlap is evident, and likely the result of 
imperfect information flow, uncertainty, and changing 
conditions due to the (recently) open nature of this 
organization (Thompson, 1967). 
The supervisory/management group contained 35 
supervisors, within 4 levels of authority, and 7 management-
administrative employees. The supervisors are split into 8 
business lines (See figure 3 on following page) offering 
distinct services for both internal and external customers, 
also making it easier to measure profits. The supervisors 
managed the production, quality, and financial results of 
their departments which included assigning work, approving 
expenditures, planning and problem-solving, and evaluating 
the work efforts of subordinates. 
The non-supervisory segment conducted studies, 
investigated problems, gathered data, and made 
recommendations to management. This group had no direct 
influence over appraisals and little decision-making 
Figure 3 
ZY & Y ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION 
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authority. Their main function is to support management and 
provide answers to reduce uncertainty. 
The technical-professional group had 90 engineers and 
information systems employees and 300-plus engineering 
associates. The first group is defined as "professionals" 
because their jobs required more skill, application of 
knowledge, and independent problem solving. This group 
analyzed the technical aspect of customers' orders to design 
the equipment or software needed to upgrade, expand, or 
modify telephone offices. 
The engineering associates (EAs) comprised over half of 
the total organization and completed the hardware 
specifications begun by the engineer in what is called 
11 analyzation 11 • This group is represented by a local of the 
International Federation of Professional and Technical 
Employees, a white-collar union selected to represent the 
EAs in a close 1966 election. The union presented numerous 
problems for management because of the fear of generating a 
grievance or being admonished for an unenlightened decision. 
Their existence contributed directly to the perception of 
uncertainty which existed throughout the organization. One 
manager was very direct about her assessment of the union's 
impact. "EA's (appraisals) are handled more carefully than 
engineers because of the grievance procedure." According to 
the method of numbering grievances, just over 1000 
grievances were filed since 1966. The majority of these 
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came in the early years and covered complaints from slippery 
floors (working conditions) to attendance records, and 
wages. During the last 5 years in which I myself have worked 
in labor relations, the grievances are focused on appraisals 
and other wage issues, like delivery of overtime pay. 
ouring 1988, 12 of the 15 grievances alleged improper 
appraisals. Occasionally, the Union charged that the 
company discriminated against its officers for their union 
activities, or that the company used improper methods to 
select candidates for promotions. 
The Union acted as a "watchdog'', patrolling the 
building for problems management should handle. A number of 
issues did not reach the formal grievance stage, but are 
handled informally through discussions between 
representatives and supervisors. Ed, the president, 
confirmed this when he told me, "You know we try to handle 
problems before we file a grievance. But we're not afraid 
to file either." 
Ironically, filing grievances or conducting formal 
discussions as a representative or officer can have an 
impact on evaluations. Representatives and officers have 
greater visibility, more contact with management and greater 
opportunity for either positive or negative comments during 
appraisal sessions (Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer, 1978; Mechanic, 
1962). It is illegal for the company to use union activities 
as a form of negative information in making appraisals, and 
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managers told me they made conscious efforts to set aside 
incidents of tense grievance hearings when appraising. 
However, both positive and negative impressions are created 
from all kinds of contacts and these undoubtly do come into 
play. The Engineering Director used to tell me that the 
former union president "is a nice guy, but he's not sharp, 
not very effective". Although this EA was rated in the top 
third of the universe, no special efforts were made to 
"push" him higher. On the other hand, reps who have shown 
"leadership" skills, without being "too radical" became 
candidates for supervisor or engineer positions which 
managers felt needed more than technical competency. On the 
other hand, some kinds of exposure during union-management 
meetings could enhance, at least informally, someone's 
chance for a higher appraisal category or even a promotion. 
This exposure process worked as a cooptation device for 
managers to socialize representatives to understand the 
company's perspective on issues that the majority of EAs did 
not see. This informal exchange helped managers deal with 
the uncertainty created by the union because both parties 
looked beyond their initial role expectations. Managers used 
this situation to identify the "best" representatives for 
future opportunities. The union "reps" who are most 
respected by management are those who seemed reasonable, 
focused on major issues, and who "understood" the manager's 
position. 
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The last employee group consisted of approximately 165 
£lerical workers who provided a variety of support services, 
such as typing, filing, making copies, processing orders, 
sorting mail, and maintaining the plant facilities. The 
skill and compensation level of this group is lower than 
that of the two groups described above, but their services 
are essential and their influence is substantial, if often 
invisible, to the mission of the organization (Mechanic, 
1962) • 
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chutes and Ladders, Escalators and Quicksand 
The mobility patterns of careers from the 1950s until 
the 1980s formed a clear, consistent motif. Mostly men 
entered the organization after high school or military 
service and began work as a draftsman or clerk. "Good 
performance" (i.e., attitude, production, attendance) 
coupled with a growing demand for telephone off ice equipment 
created advancement opportunities in two distinct career 
paths: management and technical. 
steps 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
The following figure illustrates this division. 
Figure 4 
Management vs Technical Career Paths 
Management Path 
Draftsman or Clerk 
Group Leader 
Section Chief 
Department Chief 
Assistant Superintendent 
Superintendent 
Technical Path 
Draftsman or Clerk 
Spec Detailer 
Engineering Associate 
Engineer 
senior Engineer 
Senior Staff Engineer 
Management Path 
The group leader was an assignment coordinator who 
allocated work, but did not evaluate peers. The section 
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gD.iei was the first level management with authority to 
appraise, reward, and discipline. The department chief was 
the second supervisory level with engineers and section 
chiefs reporting to it. The third level, called the 
gssistant superintendent (now business line manager) , has 
the bottom two ranks under its control. The fourth level is 
the superintendent now called an engineering director, a 
very powerful position for making local policy decisions. 
Technical Path 
The spec detailer was a higher level non-professional 
who wrote the simplest job requirements for the engineering 
associate job which is broader in scope, but still under the 
engineer, the primary position for solving technical 
equipment problems. The senior engineer is a position for 
the most competent and productive engineer. It requires 
technical skill and ability to guide other engineers without 
formally appraising them. 
Some employees are promoted through the management 
career path. These openings are less plentiful and therefore 
more valuable in the eyes of the group. As a manager told 
me, "In the past, we had an advancement path which provided 
an incentive." Management jobs are judged to be more 
prestigious because there are far less chances to be a 
manager than an engineer, and employees felt "managers have 
it made." The organization had 300 plus EAs, 90 engineers, 
and 20 department chiefs. Secondly, one could advance in 
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the technical world by increasing competence via experience 
or education. Though not an automatic route, obtaining an 
engineering degree facilitated promotion to the engineer 
level. However, promotion to the supervisory level required 
demonstration of leadership skills that did not 
automatically come from earning a management degree. 
supervisors are selected by the judgment of other managers. 
Recently the Company began using the SPR (Supervisory 
Profile Record), a paper-and-pencil test to screen those 
interested in being a supervisor. If someone "failed" the 
SPR, a dispensation letter was used to approve his/her 
promotion to a supervisory position. 
Most of the promotions occurred into higher levels of 
the technical career ladder, since the majority of 
opportunities existed there. Some individuals would move up 
to the engineer level, then branch off to the management 
path. Very few of these mid-1950s employees had formal 
educations beyond high school. Some acquired skills from 
either technical schools like DeVry Institute or from 
military experience. 
The mobility patterns changed in the late 1970s due to 
social and legal pressures to employ more women, especially 
in the EA position. The company is a government contractor, 
and so subject to Affirmative Action requirements, programs, 
and reports, making the hiring process open to review and 
criticism. Instead of relying on the former source of 
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employees, managers decided to hire a large number of women 
with non-technical college degrees and train them for the EA 
job. These employees are at a disadvantage when competing 
with experienced males for opportunities in the higher rated 
engineers' jobs. The vast majority of women earned liberal 
arts or education degrees, had been elementary school 
teachers, and lacked any technical work experience. They 
were hired, in part, because they had courses in math and 
science, a curriculum perceived by managers to prepare 
someone for the EA job. In later hiring decisions, managers 
told me, "I'd rather have someone with an associate's degree 
over a BS from DeVry, because they work out better. They 
are less likely to be disappointed in the work I can off er 
them." Other managers made similar comments, reinforcing my 
observation that educational requirements in the 
organization are often inflated to fit the perception that 
the current state of technology required an employee with 
more formal education. 
This influx of educated employees marked a shift in 
emphasis on factors that counted for movement -- formal 
education began to be more important than work experience. 
Upper management felt that these more highly educated 
employees could better serve the company as technology 
advanced and as customer relations became more important to 
the business, which is now more effected by competition. I 
believe this new direction is influenced very little by the 
111 
change in and attention given to affirmative action laws. 
Managers, encouraged to hire minorities, began to change 
their attitudes toward women and minorities because the 
external situation changed and then their perceptions 
followed. The company saw these educated employees more 
positively because, even if they couldn't learn the EA job, 
they created an internal labor pool from which managers 
could select professionals and other managers. An educated 
employee is a more flexible employee. A large number of the 
women hired were former educators, and managers detected 
they had communications skills superior to those with only 
high school educations. Some of the more educated 
individuals, therefore, went into jobs in training, sales, 
purchasing, and personnel. 
Two more recent factors also influenced the current 
opportunity structure in Engineering. A growing emphasis on 
meeting customer's needs and advancing technology placed a 
greater emphasis on formal education. The EA position, 
which once accepted former draftsmen, now required at least 
a two-year associate degree in a technical specialty. 
Managers decided this position now required more formal 
education because both customers and competitors are more 
sophisticated in their demands for a large variety of 
services. It is more difficult to promote a good EA to 
engineer for at least two reasons: first, there are 
approximately 3 EA jobs for each engineer position, so 
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opportunities are limited. Many EAs believe they would 
eventually be promoted, but one manager had an observation 
which fit the organization. "The EA job is a career 
[terminal] job, not a training post for a higher level, but 
new people think writing "specs" is a stepping stone, and 
they get disappointed." Secondly, the candidate must have at 
least a 2-year technical degree. John, a manager, told me 
that a high performing EA was passed over for promotion, 
because although Jim is only 5 courses short of a degree in 
business with a number of courses in technical areas, he did 
not have an associate's degree in engineering and is not 
considered "qualified". In order to be hired as an engineer, 
one had to have the appropriate engineering or computer 
science degree. Although managers recognized that 
experience often produced better performers than just a 
degree, graduates are favored because of the belief that 
their formal exposure to concepts enable them to handle a 
variety of jobs with less learning time, i.e., these 
employees are more valuable. Workers could no longer enter 
at the lowest non-technical levels and expect advancement to 
engineer or even senior engineer without the appropriate 
formal education. 
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I.t Looked Good on Paper! 
This change caused a number of problems. At the outset, 
the organization experienced a good deal of uncertainty. EAs 
who previously reported to and were appraised by section 
chiefs now "reported" to engineers. They are formally 
evaluated by Operations Managers (OMs) who received 
performance input from the engineers, in the form of 
observation of work habits, use of job knowledge, and 
problem-solving. The engineer's job, which is almost 
exclusively technical in nature, now assumed an 
administrative side marked by scheduling work, recording 
attendance of EAs, and offering input on performance. Some 
engineers adapted well to this change while others resisted 
the shift to more administrative tasks. 
Although the section chiefs appear to have gained the 
most (e.g., higher authority level and expanded salary 
ranges) they often found themselves in familiar situations 
once handled by their supervisor, who still controlled their 
area of responsibility. Five supervisors said they lost 
ground in the restructuring because many current OMs moved 
up to their level, while they remained in place. 
How Do We Play This Game? 
The operations managers did not feel the business line 
managers provided enough structure or guidance for 
decisions. During one meeting of OMs, called to define the 
new roles of engineers and OMs, managers expressed confusion 
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over the very purpose of the meeting we were attending. 
Tom, an experienced 2nd level manager, expressed a feeling, 
supported by others present. "Why are we wasting our time 
discussing what our jobs should be. Our bosses (BLMs) 
should tell us what they want, and the jobs our engineers 
should be doing. They don't know or won't tell us, so I 
guess that's why we're here." These remarks also reveal an 
old norm of the unit: people react negatively to failure, 
resulting in a low risk posture by most employees. People 
are afraid to fail, so a cautious approach pervaded the 
workplace. The managers at this meeting may have been 
reluctant to define the manager-engineer interface and 
propose changes because of possible criticisms from their 
bosses. 
The OMs were learning their new roles as they worked 
through assignments. One OM told me that customers familiar 
with his supervisor, Ken, contacted that person, who then 
talked to John's engineer, instead of getting John involved, 
making him feel like "a second-class citizen." John also 
told me the new second level managers are not "acting like 
department chiefs. We don't make decisions like we should, 
and we still rely on our bosses to give us direction. We're 
acting like a bunch of section chiefs." 
The members of the organization reported feeling 
confused and uncertain about many events, especially 
appraisals, direction of the company and their own 
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departments, their job functions, and multiple, competing 
goals. This uncertainty is related to group power struggles, 
poor communications stratagems, employee apathy, and demands 
from competition. The following chapters explore the impact 
of this variable on organizational life and evaluations in 
particular. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 
When addressing the problem of uncertainty in 
organizations, one can argue that control issues were an 
attempt to deal with and make activities more rational. 
Thompson (1967) said, "uncertainty is a fundamental problem 
and coping is the essence of the administrative process." 
But "complete certainty is a figment of one's imagination", 
and control structures were partial solutions to handling 
behavior and attempting to make it more "organized" or 
rational. Two important questions are: "where do we find 
uncertainty?"; and "who controls this uncertainty?" A 
preliminary response, which will be developed in this 
chapter, is that uncertainty pervades the entire appraisal 
process because standards shift and remain unclear. 
Meanwhile managers cannot know all the actions of 
subordinates so evaluations become abstractions of 
impressions. Three parties -- managers, union 
representatives, and subordinates -- sought to control the 
uncertainty generated by appraising performance. 
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supervisors are expected to be the primary control agents, 
but union reps mediate the process by asking questions and 
filing grievances, while subordinates manage their behavior 
(Goffman, 1959), to create an impression which the manager 
will see as positive in making an appraisal judgment. 
This chapter will discuss the types of behavior 
controlled, the methods used, and the impact of these 
structures. The focus of these issues will center around 
the evaluation system of the research setting. Appraisals 
are just one fiber of the web of control used by the 
organization to achieve its goals (Blau, 1967; Edwards, 
1984) . 
What is Controlled? 
The organization attempts to control, or "to manage" a 
wide range of actions related to evaluation. Recently, a 
manager told me about his discomfort over a meeting he 
attended last year to appraise EAs. These sessions were 
always tense but John's specific problem dealt with a method 
of determining cell positions, proposed by another manager, 
Doris. John said, "We had an agreement on how many 'moves' 
each supervisor would get, but when Doris defined the cell 
structure (outside the actual session), the agreements 
changed." John felt his employees would lose ground, and 
getting no strong support from other supervisors who 
(according to John) "accept a certain procedure if it favors 
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their own situation," he went to tell some BLMs (level above 
him) about the "unfair" changes. John took a risk in seeing 
sud, because "not only did I tell him what happened, I 
strongly disagreed with him about the impact, and we got 
into a shouting match. I hope this incident won't hurt me." 
The management appraisals were completed at this point, but 
salary increases were being decided. This incident shows 
the concern employees, even managers, have about how they 
act because all types of behavior becomes part of the 
evaluation process. In this context I saw that all behavior 
was "evaluated" against the company values of production, 
loyalty, and attendance. In reflection, these values were 
not usually talked about directly, but interpreted from 
conversations with other employees to find out "what counts 
around here." Twenty years ago I thought all behavior was 
evaluated and this idea has been reinforced by informal 
conversations about the impressions supervisors have about 
employees. Reno informed me: "I evaluate everything I see. 11 
Managers in the organization are especially concerned about 
controlling the following specific "areas", which will be 
further elaborated below: work habits, production, quality, 
attendance, financial factors, decision-making, rewards, and 
personnel placement. 
Work Habits 
The key areas that management seeks to control begin 
with "work habits" -- the patterned way employees approach 
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their job, routinely perform their tasks, use time, and 
generally present themselves. This factor is really a time 
usage variable, because good habits were described as 
productive, while poor habits waste time. For example, one 
manager said: "The EA with a good attitude is sought out, 
volunteers, has better work habits, chats less about pay 
stubs and retirement." A secretary, describing what managers 
want in an employee commented, "They (supervisors) also 
consider that you produce no complaints, do what you're 
told, and make no waves." 
One of the most interesting perspectives came from a 
manager of a department working on older technology. He told 
me, "I use the concept of 'easy to manage' as a way to rate 
people. The opposite were those who fall asleep during 
meetings and make negative comments. I ask myself, 'can I 
comfortably assign work or do I anticipate problems?" Work 
habits define the employee's orientation to work. 
Productivity 
Closely related to the above factor is productivity, 
which refers to the number of "specs" delivered (i. e., the 
detailed listing of materials to produce an equipment change 
or addition to a telephone office), cost reduction cases, or 
customers contacted. The EAs were defined as "direct" 
employees, which means their time and efforts were billed 
directly to the customer. More hours translate into greater 
revenue. In the engineering unit, jobs were "scored" or 
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allocated so many hours for completion, based on complexity 
and size of the order. EAs who completed the job in less 
time than allowed by "score", had a higher production level. 
The manager of a service department offered these 
observations on productivity: "What's important is getting 
the job done and serving the customer. I notice who does 
more, who asks for work." 
Quality 
Quality was discussed in meetings and as it relates to 
customers. Recently a quality council, composed of managers, 
was formed to solve problems identified by all employees. 
The company introduced the concept of performing all tasks 
"with an eye toward quality", which also includes 
redesigning a procedure to eliminate unnecessary steps. 
This renewed emphasis was, according to official literature, 
intended "to make z Y & Y more responsive to competition and 
customer's needs." The engineering group also used a system 
of "checkers", who were EAs sampling the work of peers and 
assigning demerits. Recently the emphasis has shifted from 
issuing negative comments to a more corrective approach of 
explaining how the cited errors can be avoided. In the past 
the checker would award demerits, but now, the EA would 
receive a written or verbal notice, pointing out the error 
and its importance to the job. The checker position was 
usually given to an experienced EA who has broad knowledge 
of the department's functions. In at least one incident 
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reported to me, the checker was in a powerful position, 
which allowed him to "put other EAs through their paces," 
producing feelings of resentment. Bob, a short-service EA, 
told me, "Jim (the checker) has a lot knowledge about all 
the systems we work on, but when you make a mistake, this 
guy really acts like a jerk." 
Roll Call 
Attendance was a behavior which management gave a lot 
of attention to, but very little has resulted from the 
investment. There was an elaborate system of absence codes 
for a wide range of activities, including quarantine, 
matching the extensive company policy on absence control 
involving progressive consequences for increased time-off. 
One problem was that supervisors were inconsistent in 
applying the rules, which were open to interpretation and 
supervisory discretion, depending on such factors as 
employee's reputation, past performance, and type of absence 
requested. The policy received more lip-service than it had 
bite. There used to be a popular saying about the company's 
attitude toward attendance: "the important thing is to show 
up, because once you're at work, it doesn't matter what you 
dO •II 
Purse Strings 
Managers control financial results through a computer 
tracking system (M-11 report), which compares projected 
budget figures against actual expenses and profits. George, 
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who provided accounting support for the organization, told 
me a number of times about the attention managers give to 
the M-11. "Each month I remind each OM to input their 
production hours, so we can get credit. The 20 managers 
affected by this "road map", seemed to give it a life of its 
own. George had constantly to meet with them to explain how 
their group was performing concerning costs and profits. 
These "results" were reviewed by upper management, who made 
very little of the large computer runs, as long as the 
organization continued to make a profit. 
Expense accounts were controlled by a system of 
hierarchical approval limits in which an employee could rent 
cars, purchase meals or software, but had to have these 
expenditures approved by a higher level supervisor. The 
company went to a procedure several years ago in which 
managers and professionals were issued corporate American 
Express cards mainly for business trips. Normally, you 
completed your trip and then prepared an "expense report 
form", which had to be approved by your immediate 
supervisor, or higher level depending on the amount charged. 
The supervisor reviewed the listed items for appropriateness 
by current standards and signed the form. Occasionally, a 
manager would challenge the amount or type of expenditure. 
John questioned several EAs who "vouchered the total mileage 
from home to O'Hare, when they were only supposed to voucher 
the distance in excess of their daily commute. I made them 
123 
change the voucher before I'd approve it. 11 Prior to reaching 
this decision, John told me he talked to several other 
supervisors to "get a reading" on how they had or would have 
handled the problem. 
The system of hierarchical authority with its approval 
levels limited the spending and decision-making habits of 
employees. An example of the accountability rule prohibited 
managers from approving their own expense vouchers, even 
though they could "sign for" the same amount if it were a 
subordinate's expenses they were approving. I coordinated a 
meeting for four people at the Airport Hilton, and since the 
Engineering Director was present, the relatively small bill 
of $350 could not be approved by my immediate supervisor but 
was sent to Maryland where the Director's supervisor had to 
"sign for" the expense items. The unfortunate consequence 
was a delay in paying the hotel. What was not openly 
discussed in this practice was the lack of trust implied in 
the unit, and the need for authority -- legitimated power 
(Weber) -- to intervene in the fabric of daily 
organizational life. 
Decision-Making 
Management also monitored decision-making though a 
number of procedures. Decisions were the most elusive 
product of this organization because of the high degree of 
uncertainty, the Union, and the predominantly informal style 
of the division's managers. Decisions were affected by a 
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iack of knowledge about the consequences of actions, 
reactions from the Union leadership, and a reliance on a 
verbal tradition to recall past actions due to an inadequate 
method to research past practices. 
These conditions were especially noticeable in the 
appraisal system and resulted in a highly politicalized 
system which used judgments, and commonly shared concepts of 
performance, which were not formally articulated, to reach 
evaluation decisions. Two managers reflected on this 
situation. Arlin: "The appraisal process is okay, the 
problem is putting people into cells. There is no step by 
step procedure for assigning cells." Bud, who supervised 
Arlin, elaborated on his subordinate's view: "We try to 
group similar performance. We didn't use a fixed model of 
performance to determine cell placement, but we looked at 
what was accomplished." 
I observed that supervisory decisions in the 
Engineering organization were largely made on the basis of 
judgment, guesses, and experience (Peters and Waterman, 
1982). Managers did not use these words, but talked about 
using hunches and successful practices when conditions were 
uncertain. The hierarchical structure provides overall 
control because the common practice is to push difficult 
decisions to a higher level in the organization. Members of 
the unit then operate as though each higher level had more 
credibility (Becker, 1970) and was in a better position to 
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make decisions -- choosing between alternative causes of 
actions with uncertain consequences. The company was now 
trying to downsize and restructure itself to save money and 
speed up decision-making. 
Other factors which controlled decision-making were the 
on-going assessment managers made of their own authority to 
actually decide the issues, and the decision-maker's fear of 
seeming reluctant to fulfill his/her duties rather than to 
sidestep the task by "pushing" it up the line. Managers had 
only been at their new, higher levels for a few years and 
most were not comfortable with the new level of authority. 
Bob, a services manager, told me, "Most of the OMs still act 
like section chiefs (former lower level occupied by 
supervisors). We haven't learned to make decisions like our 
bosses used to. In fact many of the OMs lack the 'class or 
decorum' of the old department chief level. We have people 
who seem to just be able to fight in the trenches." These 
comments also illustrate a division of labor between 
management levels. Each level felt it had a main focus of 
authority and responsibility tied to their rank and related 
compensation level. Referring to the evaluation process for 
illustration of this division, one manager said simply, "OMs 
rank people, but the BLMs actually draw the lines" (to 
determine cell assignment). 
Very often managers took a passive stance, hoping 
someone else would assume responsibility for the problem. A 
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fear of failure was another force mediating against active 
decision-making: people were afraid of failure and public 
embarrassment that could accompany it (Trice and Beyer, 
1984). Managers sought alliances to confirm their 
perceptions, alleviate concerns, and gather strength for 
various actions. This pattern (analyzed in Chapter 7) was 
especially visible in the EA appraisal process because of 
the dependence on perceptions of performance rather than on 
the measurement of actions that were more objective and 
discernible, such as the production of manufactured 
components rather than service to customers. 
Rewards 
Managers also attempted to control rewards through 
salary increases and cell movement. The subjects always 
cited financial rewards as the main kind of incentive to do 
a good job. Managers restricted the distribution of 
increases through the appraisal program, which directly tied 
performance level to salary level because they felt the 
"better" workers should earn a higher salary (Kerbo, 1983; 
Feldberg, 1984; Mahoney, 1983). 
The organization also had a number of rewards for 
attendance, even though this was expected behavior. The 
clerical employees were eligible for a $25 gift certificate 
for each 6 months of perfect attendance. Management 
employees received a certificate and might be taken to lunch 
by their supervisors. The message that "organizational 
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attendance is important" is taught in American high schools 
and carries over to the workplace. Secondary schools 
receive funding based on attendance and have employees 
dedicated to monitoring, tracking, and verifying student's 
whereabouts through an elaborate set of procedures 
(according to my wife who works at a local high school). 
Employees in the research setting were told to call their 
supervisors when they were to be absent. This information 
was recorded on time sheets and stored for at least 3 years. 
These data were input to a program which provided a monthly 
listing of attendance, including total days of pay and no 
pay. 
Personnel Placement 
The organization's placement system also controlled 
movement of people. Information on openings became widely 
available, but specific policies restricted employee 
movement. For example, if an employee wanted to "bid" on a 
certain management level job, he or she needed the 
supervisor's approval. Wishing to avoid confrontation, most 
managers approved the forms and placed the decision-making 
burden on the department with the opening. One manager 
remarked, "I don't want to hurt the EA by past recorded 
remarks. The problem could be temporary." A staff manager 
agreed: "Managers want to avoid confrontations." Also, the 
engineering organization had a policy that restricted 
lateral movement if the unit needed people. The corporation 
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launched a career Development Program which established more 
flexible guidelines for movement and definite time periods 
during which an employee might be denied lateral movement. 
Transfer policies were overly restrictive. A 
dissatisfied EA, who was a problem for management because of 
his outspoken nature and sharp criticism of appraisals, 
wanted to move laterally to a job outside the Engineering 
group, but management refused his request because the 
department still needed EAs. This resulted in an unhappy 
employee and more problems for his supervisor. 
The system of listing "job qualifications" for openings 
also narrowed opportunities for people because artificial 
requirements might be included to raise the status and level 
of the job. Educational level worked in a similar way to 
impose barriers to entering the job when, in practice, these 
specialized skills were often not required as bona fide job 
qualifications. However, the imposition of inflated 
requirements guided the movement of personnel. This was 
similar to Spring's argument (1976) that the educational 
process uses testing and grouping work as a "social sorting 
machine" to determine individual potential and increase the 
efficiency of industrial society by proper selection and 
channeling of manpower resources." Also schools operate in a 
way that resembles the work situation, so it functions as a 
training ground in work habits, methods and attitudes. 
Managers listed qualifications that screen out most 
candidates, leading employees to ask: "Is the job wired?" 
Managers wanted to retain control. Job qualifications 
operated as a justification for more education, and the 
tuition assistance plan reinforced this process by paying 
only for courses that were "job-related". This belief 
supported Spring's argument that education was used to 
select candidates for increased efficiency, a position 
developed in Chapter 6. 
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The point of the above discussion is that the dominant 
position of managers was to control the personnel movement 
of the vast majority of their employees. The main 
rationalization for this stance was the right of management 
to "run the business", described and conceived as similar to 
a living organism with various needs, some more important 
than other needs. When managers talked this way they were 
actually referring to the wishes of individual supervisors 
who had a range of influence in the group due to current 
problems, reputation, and perceived knowledge and ability to 
work around an impasse (Pfeffer, 1978). Table 2 summarizes 
of behavior and methods to control the behavior in ZY&Y 
Corporation. 
Table 2 
List of Employee Behavior and Methods for Control 
in Engineering Unit, ZY&Y Corporation 
Employee Behavior Control Methods 
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work Habits Feedback from observation 
Production Reports 
Quality of Service Use of EAs as "checkers" 
Attendance Timesheets, general rules 
Financial Results "Road Map" report 
Expense Accounts Vouchers, approval levels 
Decision-Making Intuition 
Past Practices 
Hierarchical structure 
Assessment of Authority 
Fear of Failure 
Rewards Appraisals 
Placement/Movement Bidding System 
Job Requirement Policy 
The above matrix of factors pose a curious situation 
because of possible interpretation. On one hand, managers 
actually considered the diverse variables as important 
outcomes, which attained this status because these factors 
were tangible, measurable, and visible (Blau, 1967). 
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secondly, managers have used these "behaviors" for a long 
time -- over 20 years -- so they became part of the unit's 
culture and tradition. Finally, because of visibility and 
tradition, the parties accepted the variables as 
understandable and useful in evaluating performance. 
The application of the above methods also reflected an 
illusion, because, although talked about, these factors were 
not used as much as they appeared to be. They operate as a 
shared myth of what counted, but were ignored because 
managers formed an overall abstraction of performance due to 
the uncertainty of standards and knowledge of behavior. 
There was too much data, and too many employees for the 
system to work as these factors might indicate. However, 
the illusion of the application of these methods worked to 
control employees. 
Factors Affecting Evaluations 
A key and pervasive factor in the life of this 
organization was the need to control and manage behavior. 
This section will examine how the evaluation process 
controls subordinates which was important to managers for 
several reasons. First, control activities help to reduce 
uncertainty by actually solving problems or at least 
creating the illusion of being proactive. Second, control 
procedures define what is important in the organization and 
these help make sense of activities. Third, leaders derive 
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power from their positions as control managers, enhancing 
their own influence by monitoring and controlling the 
behavior of subordinates. Thus, a wide variety of 
organizational variables were used to restrict employee 
behavior through the evaluation system. These factors 
included: job and opportunity structures, appraisal forms, 
beliefs about appraisals; group meetings; information; 
authority levels; the environment and the Union. The EAs 
knew how the appraisal/salary worked through their 
supervisors, but mainly via their peers. There was a 
widespread myth that actual performance counted, but in 
practice other social factors, such as, supervisory 
perception really accounted for one's appraisal. These 
popular beliefs kept most EAs working at their jobs (and 
will be examined in detail in Chapter 6). 
It's Not My Job 
Jobs differed in their degree of opportunity (Kanter, 
1977), offering a greater chance for exposure and less 
pressure, so good results were easier to achieve. John, a 
manager and one of my key sources of information, told me 
how upset he was that Mike, an engineer, was rated above his 
four engineers. I told John I understood that Mike s. had a 
good reputation with a third level manager. John said, 
"Sure he's got a good reputation. But, that's because he's 
got a job which allows him to concentrate on one problem at 
a time. My people are getting calls from the field, helping 
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EAs, and doing special projects. Mike looks good because he 
does not have a demanding job, one that requires his time 
and attention in a variety of areas." 
AP Form 
Actors also feel that the record of performance -- the 
AP -- should be a tool to determine cell placement. A union 
officer, commenting on the sequence of appraisal events, 
told me, "The AP forms are completed after the rank order 
and cells are assigned. The form should be used by the boss 
as ammunition to get moves." Many realized that the AP was a 
formality, required to meet legal requirements, and carried 
little weight in producing cell movement. Kurt, a new 
manager, expressed it this way: "To the EA the form is a 
piece of paper that doesn't mean anything. The AP does not 
match the cell assigned. They aren't read and exist only as 
a formality." However, some EAs held that the document was 
valuable because it was written and represented a permanent 
record. The Union took this position and requested APs when 
a grievance was in process. 
What's Important 
The fear of obtaining a poor rating, with the 
consequence of no salary increase, kept most EAs performing 
to meet department standards. Behavior that was rewarded 
included: production, quality, good work habits, and 
timeliness. (Production referred to the number of jobs or 
specs the employee wrote within a specified time limit.) As 
134 
Reno told me, "Specs are due on Monday, so I know how my 
people do regarding 'on time delivery'." Quality concerns 
accurate and complete spec preparation. Eddy said, "The 
most important factors are production, quality, on-time 
delivery, and job knowledge." Kurt summed up the factor of 
work habits: "The EA with a good attitude is sought out, 
volunteers, has better work habits, chats less about pay 
stubs and retirement." Even though the possibility of 
termination was remote, the concept existed in the 
employee's mind, and functioned as a powerful force for 
adherence to management goals. Lou, a management staff 
employee, had a number of negative reactions to the 
appraisal system. He also reflected the ultimate fear: 
"Management could get rid of you if you're a troublemaker." 
Group Meetings 
Another control technique used in evaluations was a 
series of group meetings where supervisors discussed 
candidates and used "multiple supervisory judgments" to 
produce a rank order list. A supervisor in Personnel 
explained how this worked. 
"We try to discuss performance, but bosses have their 
own idea on what defines performance. For example, some 
people have attendance problems, but were nominated for 
'outstanding'. It's nice for the boss to give out an 
outstanding rating. But other supervisors in the meeting 
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offer opposing data on a candidate, and the nominating boss 
changes his mind and withdraws the candidate." 
A manager from another company reported the same 
"leveling effect" of the group meeting. "There was a person 
pushed for a top spot who had insulted people and was 
indignant. Negative feedback brought this guy down. Group 
discussions were used to 'take away bias'." This technique 
rationalized the legitimacy of a subjective process and was 
often cited by the bargaining agent to defend his position 
during grievance hearings. Interestingly, the technique 
diffused the blame and responsibility for a poor rating by 
giving the appearance that the appraisal was the result of 
the group process, when in fact the largest weight and 
initial recommendation rested with the employee's immediate 
supervisor. 
Information 
Information was a valued commodity which was guarded 
and censored to retain its exclusiveness and secretiveness. 
Managers controlled the creation and distribution of 
information on policies, appraisals, raises, and promotions. 
"The AP form is often done after the rank order and cell 
assignment are finished." Another manager said, "The forms 
are used carefully to meet the cell position assigned to the 
person. We don't want to hang later. We are careful to 
imply nothing." Another manager, John J., supported this 
feeling. "Some AP's are written to justify appraisals." 
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There was constant discussion about what was appropriate to 
tell people, and in what format. In one curious 
contradiction about the use of data, the Union distributed 
and discussed performance and salary data, while the Company 
considered this to be private information and worthy of 
protection. Managers concealed this data to spare the 
employees embarrassment and his/her own need to justify the 
unequal distribution of raises. The Union exposed the 
salary details to challenge management's decisions, to 
reinforce their belief in equality, and to create the 
illusion that their own continued existence was vital to the 
workers. 
An example of these opposing views was the distribution 
of the rank order list, containing names of 300-plus EAs 
from top performers to lowest performer. For years the 
company had successfully resisted the Union's attempts to 
obtain a copy of this list. The company's practice was to 
give each EA's appraisal level and new salary, but not the 
relative position of everyone in a rank order. Sharing this 
data with the Union had several implications. First, 
representatives could encourage grievances by showing some 
EAs how they "made out" compared to their peers. This also 
revealed the underlying competition between workers and 
between supervisors who tried to get the most for their 
group. Third, the list exposed the collective judgments of 
managers to criticism, whereas these perceptions of relative 
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performance had only been known to managers in the past. 
ouring an arbitration case several years ago, the Union 
"demanded" rank-order data for the previous 5 years. our 
attorney advised us to provide this information. After this 
occasion, the Union officers asked for the rank-order data, 
citing our recent submittal in an arbitration case. our 
attorney again told me, "The Company may not like it, but 
the Union has a right to the rank order data, just to see if 
they should file a grievance. I'm surprised you got away so 
long without having to give them the rank list." 
When our managers heard that the Union received this 
information, they were upset. John said, "It isn't good the 
Union has this information. It's going to cause trouble. 
They're going to file more grievance now, just because they 
think some EA should be above another EA, even in the same 
performance cell. 11 I explained the lawyer's reasons. 
John's response was typical of others I heard: "I don't care 
what Jim (the attorney) said. If the Union has the list, 
they're going to show everyone, which will create grievances 
we and not Jim will have to answer." The managers sought to 
regulate private data to control the unrest of the EAs, 
while the Union wanted to reveal management's decisions to 
public review. 
Grapevine 
The informal communications network controlled 
management decisions which subordinates questioned. Members 
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constantly discussed what the organization was doing and 
why. Recently much talk centered on the unit's plans to 
reorganize departments and rotate supervisors. Once 
specifics of the plan were known, upper management began to 
deny the finality of the plans, instead contending that "we 
are just in the discussion stage." When upper level managers 
heard about employees' reactions to rumors, they tempered 
their plans and discussions on supervisory changes. 
Position and Influence 
One's position was also a factor in organizational 
control. As Mechanic (1962) has pointed out, even lower-
level participants secretaries, staff people -- had a 
good deal of power in the organization. Those taking an 
active role in discussing the daily problems and issues of a 
unit have greater control than others situated in less 
communications-linked positions. Judy, a secretary, noted 
that it was also "important to make the boss happy, don't 
wear jeans, and have good attendance. Your rating is based 
on whether they like you. They also consider that you don't 
complain, do what you're told, and make no waves." Bob, a 
manager of staff employees, offered this about his group. 
"I notice who asks for more work. When people are even, we 
look at attendance or a person's willingness to do extra." 
Both these employees pointed out another feature of the 
control question. Employees did not take a passive role in 
relation to their appraisals. They attempted to manage the 
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impression they produce for their bosses (Goffman, 1959). 
Individuals who maintained a low, work-focused profile, knew 
less, and actually controlled fewer decisions or introduced 
fewer ideas into the group. Managers who were action-
oriented, verbal and visible, exerted a greater influence on 
decisions by the sheer volume of their efforts. 
Impact of Environment 
The organization moved into a competitive environment 
after the parent company split up in 1984. This has 
produced a new approach to responding to the environment and 
meeting customer's needs. Prior to 1980, the corporation did 
not have a traditional marketing group, but relied on 
engineers to explain and sell products as a part of their 
jobs. Since divestiture pushed the company into the open 
market, the organization has made the customer the primary 
focus. The environmental domain of competition has directly 
shaped the internal structure, values, and processes of the 
engineering unit (Scott, 1981). Traditional notions of 
efficiency and quality -- managers deciding what the 
customer needs -- has been replaced with a customer-driven 
workplace. What the customer wants is the quality standard 
now. This shift caused supervisors to stress customer 
relations, selling, problem-solving, and teamwork over 
individual productivity and strict adherence to a 11 9 to 5 11 
schedule. Managers become confused on what was important, 
and uncertainty increased. It was necessary to redesign 
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appraisal forms for engineers and EAs. While managers 
sought greater objectivity and improved measurement tools, 
they found themselves in a workplace immersed in subjective, 
shifting performance standards. 
Linked to the above environmental changes, I found a 
renewed interest in protecting proprietary information, and 
one tangible outcome was the "Code of Conduct" and "Conflict 
of Interest Questionnaire." These documents require 
employees to declare any economic interests in companies 
doing business with the corporation, and to review a set of 
company sanctioned practices (use of company property; 
honesty and integrity; and other rules of conduct) to guide 
employee behavior. These rules serve as guides to behavior 
and occasionally work as moral checkpoints when employees 
transgress the norms. These procedures, for example, 
describe the correct way "to voucher" or account for 
expenses on a business trip. Knowledge of the rules through 
discussion, videotapes, booklets and memos constitute a 
strong device to regulate employee actions. 
Union Presence 
The local union was one of the most powerful control 
factors influencing the engineering organization's decision-
making, information flow, and benefits. The company could 
not unilaterally change working conditions, wages, or hours 
without "negotiating". This legal provision to bargain 
filtered management's decisions and created boundaries to 
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limit the company's control when assigning EAs to training 
classes, overtime, travel time, job duties, etc. Managers 
questioned their ideas against the contract provisions, past 
practices, and company policy. During bargaining in 1988, 
the company introduced a new salary administration plan 
which would have granted supervisors greater discretion in 
awarding merit increases. The Union officers laughed when 
they realized the proposal would increase the use of 
supervisory judgment, rather than limit it. Ken, a member of 
the Union bargaining team expressed his feelings this way: 
"We have complained about the problems in the current, so 
called 'merit' plan for years, and now you want us to accept 
a plan that gives supervisors more discretion? We want just 
the opposite. We want to take salary decisions away from our 
bosses, and make these increases automatic. You guys don't 
listen to us." 
Information distributed to employees was often divided 
into "management" and "non-management" or "represented" 
categories. I've seen that data, which at first appeared 
unlikely to produce a reaction from the Union leaders, were 
later defined by managers as inappropriate for the Union, 
whose presence restricted the unquestioned flow of 
information. In some ways this information was involved in 
a turf battle between the parties. Managers contended that 
they would decide what data were appropriate and when they 
should be sent. The Union officers argued that their 
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members deserved special consideration because they had 
rights under the contract. Often the discussion was 
frustrating for local managers because they did not have 
control of information content or distribution which became 
an issue between the parties. Because the Union existed, 
managers discussed, evaluated, and predicted how the Union 
would react. Supervisors constantly asked, "Do we just 
distribute this announcement (e.g., Saving Plan changes) or 
must we bargain, discuss, and entertain ideas from the 
Union?" One of the main conflict points between the two 
parties concerned the Union's demands for a variety of data, 
such as timesheets, APs, salary, and memos. Managers 
constantly constrained their actions according to a 
prediction as to how the Union could react. This situation 
was more evidence of the uncertainty in this organization 
created, in this instance, by the presence of a union and 
managers' fear of making mistakes in this relationship. 
Impact of Control Structures 
Balancing Work and Rewards 
Elaborate control mechanisms affected the engineering 
unit in several ways. First the motivation level to perform 
well was lessened as employees experienced limited 
opportunity for rewards due to system limitations and 
restrictions (Kanter, 1977). The engineering unit was 
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essentially a utilitarian organization (Etizoni, 1961; 
Thompson, 1967) which "bought" involvement through rewards, 
which when limited, caused employees to "withdraw" their 
labor enough to balance the work-reward equation. Employees 
recognized the nature of this relationship and the 
importance of rewards under the current system. 
Bill: "I need rewards to motivate my people. They meet 
all the goals, but I still can't move them." John: "We need 
to have some form of reward available." Regina: "No one pays 
much attention to appraisals because they aren't an accurate 
reflection of performance. People look at money, not 
appraisals." Two non-supervisors saw rewards this way. 
Chris: "Appraisals are a carrot to make us try harder." Ed: 
"One of the biggest complaints of the EA is that effort 
doesn't match the cell. They say, 'Why work hard if nothing 
(movement) happens? Others will be ahead of me no matter 
what I do'." 
Legitimated Inequality 
The elaborate control structures also reflected a 
stratification system which revealed structured and 
legitimated inequality. Kerbo (1983) provides a model of 
stratification adaptable to the research setting. His model 
examines several features of stratification systems: the 
degree a system is open or closed; the method of placement; 
how the inequality is legitimated; the form of inequality 
(e.g., status, economic, group power); and the degree of 
inequality. 
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The ~ of inequality at ZY&Y was marked by 
differentiated access to resources and opportunity within 
the organizations. EAs were limited in upward appraisal 
movement because their system required all the performance 
bands to balance to cell 5, in a plan where cell 1 was top 
performance and cell 8 was low good performance. 
Table 3 shows the appraisal cell structure. 
Table 3 
EA Appraisal Cell Structure 
Cell Position Appraisal Status Target Pay Percent 
1 High 118.6 
2 High 115 
3 High 110 
4 Middle 105 
5 Middle 100 
6 Middle 95 
7 Low 90 
8 Low 85 
9 Unsatisfactory 80 
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These three columns have specific meaning for members 
who talk about their relative performance by referring to a 
specific cell number, e. g., 5. Although not always directly 
expressed, each cell symbolizes a status in the reward 
system from high to low. No one has been rated 
unsatisfactory for at least the last five years. This means 
an EA rated in cell 8 was considered "satisfactory," 
although this specific term was not part of the words 
formally used to describe performance. Everyone rated in 
cells 1 through 8 (the latter low satisfactory,) was 
eligible for salary increases and bonus payments. Finally, 
all the target pay percents had to average at 100% to 
provide adequate funds to cover increases in employees' 
experience from the past year. 
Recently the subdivision of the unit known as "high 
tech" was allowed to balance at more than cell 5, 
effectively reducing the movement opportunities for other 
EAs. One appraisal norm of the organization was to divide 
rewards equally to "share the wealth." But allowing a part 
of the organization to balance over 100%, i.e., give their 
EAs better treatment, violated the past practices and was 
not easily accepted by the other managers. Upper 
management's justification was that this group had more 
complex work, requiring more employee development, for which 
these employees should be rewarded. 
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The degree of inequality was minimal on some levels, 
and moderate on others. EAs and managers shared the same 
benefit plan, with the exception of the Pension Plan. The 
management plan required longer tenure, but the payout was 
greater. A more noticeable difference centered on the salary 
plans. Management employees were eligible for 3 
compensation awards each year: a Team Award -- given to all 
members who were rated at least satisfactory; an Individual 
Performance Award -- given to 50-60% of the workforce 
depending on achievement; and a merit increase which 
affected the employee's base rate. 
The first two of these were in the form of lump sum 
checks which could vary each year. The non-management 
employees (EAs) were eligible for a lump sum award and a 
merit increase, but did not have an IPA (individual 
performance award) in their compensation plan. The 
management plan had the appearance of delivering more merit 
money because of the IPA provision. Another inequality 
dealt with the education required for certain jobs. 
Technical assignments demanded more specialized and formal 
educations, while management assignments had much more 
generalized requirements. Usually, salary differences were 
moderate, with a good deal of overlap between EAs, 
engineers, and lower to middle management people. 
Status differences were more pronounced. EAs and 
engineers worked at desks arranged in rows in an 
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undifferentiated setting. Managers had cubicles with more 
room and privacy. They also had far greater discretion in 
movement around the office and, though more responsible, 
were less accountable for their time, if not their results. 
Non-supervisors usually had to "request" permission to leave 
early or take time off, while managers had only to "inform" 
their supervisors about their intentions. There was a 
qualitative difference in the worklife experience of the 
management and non-management groups. Most managers, 
engineers, and even EAs perceived EAs to have less prestige 
than professional engineers or managers. At least 10 years 
ago a former General Manager told a group of EAs, "You are 
overpaid for what you do, and you don't need to attend 
corporate training sessions." When individuals had payroll 
or benefit problems, they spoke of themselves as "2nd class 
citizens who don't count for much." EAs also traveled much 
less frequently than did engineers or managers. This 
activity was viewed as a privilege because the employee was 
away from the job, unsupervised, and able to spend company 
funds to a limited degree. Managers wore ties and their ID 
passes contain the letter "L", signifying a supervisory rank 
and ability to "sign in" visitors. EAs generally dressed 
more informally -- what you might expect to see on a day off 
form "work" -- no ties, sport shirts, and ID tags with no 
special symbols. 
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This discussion noted that salary differences between 
actors were moderate, while status differences were more 
obtrusive. This has implications which resulted in 
uncertainty and social distance. Since salaries overlapped, 
members had similar economic power and felt financial 
impacts on the company, producing a heightened sense of 
community. However, the status features tended to drive a 
wedge between non-management (EAs) and management (engineers 
and supervisors) . The EAs perceived they received less and 
held an "underclass" position in the organization even 
though salary distinctions were moderate. 
Methods of placement were affected by formal education, 
achievement (performance), and organizational circumstances. 
As pointed out earlier, an employee stood a better chance 
for promotion to a higher technical level if he/she had had 
formal education in a technical field. The organization 
favored individuals with education because this commodity 
was viewed as important for dealing with the customer. Past 
performance determined which candidates "merited" 
consideration for promotion, because the organization 
attempted to reward those who achieved results. This 
practice reflected the myth used to legitimate unequal 
rewards -- they were based on contributions. One manager, 
Arlin, told me: "I look at productivity -- the worth of the 
individual's work to the department's goals." Bud, Arlin's 
boss added, "What is most significant is giving a job to 
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someone and it gets done." John and Ed, two production 
managers felt, "The most important factors are production, 
quality, on-time spec delivery, cost reduction cases, and 
job knowledge." Eddy went on to elaborate: "I focus my 
appraisals on what each EA contributes toward common goals. 
I see the total package of contributions in conjunction with 
experience and ability." 
As Kanter (1977) noted, some units provide greater 
opportunities for development resulting in greater 
motivational levels for these employees. EAs who dealt with 
R & D had more chances to transfer there, because of their 
position. Another example covers EAs whose jobs were 
reclassified to management positions. Although the openings 
were posted for anyone to bid on, those already in the jobs 
had the best chances to be selected because they had the 
experience described on the job ad. This kind of situation 
rendered an apparently open system, in essence, closed. 
The impact of the control system produced inefficiency, 
lower motivation, resistance to company policy, and -- most 
significantly -- it helped maintain the Union as a buffer 
against the manager's whims. A question follows this 
discussion -- If the system was so dysfunctional why did it 
continue to exist? Was management blind to the problems? 
Managers did see the dilemmas because they administered and 
lived with the results of the system. There were several 
reasons the system was reproduced. First, as Michels (1984) 
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noted, members were apathetic and preferred to be led. No 
strong management coalition emerged to make changes and a 
iack of strong EAs kept the status quo. Second, the current 
procedures were known and predictable and helped deal with 
most of the organization's uncertainty. Although highly 
imperfect, the appraisal-reward system was a legitimated 
form of inequality which delivered satisfactory salary 
increases to most members. The feeling, "It could be 
better, but also worse," pervaded the organization. 
The company was, in effect, losing productivity and 
profits from a faulty system it had developed to reward and 
motivate workers. In partial recognition of this 
contradiction and as a way to save money, the company gave 
smaller gross raises to employees' base salary and began 
using bonus awards linked to company-wide prof its and 
performance. This shifted the compensation plan to one 
based on more equal treatment, since a large segment of the 
bonus payment went to all employees. 
Why Does the Union Remain Strong? 
Before I began formally collecting data, I heard 
stories that the Union was formed in 1966 in reaction to the 
harsh, insensitive treatment of EAs by the former manager of 
the engineering group. During the interviews, I asked 
several senior managers and a union officer about the 
genesis of the Union to verify these stories, but none of 
the three people offered any more details, just a 
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confirmation of the rumors. The Union was voted in by a 
majority of 5 people, has sustained only 2 decertification 
elections, and continues today with over 65% of the EAs 
paying dues. 
Managers' popular beliefs were that the EAs did not 
need a union and, in fact, did not gain anything from having 
one. This argument did not hold up on closer examination 
because the Union filed a 1980 lawsuit which resulted in 
time-and-a-half pay for working overtime. This was a 5-year 
suit, finally settled in the Union's favor. The Union also 
provided a legal means to present problems, file grievances, 
and demand arbitration. The Union had power in the sense it 
could make individual supervisors do things (e.g., bargain, 
offer benefits) that it would normally not do willingly. 
An unexpected pattern of interaction occurred between 
the company and the Union. Managers used a wide variety of 
bureaucratic procedures (e.g., AP forms, time sheets, 
authority levels) to control members. These procedures 
required supervisory action and time to insure the rules 
were being kept. This surveillance then often replaced the 
substance of conflict (e.g., appraisals, promotions) and 
became one of the points of conflict between the parties. 
Issues arose more over the methods and actions of management 
rather than the substance of the issue (Hill, 1981). For 
example, the Union representatives accepted the company's 
right to appraise and grant salary increases, but 
continuously disagreed over how management determined 
appraisals and merit increases. 
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The Union representatives remained influential because 
they could demand data and keep management accountable for 
their actions. They provided a formal means to handle 
conflict peacefully and to insure that both parties were 
responsive to each other. It was interesting to experience 
the ''institutionalization of conflict" (Hill, 1981) several 
years ago during an arbitration hearing at ZY&Y. The leaders 
were displeased because management developed a new way to 
group EAs by service band which was intended to deliver 
money more equitably. The Union leaders argued that EAs 
should be evaluated as a total universe and not as four 
separate groupings created when managers divided the EAs by 
service. Managers said this was a fairer way to pay newer 
employees who "funded" more money into the raise fund 
because their salaries were low, but who wound up receiving 
less money. The Union saw this as a method of favoring the 
young, more educated EAs at the expense of the older, more 
experienced employees. Here we see a conflict of values 
within the ranks of the Union. They called for equal 
treatment of all EAs but actually sought to protect the 
senior EAs. The Union debated bitterly before and during the 
grievance process. Emotions ran high and feelings and 
communications were greatly strained. Once the parties met 
in a neutral site, and the rituals of arbitration began, 
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both sides were more controlled and rational with each 
other. The outcome was mediated by the presence of a third 
party, the arbitrator. The practices and formalities (e.g., 
questioning, cross-examination) made the union-management 
interaction more analytical and rational, and removed 
emotions from the hearing. The angry words were replaced by 
polite conversation to explain the system and how 
supervisors had mismanaged it. 
Summary of Evaluation Control Methods and Their Impact 
As this chapter has shown, a wide array of control 
"methods" were active in the Engineering unit, producing a 
number of consequences. Following is a brief summary of 
those evaluation related control factors and their impact. 
Beliefs in equity strengthens the utilitarian view of 
organizations where employees expect rewards for their 
labor. This reduces employee commitment and maintains a 
distance between boss and subordinate. The nature of one's 
job affects his/her chance for visibility and movement. 
Some positions are less demanding thus freeing up time to 
"look good" in other projects. Appraisal forms reveal 
inconsistencies between managers but are a formal record 
which carries weight during grievances, so language conceals 
data rather than reveals it on the form. Tied to this is 
the employee's fear of receiving a poor rating which will 
limit raises. This perception generally results in 
compliance to work rules and company objective. 
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Managers use group meetings to reward subordinates, 
form coalitions, and maintain inequality. These gatherings 
focus on supervisory conflict rather than assessment of 
subordinates' performance. The continuing belief in formal 
authority levels blocks the employee from taking chances and 
trying new solutions because these needed to be approved by 
the boss. Independent thinking and creativity are 
destroyed. The use of job qualifications limits employee 
movement especially when the requirement has inflated 
educational demands to ease the selection of favorite-son 
candidates. 
Managers act like guard dogs over the use of salary and 
personnel data which keeps them more powerful than 
subordinates who rely on the grapevine. However, this 
informal device slows some questionable management decisions 
by exposing negative reactions. Changes in the environment 
also tends to protect and restrict information flow, based 
on what the god-like customer now demands. 
Finally, the presence of a union produces conflict, 
protects employees, helps maintain itself because of the 
tension it creates, and makes managers cautious about 
decisions they feel are completely in their domain of 
discretion. 
CHAPTER 6 
ORGANIZATIONAL BELIEFS AND VALUES 
My experience in the organization shows that a variety 
of beliefs related to the evaluation system were taken-for-
granted by the majority of actors. This chapter will expose 
these values and demonstrate their impact on the engineering 
organization and its appraisal system. This will be 
accomplished by discussing the values/beliefs of management, 
the Union officers, and other non-supervisory employees, 
using interviews, bargaining sessions, and general 
participant observation. As a point of reference, I define 
a value as some action, state of mind, or material object 
members of the organization see as important, desirous, or a 
good worthy of possessing. 
Management Beliefs 
These observations are described from most to least 
frequently discussed. All comments relating to beliefs are 
listed, then grouped into nine categories that reflect a 
common theme and include: What Counts; Let's Do This Fairly, 
But Easily; How the Pie is Divided; The Payoff; Something is 
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wrong Here!; The Blueprint is Good; Sizing Up the Prospects; 
Judge Wapner May Need It; and Can They Become Butterflies?. 
What Counts 
These statements describe what "counts'', i.e., what was 
seen as important, in assigning employees to performance 
bands, and constitute the largest frequency of responses 
from the interviews. 
The largest grouping of performance attributes concern 
production and contain references to contributing to goals, 
completing tasks, using resources, and working consistently 
over a long period. Ed told me, "I focus my appraisals on 
what each EA contributes toward common goals. One year 
someone could produce $100 in sales and then $150 the next 
year, but a second EA who also once produced $100, now does 
$300." Arlin said, "I look at productivity -- the worth of 
the individual's work to the department's goals." Bob 
added, "What's important is getting the job done and serving 
the customer." A subcategory, hard work, also fits here even 
though it covers behavior that went beyond the norm of 
performance, or revealed some special effort. Bob said he 
"notices who asks for more work and completes it. When 
people are even, we look at a person's willingness to do 
extra, stay late." Kurt saw that "you must do something 
extra and have it noticed." 
The next grouping centers on personal skills that 
managers saw as innate or in sociological terms, ascribed. 
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These highly valued attributes, included attitude, loyalty, 
commitment, judgment, imagination, ingenuity, and 
initiative. This belief established the basis for managers 
to use subjective factors (e.g., personality and attitude) 
as an acceptable way to evaluate workers. This was a 
convenient means to begin or conclude "confusing" appraisal 
decisions, i.e., those where little was known about the 
person's behavior. A number of managers expressed their 
views on this group of skills. Arlin: "Getting a raise or 
not doesn't change the work habits of most people." George, 
a staff specialist, said, "Bosses look at the kind of person 
you are, not really hard data." John J. noted that 
"flexibility is important to me." Kurt: "The EA with a good 
attitude is sought out." The staff manager added, "The most 
important behavior is someone going out of his way to do the 
job." Supervisors generally agreed upon a definition of 
these abstract concepts, but they admitted to using a good 
deal of personal judgment when rating people on these 
qualities. 
This grouping also contained interpersonal behaviors 
such as cooperation, teamwork, and handling differences. 
Arlin told me, "A cooperative guy knows who's the boss and 
is good technically." Chris, a staff support specialist 
felt, "Results are important, but it helps to be cooperative 
and listen to what others say." Chuck noted, "In selecting 
EAs for moves we discuss going above and beyond, and quality 
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of teamwork." John W. said, "Work habits, like following 
the rules, are important." These were valued because the 
work of the engineering unit required a high degree of 
interdependence, and the tasks and departmental objectives 
were highly specialized, so it was critical for members to 
rely on each other in order to accomplish tasks or solve 
problems. 
I called the third grouping achieved or learned skills 
because they reflected valued qualities employees acquired 
through experience or training (e.g., job knowledge, 
technical and administrative skills, cost reduction ideas, 
safety, communications ability, and the capacity to apply 
what one knows). Managers had these comments to illustrate 
this skill. Bob: "I want my people to conduct themselves as 
professionals." John: "I look at the type of work they can 
do, like the number of systems they know, and the complexity 
of work they handle." Reno: "The top EA does the 'junk' --
probing tough jobs, and teaching others." 
The fourth grouping focused on the concept of time. 
The way the employee used his time for production, and the 
timeliness of his/her work gained attention during 
evaluation. Another item under this subgrouping was the 
concept of seniority. Managers valued workers who had "more 
time" in the department or with the company. Ouchi's (1982) 
research about Japanese organizational structures supported 
the use of seniority as a tool to reinforce the corporate 
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values. Longer service employees learned the culture and 
strengthened it through their routine behavior. This finding 
fit the Japanese situation with its monolithic culture and 
deemphasis on annual evaluations, but revealed the myth that 
actual performance accounts for an appraisal level. 
Seniority was not equivalent to job performance and 
reflected that "time on the job", in practice, counted for 
more than one's achievements. Bill was direct in his view of 
tenure. "I use tenure as a basis of appraisals. I'd place 
a 4-year person above a 1-year guy. I give preference to 
the one who's been producing longer." Chuck shed light on a 
problem related to seniority. "It's difficult to move a 
young EA coming on strong because other managers won't 
accept taking a new EA over a senior EA. Mature EAs were 
held back in the past due to a shrinking universe, so they 
deserve to move now. 11 Kurt supported this position. "The 
more consistent EA would get moved, because he's performed 
over a longer period." 
Most members believed that people should move up in 
performance cells over time, with a shared expectation that 
length of service should equate to a higher appraisal band. 
Kurt had an insight into the situation. "EAs feel they 
should keep moving up, that they're entitled to a higher 
cell, and those who move up aren't motivated because they 
feel entitled to the move." Bob observed, "People feel that 
if they're doing the job or some extras, they should move 
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up. People reject the system -- it takes too much time to 
move and when it finally comes, people are negative." 
Members expressed dissatisfaction when shorter service 
people ranked higher than the more senior individuals. 
Upper management verbally supported the idea that 
performance should not be tied to seniority, but to the 
individual's actual behavior. During level 3 grievance 
hearings, the bargaining agent argued that "time at the desk 
doesn't equate to a cell position. We still believe that 
performance, regardless of service, is what matters." As 
indicated above, the myth continued because the practice of 
managers was to give credit to an employee's seniority to 
the extent that, in the case of "equal" performance, the 
more senior worker got the higher cell position. 
I classified the above statements into four types of 
performance attributes because of the type of behavior 
described. The purpose is to show and summarize the types of 
behavior managers judged important in the engineering unit. 
The theoretical basis for this classification came from 
Scott and Dornbusch (1967) who analyzed authority systems by 
evaluating actors' performances. Assessments were used to 
distribute unequal rewards, and evaluators had four tasks in 
the process: 
1. define goals decide what each person should do 
2. set criteria specify desired performance and the 
standards to use 
3. sampling -- select segments of performance for 
evaluation 
4. appraising -- judge performance from the sample, 
and apply criteria to reach evaluation decision. 
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Scott and Dornbusch concluded the evaluation process 
supported the authority structure because authority came 
from the position of significant evaluators whose actions, 
decisions, and judgments influenced the distribution of 
rewards. Since the managers were the "raters" in the 
organization, an understanding of the goals and criteria of 
performance they defined as significant was enlightening for 
the research. 
All the performance attributes shared a common theme: 
managers valued qualities that improved the department's 
goals of greater production and profitability. These 
features were very rational, or results-oriented with little 
disagreement among managers on the importance of these 
performance attributes, although individual "bosses" might 
stress cooperation over quality or inventiveness. These 
comments defined that "work" in this organization meant to 
be productive, do an accurate job, have a good attitude, be 
cooperative, apply technical knowledge, put in one's time, 
and do something extra to "stand out." The results were 
taken-for-granted but revealed again the distinction between 
organizational and individual goals. Managers valued, 
measured, and rewarded those whom they saw as contributing 
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to their department goals (Scott and Dornbusch, 1967). 
Individuals enhanced their chance of succeeding in the 
system if they learned the rules of the game (Pugh and 
Hickson, 1989; Burawoy, 1979}, "played ball" with 
management, and hoped their efforts were recognized as 
supportive of the results-achievement game. The majority of 
actors concentrated on doing their jobs and presenting the 
behaviors they thought were valued, recognizing however, 
that perceptions of their efforts didn't match the rewards 
they received. The Union president told me, "One of the 
biggest complaints of EAs is that effort doesn't match the 
cell. They feel why work hard if nothing happens. Others 
will be ahead of me no matter what I do." This group either 
gave up chasing the reward carrot, or developed skills to 
manage their performance to beat the system. A staff 
specialist pointed out a problem. "They (boss) can't always 
see you (e.g., how you work, what problems you overcame), so 
you have to 'play politics' and tell your boss what you're 
doing. It's important to keep the boss up to date on your 
work -- it doesn't allow them to ask any questions." Again 
it was apparent that appraisals were "window dressing", 
hiding the reality that evaluations did not reflect 
performance, but variables like personality, seniority, and 
the influence and judgment of managers. 
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Let's Do This Fairly, But Easily 
The following section reflects management's overall 
perspective on how appraisals were handled in the 
organization. The comments with the highest frequency showed 
that managers believed appraisals should be fair and reflect 
equity: employees should be rewarded differentially, 
matching their contributions, which should come before 
rewards. However, this belief was a myth because equity was 
an illusion, a goal, which managers talked about, desired 
but never reached. This wish for fairness remained strong 
in the face of employees' dissatisfaction because it was a 
way this system of inequality was legitimated (Kerbo, 1983). 
If workers lost this belief, the imperfections and 
unfairness of the system would emerge above the lake's 
surface, like the elusive Loch Ness Monster! In an equality-
based system, everyone performing at some minimal level was 
rewarded (Kerbo, 1983). Also the equity concept clearly 
recognized that management assigned a different "value" to 
each employee, a process contrary to the Union's willingness 
to accept the same general reward for all members. The 
equity value again emerged when managers stated that a merit 
system provided needed incentives, while an automatic 
progression plan would only hurt performance. 
Interestingly, the second most frequent set of comments 
showed that management "did not want to hurt" employees. Bob 
informed me that "we try not to hurt anyone, so we keep the 
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positions the same. To move someone up, you must drop 
someone." The former staff manager said, "Managers did not 
want to drop their person because of the negative impact on 
salary." This meant that once a raise was granted or a 
higher performance band assigned, supervisors were reluctant 
to take these back. Their comments conceded they felt the 
employee no longer deserved the prior status, but the 
manager did not want to lower the rating and confront the 
person and explain what happened. According to Regina, 
"Managers want to avoid confrontation." In addition some 
supervisors didn't see much value in confronting employees. 
Bill: "I've told EAs about negative things, like tardiness, 
and there still wasn't a change." Kurt supported this 
position. "EAs are told the same thing each year and there's 
no change in behavior." This practice of not hurting workers 
had several consequences. First, employees missed feedback 
which could help improve performance and develop skills. So 
a desire to avoid hurting subordinates now actually "hurts" 
them throughout their careers. Second, managers contributed 
to the legend of evaluations by retaining workers at levels 
which didn't reflect the subordinates' most recent 
achievements. Appraisals affirmed a history of performance 
rather than current status. This further questioned the 
value and purpose of this yearly "report card" in the eyes 
of everyone affected. 
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Another perspective widely shared by managers favored 
an appraisal system which was convenient to administer. 
supervisors found the whole notion of appraising others 
distasteful and saw it as "the time of year during which we 
earn a year's salary." Ed B. told me, "At the review 
meetings, OMs get worn out and give up on pushing their 
candidates. There's a feeling to just put the EAs 
somewhere." Another manager, Eddy said, "Some supervisors 
find it difficult to write so they used the phrase 'met 
expectations', instead of being specific." Gen, who 
supervised clerical employees, said: "Appraisals are dreaded 
by everyone. They interrupt the daily routine of work and 
social relations." John w., a keen observer of the 
organization, told me: "Managers accept a certain procedure 
if it favors their situation, like the methods to place EAs 
into cells." Managers found the appraisal process 
distasteful because it produced a fight for a limited number 
of "better" ranks, and supervisors argued with each other to 
move their candidates. Gen told me, "It's a dog fight -- it 
depends on how you made your case. You feel like a lawyer 
because you must prove your case to get your candidate a top 
spot. 11 John informed me that, "There's fighting for 'my guy 
is better' position. We are rewarding on opinions and 
perceptions, not performance." 
This system was guided by the value of convenience and 
focused primarily on completing the appraisal process, 
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rather than producing a list which accurately reflected a 
correlation between performance and appraisal band 
placement. Bud, a third level manager (BLM), expressed it 
this way: "In the past, our goal was to balance at 100% more 
than focus on real performance differences." This is further 
evidence that appraisals are "window dressing" for what 
really happened in the unit. organizational needs for 
efficiency elevated convenience, i.e., completing employees' 
appraisals, over working on "accurate" evaluations where 
there were better matches between achievements and appraisal 
classification. 
The value of convenience was also evident in the use of 
the 100% balance point for appraisals, which produced an 
allocation system rather than an evaluation system. since 
not all people can move to the cells their supervisors 
nominated them for, the organization used the 11 100% rule" to 
fund the plan with salary increase money, and to establish a 
target value (100%) as the average for all appraisals in 
order to legitimate a system that failed to recognize all 
deserving employees. It was convenient to cite the limits of 
the system, rather than to tell the individual that he/she 
did not deserve to move up a cell. Mike, a relatively new 
manager, justified the failure of his employees to advance 
when he told an EA, "I know you're a good performer and I 
tried to get a cell move for you, but I was limited by the 
system we use." Jim, a veteran manager, criticized Mike: 
"Don't blame lack of movement on the system, say other 
supervisors convinced you that their people were more 
deserving." 
167 
Based on my contact with all levels of employees, the 
negative reaction to the appraisal system was linked to lack 
of recognition and increased when the person felt he/she 
deserved a reward. EAs who were negative had these comments: 
"It stinks. As a member of the support group, it's harder 
to compete against the line, i.e., the production group 
responsible for writing "specs." Another said he couldn't 
understand the process, had "no sponsor", and felt 
appraisals were "distortions." A third EA said, "There are 
a lot of unhappy people. Apparently, loyalty and hard work 
don't count for much." Another EA mirrored comments made by 
managers. "The system works on allocation, not skill or 
achievement. I'm not higher because there's no room for 
movement." Engineers had similar reactions. One said, "The 
process is poor. It operates on politics and 'brown-nosing'. 
I was told by a boss that nobody gets an outstanding 
(rating), then found out some did." Another engineer felt 
he didn't advance because, "I didn't play politics or 
socialize." However, when an individual was rated well, 
things looked different: "The system works fine for me. I'm 
at the top and have been treated positively." 
One wonders, "How can such an appraisal plan continue 
when there are such negative reactions?" Let me offer some 
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explanations. Employees complained because they weren't 
rewarded to the level they thought fit their performance. 
However, almost all employees did receive rewards each year. 
You could say things are fine, but they just could be 
better. These limited rewards and the possibility that 
conditions would improve legitimated the system enough to 
maintain it. Also the majority of subjects told me they 
were powerless to change the system because managers 
controlled. It was enlightening to see that, when issues 
were perceived to be outside one's domain of influence, they 
proved to be beyond one's power. This has elements of the 
self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1968). 
Supervisors repeatedly commented that they used and 
accepted a variety of appraisal methods, taking a "do it my 
way" stance; They supported this position by noting the 
uniqueness of each job and stressing their individual right 
to exercise discretion. Bob: "We face a difficulty because 
there are many different kinds of work in engineering and 
it's hard to merge the performance lists." Ed B. : "Work 
varies so much, managers have to interpret what produced the 
results." Reno: "Numbers like efficiency and quality ratios 
don't mean much because departments vary so much." Eddy: 
"Groups vary too much by experience and work to treat them 
as a single unit." John W.: "There's wide variation in 
what's considered good performance. Some stress numbers, 
others personalities. Each manager uses his/her own 
standards." 
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Closely tied to this position was the stated belief in 
the use of manager's perceptions, judgment, and input from 
engineers, which was a relatively recent source of appraisal 
data. Arlin: "Since the engineers assign work to the EAs, I 
developed a questionnaire for them to fill out on their EAs. 
The basis of this was perception, not 'statistics'." Eddy: 
"I conducted 3 development reviews during the year in which 
I get input from my engineers. I used sheets for the review 
which have categories like problem-solving, and 
productivity. Each item can be rated as 'below' or 'above' 
expectations. I then write a paragraph on what needs to 
change. This was done with engineers and EA present." The 
key point was that managers accepted multiple appraisal 
factors and rejected the use of a formal set of guidelines, 
rendering the entire system even more situational. 
Throughout all my interviews and observation of meetings, 
only one manager -- Bill -- said he either wanted to or in 
fact did use a written set of performance norms. All 
others wanted to control the appraisals of their people. 
John J. put it this way: "I want to be able to appraise, 
rank, and reward my people according to the conditions 
facing my department." 
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HOW the Pie Is Divided 
Insights about what managers valued occurred when I 
examined their beliefs about how appraisals should be 
accomplished. The responses clustered into several 
categories, but the most frequent one showed that 
supervisors approached the process seeking a fair allocation 
of the limited moves. Recognizing that not all deserving 
employees can advance, the managers adapted a system of 
upward moves based on size of the sub-branch, number of new, 
non-rated employees, and the unit's current balancing point 
relative to the 100% target. This practice invalidated the 
claim of equity and reinforced the myth of appraisals, 
reflecting a whole set of variables beside performance which 
accounted for an evaluation. This argument will be expanded 
in Chapter 7. 
An example will illustrate this procedure, based on the 
numerical restrictions defined by management, to average all 
appraisals to 100%. A large subbranch was allowed more 
moves because it contained more employees. The two largest 
branches had 130 and 100 EAs, respectively. Managers argued 
that group B (100 EAs) should be allocated 30% of any 
available moves because they had 30% of the total universe. 
New EAs traditionally began their appraisal career in cells 
8 or 7 with expectations to move at least, toward cell 5, 
the "mid-point." These lower positions, with values below 
100%, allowed more senior employees to be in higher cells 
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and still maintained a balance of 100%. The more new EAs in 
a department, the more veteran EAs who were placed higher. 
Related to that circumstance was the requirement, cited 
earlier, for the appraisals of all EAs to balance at 100%. 
Departments below 100 had more opportunity to fill positions 
to come up to 100, while groups above 100, were questioned 
for placing even more EAs in higher cells, forcing the 
overall average to exceed 100%. 
The fallacy of this plan was that performance did not 
count as much as seniority or prior movement, allowing for 
more opportunities. The parties continued to have the false 
impression that achievement counted when, in practice, a 
number of "system" factors (e.g. openings, seniority) 
determined placement. Again, the myth that evaluations 
reflected contributions was exposed. The words of individual 
managers illustrate these points. Arlin: "We feel we should 
share these moves. We determine how many we can move and 
then allocate." John: "It's a numbers game. Only so many 
people can be in the top categories." Ed: "Some departments 
stay higher over time. I got most moves by promoting and 
hiring." Bill: "We work with the idea of sharing moves --
all departments get a fair share of moves. The allocation 
of moves was based on the department's balancing percentage, 
and the number of people in the department." Reno: "The 
BLMs take turns putting EAs into top positions." This 
practice illustrates again that the current relative 
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performance system was based more on the number of possible 
actually available rather than the merit of the individual's 
performance. Management recognized that system limitations 
-- need to balance at 100%- "cut back" people nominated for 
upward movement. This situation created an interesting 
contradiction. An appraisal system, intended to reward 
performance, was modified to accommodate movement limits, 
reduced chances, and thus increased the likelihood that 
employees would lose faith in the plan, that legitimacy 
would be reduced and so cause the plan to "break down." The 
myth was never fully embraced probably because its exposure 
would be too devastating for the actors to handle. The lie 
of equity was too large to accept. 
However, in contrast to the belief and practice of 
fairness in allocation, managers thought they could compare 
people and determine each one's relative performance as 
expressed in the rank order list, used to determine cell 
placement and ultimately the number of moves allowed. The 
relative system supported the competitive nature of the work 
relationships, where "cooperation gets lip-service." It was 
a long standing practice for managers to preach teamwork and 
cooperation, while granting individual salary increases and 
promotions. As one manager, Ed, explained it to me: 
"Appraisals exist, like in football or baseball, to produce 
a starting line-up. You always need competition to get 
results." Under this competitive system -- employees vying 
for a limited number of upward moves 
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appraisal practices 
focused on selected, visible aspects of performance (e.g., 
production, quality, timeliness) while ignoring teamwork, 
positive relations, and problem-solving. 
Managers also believed that appraisals and associated 
rewards were needed to motivate subordinates. This is a 
common, taken-for-granted value in utilitarian organizations 
described by Etzioni (1961), or in inducement-contribution 
settings (Thompson, 1967). People must be involved and 
committed to the unit's goals and activities through a 
tangible reward. A common expression was, "Do you think I'd 
show up for work if they didn't pay me?" This belief fit the 
equity concept and resulted in the general acceptance and 
justification of unequal salaries, based on varying 
contributions. 
Managers were also appraised, so they generally "played 
the game" to protect or enhance their rewards. crozier (Pugh 
and Hickson, 1989) noted the games actors played to increase 
their power. His research showed that bureaucratic units 
were sites for a series of games between groups of actors: 
boss-subordinate, peers, men-women, and young-old. He argued 
that at the "heart of the games was the goal to maximize 
one's gains (e.g. power, influence, rewards), while 
lessening these factors in others." For him "knowledge was a 
key variable, and so was reducing uncertainty, which leads 
to power." This was not a static situation because the 
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"advantages change sides during the game." A number of years 
ago, I asked Dennis, a manager, why he was successful, based 
on his above-average ratings and salary treatment. He said, 
"I play the game. I give them what they want, and tell them 
what they want to hear." As I said above, most managers 
played the game Dennis described, and thus the organization 
had a compliance orientation, rather than a risk-taking 
stance (Edwards, 1984). 
Managers believed that discussion and feedback were 
useful to improve behavior. Interestingly, supervisors 
admitted some people did not change after repeated feedback 
on shortcomings in the setting of a merit-based system that 
should pay differently for compliance behavior. This was a 
sign the system's legitimacy was eroding. As Bill, manager 
of a software group, said: "I've told EAs about negative 
things, like tardiness, and there wasn't a change." 
Supervisors also accepted multiple judgments as a way 
to allocate moves and check individual perceptions. 
According to John W., "The multiple manager meetings offer 
checks and balances on some cases. Extreme upward moves are 
restricted." There was support for consensus on the 
appraisal decisions. If candidates passed this test of 
fire, they were judged worthy of higher cell placement. 
Managers recognized that appraisals were largely based on 
perceptions and were not produced by a "pure math 
calculation." Group meetings justified candidate selection 
and tested and validated the values and judgment of all 
supervisors. 
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Finally, another set of conflicting beliefs about the 
link between salary and appraisals existed in the 
engineering organization. Some managers argued that 
appraisals should be done independently of their potential 
impact on salary. This would decrease, the perceived impact 
of salary on appraisals, but also weaken the motivational 
"whip" of salary. If someone were highly paid, managers did 
not want to drop the person's appraisal. Since performance 
evaluation drove salary level the equity concept --
knowledge of salary was a factor raters always considered. 
However, supervisors told me they calculated the-effect of 
appraisals on salary and based some of their decisions on 
who benefited most and who would be hurt least. According to 
Chuck, "We try to be fair and look at the impact of raises. 
If advancing someone (a cell) will not get them more money, 
that EA may be dropped or not advanced as much." Kurt was 
more specific on the impact of salary. "Once we put some 
engineers in a higher cell because we were told more money 
was available." This practice again pointed out that the 
system was driven by a bureaucratic system's need to balance 
and allocate moves, rather than managers' desire to assign 
people to bands based on their performance during the 
period. The value of organizational convenience or task 
orientation controlled the system, and it was management's 
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way to distribute a limited set of resources (e.g., cell 
moves and resulting salary increases). Employees were 
passive recipients, often viewed as a commodity with 
varying, unequal value, based on their contribution to the 
engineering unit's goals. 
The Payoff 
It was clear that cell position and salary were the two 
key correlated rewards. The main factor was cell placement 
which in turn determined the salary for each person. 
Managers said their subordinates felt that cell advancement 
was expected and something they were "entitled" to receive. 
This belief placed enormous pressure on a system that used a 
fixed balancing point and limited allocation of moves. 
Individuals viewed the current system as, in my terms, a 
long duration "cueing" process which started an EA at the 
bottom (cell 8 or 7) and moved him/her toward the middle 
(5,6) or even to the top (1,2) over time. Both supervisors 
and EAs valued seniority, loyalty, consistent performance, 
and playing the game as factors that helped EAs maintain 
their relative position in the cue or allocation system, 
which was passed off as a "merit-performance" plan. Again 
contributions took a back seat to other factors (e.g., 
waiting your turn for promotion), strengthening the myth of 
appraisals as reflections of personal contributions. 
Supervisors said appropriate individual rewards 
included movement, money, recognition, and personal growth. 
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Across-the-board increases were viewed negatively because 
they were granted "to everyone regardless of performance," 
failing to differentiate rewards. Once again it became clear 
that rewards were intended to reflect differential 
performance and had to be earned by the individual 
employee's actions. Compliance with the group's rules 
(e.g., work habits, timeliness) were rewarded (Edwards, 
1984), and most managers thought their subordinates remained 
in the organization because they were satisfied with the 
salary, benefits, and working conditions, compared to their 
efforts. Chuck saw it this way: "EAs may not like 
appraisals, but they are content, have a good boss, work 
overtime, and like their benefits." There was a satisfactory 
utilitarian arrangement when resignation rate was used as a 
indicator of dissatisfaction, because fewer than 5 of 300 
EAs voluntarily left the organization each year. 
Something Is Wrong Here 
Managers expressed a number of value contradictions. A 
dominant theme was the incongruity between an EA's cell 
location and the behavior perceived by managers. There were 
highly rated employees who should have been lower, and 
others situated in the bottom third (cells, 8,7,6) who 
"belonged" in the middle or top positions. Managers had a 
number of comments about this issue. Bill: "Appraisals 
don't mean anything. They don't reflect the cell one is put 
in." Ed: "I believe my own appraisals are accurate, but the 
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overall system doesn't match performance and placement." 
John J. had even more specific comments: "I don't believe 
appraisals for myself or my EAs. I can compare 3 EAs in one 
sub-branch and conclude they all don't belong in the same 
performance band." 
Supervisors also commented that the AP form, employed 
to record job objectives and accomplishments, contained 
language which "trapped" the supervisor into taking a 
position that could be challenged through the grievance 
procedure. Because of this fear, the form concealed 
information instead of revealing specific feedback. John's 
reaction to the appraisal form was typical: "I put little on 
the AP form because the EA and Union use it against us. The 
statements were general and consistent to fit the overall 
appraisal. I cover myself against challenges. The form 
only forces managers to write something and to talk to his 
EAs." This contradiction was one of several associated with 
the appraisal process, which purported to develop employees 
but actually withheld information, causing dissatisfaction 
instead of enhancing motivation. 
Upper management advocated communication, while most 
supervisors tried mainly to avoid confrontation. However, at 
least two managers said they gave feedback to employees. 
Kurt: "I let my EAs see their score on production and 
quality, so they can track themselves." John pointed out a 
similar practice. "I use a book of results available for 
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all EAs to see. They get feedback and correct themselves." 
When supervisors did not completely avoid these face-to-face 
meetings, they sought ways, through the use of forms, to 
routinize the job of interviewing 25 EAs and to avoid 
unpleasantness. A number of non-supervisory employees 
reacted to the use of appraisal forms. Lou: "I don't think 
the MAP [Management Appraisal Plan] form was used at all. 
My boss filled it out and gave to me to sign. He just hands 
me the MAP; there is no discussion." Chris: "We use a 1-
page form, containing different performance levels. The 
boss reviews the form and we're expected to sign it. It's 
basically a 'telling' session." Judy, a secretary, pointed 
out her perception of the private misuse of forms: "My boss 
xeroxed an appraisal form for 2 employees who performed 
differently. He used the form during the interview, allows 
you to review it, but it doesn't matter what's said because 
the level is already decided and it won't change." 
Managers also mentioned forms. Regina: "There is a poor 
use of forms; they are not always filled out. Employees are 
not given a chance to discuss objectives, but told to sign. 
Bosses want to avoid confrontation and ambiguous situations. 
They want one set of standards for all engineers, because it 
takes too much time to tailor forms to individual 
situations." Reno: "The AP is a tool which prompts verbal 
comments not on the form. It is easier not to talk or 
confront EAs, so we like to avoid the situation." Chuck: "I 
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use a questionnaire I developed with my engineers, to write 
the AP. Sometimes I discuss a problem rather than write 
them on AP. I don't want to hurt the EA by past 'recorded' 
remarks. The problem could just be temporary." Ed: "I use 
a 8-item developmental review paragraph, instead of a check 
list. The AP had constraints and some supervisors find it 
difficult to write, so they used the phrase, 'met 
expectations'. They might ship significant items." These 
comments disclosed another side of appraisals not normally 
discussed -- they were situations of conflict and 
uncertainty between boss and subordinate which the 
supervisor controlled through uses of selected language on 
AP forms. The interview was not a neutral, routine 
conversation between the parties, but a setting for the 
evaluator to define the situation and control the 
subordinate. 
A few supervisors said it was not possible to 
distinguish and rank 300-plus EAs, while some felt that such 
a task was realistic and valid. Chuck told me: "A small 
group is easy to compare. There are a lot of fallacies with 
300-plus EAs. I don't see how we could accurately rank that 
many people." John J.: "The large size of departments (30 
employees) puts constraints on doing appraisals." Two 
managers contended starting salaries were too high, 
resulting in no chance of an increase during the next few 
salary reviews. This again indicated that current salary was 
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an important factor in determining an EA's appraisal 
position, placing 'performance' -- a mythical cliche held by 
many to count toward placement -- into a secondary role. 
upper management had to justify its policies, so commonly 
managers defended the process even while admitting its many 
problems. I attended numerous grievance hearings where the 
bargaining agent described the use of multiple supervisory 
judgments: "We get all the supervisors in a locked room and 
they argue for who had the top person. I know this isn't 
perfect, but we believe a merit system is the best way to 
handle the type of work you do." 
Closely tied to this rational position was the belief 
that training could fix problems. several years ago a third 
level manager had me conduct a one-day workshop on 
appraising employees and conducting interviews. I presented 
a number of concepts, stressed the need for documentation, 
and the value of preparation. Most supervisors listened and 
participated, but toward the end of one session, Ed B. said, 
"I understand the need to do things in a careful way, using 
definite performance norms, but I'm going to continue doing 
appraisals like I have for years." These managers received 
the information, but were fixed in their techniques and 
weren't going to try another approach. This was just one 
example of management's belief, that given enough resources, 
any problem could be solved (Cohen & March, 1972; Daft, 
1986). Training supervisors might develop their individual 
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skills, but a seminar did virtually nothing to influence the 
§!YStem of interaction in the organization. Sets of beliefs, 
procedures, and norms exerted a powerful, if often 
invisible, effect on the decisions managers made. 
Managers operated in a system that rewarded production, 
quality, cooperation, and achievement. "Making waves", 
trying something new, taking risks, and acting independently 
were not perceived as wise actions. Supervisors called me 
to check on contract language to make sure they "aren't 
violating the agreement and are consistent with other 
managers. 11 The current reward structure recognized 
compliance; actors were aware of this as "one of the rules" 
and played along quite satisfactorily. These forces were 
talked about, but remained informal, subtle factors and did 
not appear in manager's departmental goals. As John told 
me: "Financial goals define department goals because my 
appraisal is tied to those results." 
The Blueprint Is Good 
Managers also viewed parts of the appraisal system from 
a functional perspective, claiming the AP form identified 
departmental goals. Some used the form to communicate goals 
at the start of each year. John J.: "I tell my people what 
they'll be measured on. I use the AP to describe their 
functions, and compare them to the department average." 
Bob: "I use the AP/MAP forms to explain responsibilities and 
get the person's agreement." Kurt's comments provided a 
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good example of AP usage linked to department goals: "I use 
the AP form and 'tailor' it to each job. I set up 
department goals which were generic. Each EA contributes 
toward that goal." Arlin said, "Department goals are tied 
to a questionnaire I developed to rate EAs, which helped me 
fill out the AP form." It functioned as both a control and 
developmental tool on and for employees. 
In the end, supervisors thought they used the proper 
techniques and so had the right to evaluate performance and 
place employees into unequal categories. This was a 
strongly held belief which I had never heard questioned, 
even by the Union president, who usually challenged 
individual perceptions and judgments but not the company's 
right to appraise. 
Sizing Up the Prospects 
The managers held contrasting views about whether they 
could realistically measure the contributions of members. 
Some treated production and quality as real and thought it 
was possible to have an objective view of performance and 
results. Supervisors also saw the form as reflecting valid, 
real facts-of-performance with efficiency or cost-reduction 
data as tangible products of the organization. Kurt pointed 
this out: "I tried to show differences on APs by using 
adjectives showing degrees of the same quality." Some 
managers used the AP as an absolute, end-product appraisal, 
while others merely used it as a relative guide to 
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determining band designations. Bob: "I use the AP for 
discussion, but I can't measure like 'the line' which has 
production and quality numbers. I can't even use the number 
of cost reduction cases because they vary in degree of 
difficulty." These comments show that evaluations were 
interpreted and used differently by various raters, making 
them non-standard. The real evaluations happened on a less 
rational and more personal basis than some members were 
willing to admit, offering more evidence that appraisals 
were "window dressing" for what really took place. 
I attended several results meetings where graphs showed 
weekly production results for various departments. The feel 
of the discussion was that the charts captured the "reality" 
of the production process, i.e., it could be quantified, as 
if EAs worked on punch presses. A number of managers made 
statements indicating their acceptance of "objective" 
factors and the appraisal process. John: "We sometimes use 
last year's rank as a criterion. The EA who was higher keeps 
that position." Kurt: "You look at past appraisals because 
you don't turn the pile upside down." Ed B.: "The most 
important factors are production, quality, on-time 
performance, and job knowledge." Arlin: "I look at 
productivity -- the worth of the individual's work to the 
department's goals." The strong reliance on old data hurt 
EAs who had supervisors negligent about keeping good 
production and quality records. The use of talked-about 
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observations carried less weight because managers could say 
anything about their candidates. Documented data were more 
significant because they were substantiated. The rank-order 
list appeared as a valid reflection of performance 
differences. Others said the system and its product -- a 
rank order list -- were bogus and did not reflect true 
relative performance because, if for no other reason, it was 
impossible for every supervisor to know the performance of 
300-plus EAs and then weigh the relative contribution of 
each member to produce a valid list. Bob: "My people want to 
know how someone outside of our group could evaluate them." 
Ed B.: "Multiple supervisory judgments don't work because we 
don't know all EAs well enough. You can only know your own 
group." Regina: "If a person is not seen by other managers, 
he has little chance of getting higher appraisals." Reno: 
"Performance is whatever we see. 11 
Almost all supervisors admitted the system relied 
heavily on individual, subjective, i.e., non-verifiable, 
data to make evaluation decisions. Ed B.: "Cell definitions 
vary each year because of the people reviewed and the work 
conditions. Movement is relative to what others did that 
year. The definitions of what behavior fits each cell 
depends on the OM's perceptions." Reno: "We can justify any 
action we take for moving people." Arlin: "Because we don't 
provide statistics, you cannot prove who's the top EA." 
Chuck was very clear on where he stood: "The current system 
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is inaccurate and the final product is shit, it's 
worthless." John w.: "I use hard data as much as possible, 
because the process is so subjective. We look beyond 
efficiency and attendance to see what numbers mean." 
These comments focused on a key problem area: how can 
managers argue over performances when the factors used 
(e.g., quality, customer service, production) were based on 
non-verifiable items? I address this question fully in the 
next chapter on the appraisal process, but let me offer a 
hypothesis: managers, surrounded by uncertainty (e.g., 
shifting objectives and supervisory perceptions), employed 
political tactics, such as coalition formation and ad hoc 
rules to select candidates for rank order position and cell 
placement. Each supervisor saw the world differently and 
could not convince others that his candidate was better 
because most EAs were perceived differently. Each manager 
justified performances in terms of departmental or 
environmental conditions, which varied by department. 
Subjectivity was a key factor in this appraisal system. How 
did one measure subjective factors? Measurement became the 
heart of the frustrating debate. 
Judge Wapner May Need It 
Supervisors also viewed two products of the system in a 
legal perspective. The AP form filled a need to document 
performances in case an issue arose due to a grievance, EO 
charge, or law suit. Recall, the AP was written in a 
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general way to avoid overstating an EA's performance and 
this was likely to be useless in a legal arena. It was 
written for one purpose which did not make it suitable for a 
lawyer's review (Garfinkel, 1967). The forms contained 
general descriptions and conclusions about achievements 
which always left the documents open to interpretation by 
either side in the debate. The Union representatives looked 
for words they said showed bad judgment or favoritism by 
comparing the forms of several employees. They then 
contrasted the contents with memos or other witnesses who 
refuted the AP form. When discrepancies were found, the 
Union case became more credible before an arbitrator. In 
most cases the form was not significant enough to make a 
case, thus providing more evidence that appraisals and its 
products (e.g. lists, AP forms) were charades of what really 
happened during evaluations. Kurt: "I noticed I began using 
the same words on APs, which read the same even though the 
EAs described were in cells 3 to 6. The form did not match 
the cell assigned. They aren't read and exist as a 
formality." However, supervisors believed appraisals 
provided evidence for future personnel decisions. A company 
lawyer told me the firm was in a more defensible position if 
managers gave the employee clear, direct feedback on his or 
her performance. This way the individual could not contest 
a lack of awareness about the problem. Management clearly 
saw appraisals as a tool for their protection. The 
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reluctance to describe and confront problems came back to 
haunt management if a problem employee filed a charge, 
because the record was often too general to show where the 
individual ranked. As Reno said, "The forms are used 
carefully to meet the cell position assigned to the person. 
we don't want to hang later. We are careful to imply 
nothing." 
can They Become Butterflies? 
Managers held contradictory beliefs about change. Some 
thought performance change was possible through feedback and 
discussions. Kurt: "I let my EAs see their score on 
production and quality, so they can track themselves." 
During a one-day training program conducted by a 
company representative, the importance of feedback for 
developmental and evaluation purposes was stressed. As I 
thought about the concept of "employee development", it 
attempted to make the person productive in terms of company 
goals and to generate "correct", or as Edwards (1984) 
described it, "compliance" behavior. The speaker attributed 
poor performance "to not knowing what was expected." This 
view diminished the impact of the reward system with varying 
opportunity situations (Kanter, 1977; Thompson, 1967). 
Employees did not change or perform better because the 
organization had inadequate or unfair rewards, according to 
the perceptions of those affected. 
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During the session, a good deal of time was spent on 
the technique known as "The one minute manager. 11 But I 
began to wonder, if these techniques worked, wouldn't 
everyone be rated the same and at the top? Employees would 
"get the message", continue good behavior, and cease "bad" 
behavior. But this didn't happen. This approach represented 
the rational, dominant management position, which 
legitimated the supervisory status. However, other 
supervisors reported that repeated talks over as much as 
five years had not altered performance. Bill: "I've told EAs 
about negative things, like tardiness, and their still 
wasn't a change." Kurt: 11 EAs are told the same thing each 
year and there's no change in behavior." Also supervisors 
noticed that some subordinates continued to 11 work hard" even 
when conditions for motivation deteriorated, such as a loss 
of status through a downgrade, or a lack of a salary 
increase. These managers thought the individual had an 
innate quality that remained constant in the face of 
shifting situations. 
Union Beliefs 
During annual union-management bargaining, and at many 
grievance hearings, the Union officers attacked the 
appraisal system. The officers contended that managers 
abused the plan by playing favorites, ignoring 
contributions, and employing poor administrative techniques. 
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The representatives never used the expression "sham" or 
"myth", but their beliefs in essence defined the evaluation 
system as an illusion of what really occurred in the 
organization. 
we'll Tell You What's Wrong 
The officers expressed a variety of concerns, the 
largest concentration of which dealt with what was lacking 
from the Union's perspective. The first area of beliefs 
related to the rewards associated with the current system. 
The officers thought that key factors like experience, 
productivity, and training others should be, but were not in 
practice, rewarded. In fact incentives were missing, and 
"favorites" got raises, while productivity did not result in 
a merit increase. The heart of the concern was that 
performance, commonly thought to affect evaluations, did not 
relate to appraisal bands. Recently, during a company 
training session, a female EA told me how angry she was 
"over working hard, doing a wide variety of assignments, and 
not being moved a cell" during the recent evaluation review. 
Her efforts were recognized, but did not translate to upward 
cell movement, confirming the Union's on-going complaint. 
The bargaining minutes also revealed a number of 
concerns. Appraisal factors what counts -- were ~ 
differently by supervisors and were not specific. The Union 
president, told me, "The process is inconsistent in use of 
guidelines. The performance factors described in the 
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contract are inconsistently applied. Managers place 
different importance on factors and these can vary each 
year. One time quality is stressed, the next time it could 
be efficiency or production." The bargaining team expressed 
a need for precise descriptions of performance bands and 
target pay points. This problem came from two sources of 
concern. By having specific pay points, the officers could 
monitor the treatment of their members for fairness, and 
they could reduce the discretion of supervisors to pay EAs 
at a range of pay points within a performance cell. For 
example, the range for cell 5 was 98% to 102% with 100% as 
the mid-point or target pay point. When the officers 
bargained to use only 1 point within the band -- 100% point 
-- it eliminated the possibility that some boss could change 
this amount. Managers argued that they could distinguish 
higher and lower performance within a band and reward 
accordingly. 
The Union supported precise descriptions of 
performance, based on specific actions, because these formal 
standards would more strictly challenge the judgment of 
managers. The Union could question the managers on the data 
or observations used against the words of band descriptions 
to arrive at cell placement. Managers resisted this because 
they wanted to control who was assigned to each cell. Also, 
specific performance descriptions made it more difficult to 
explain why an EA was not in a particular cell. The Union 
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wanted to reduce management discretion and have a more 
predictable process. During bargaining, several years ago, 
Ken told the management bargaining team, "You offer us a 
plan with more management discretion. We want a progression 
plan, so we don't have to worry about bosses playing 
favorites." 
The Union officers also said the appraisals were not 
taken seriously by EAs, that the higher rated ones did not 
get the proper raises, and that the system was rigged and 
unfair, meaning the wrong people were rewarded for the wrong 
reasons. The Union and individual EAs preferred a system 
based on seniority or some other form of automatic 
progression which would treat the majority of EAs the same, 
mitigating the effects of supervisory bias. Linked to this 
position, the officers said the system produced too many 
incorrect rank placements, unfair ratings, and rejections by 
EAs. The president said: "Cells are not a true picture of 
performance. There's real disparity from the middle (cells) 
down. One of the biggest complaints of EAs is that effort 
doesn't match the cell (they are placed in)." 
The Union valued a concrete, measurable system, rather 
than one based on a great deal of management judgment. 
According to Thompson (1967), they preferred a 
"computational" rather than a "judgmental" approach to 
appraisals because it reduced supervisor's judgments and 
made the entire process visible and easier to monitor. The 
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union thought that production, quality, and cost reduction 
statistics were not used much any more, and as a result, 
management applied the concept of "multiple supervisory 
judgments" as a defense for the lack of good records, and 
the presence of poor statistics. The officers saw through 
this position and argued bitterly that it was a sham. Again 
the Union president, told me: "Managers differ in how they 
use material to support evaluations. One may use large 
amounts of documents on quality and efficiency while others 
use only observations and mental notes. Supervisors place 
different importance on factors and these vary each year." 
Situational Factors 
The Union argued that a number of factors, unrelated to 
the actual job, resulted in cell placement. These variables 
were classified as social because they included a number of 
situational factors. 
The first concerned personal factors in which 
individuals were in a "popularity contest" where appearance 
carried more value than performance because being liked 
filtered out performance problems. As Judy noted, "My boss 
doesn't like fat people or those who wear jeans to work." 
More senior EAs who demonstrated consistent and loyal 
behavior often remained at higher levels no longer warranted 
by current performance. What was curious about this position 
was that the officers favored "fairness" over merely 
seniority, a stance unexpected for most unions. In addition 
the grievance committee also argued against "young, DeVry 
educated people the company favors when it comes to cell 
assignment." Equity was important and believing in it 
legitimated some management appraisal decisions. 
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The halo effect of past performance locked people into 
either high or low positions, no longer justified by 
performance. Lou said, "They (managers) don't look at your 
ability, especially if you're older." Representatives 
heavily involved in union activities could be unfairly 
restrained from upward movement. Ken argued: "I was held 
back because I was outspoken about the appraisal system. 11 
The Union leaders also thought evaluation factors 
varied and were seen differently by the boss and the worker. 
This supposedly led to misguided employee efforts and lack 
of supervisory recognition because the parties sought 
different goals. This area also tied into the debate between 
concrete, measurable appraisal factors and management 
perception and judgment. 
Finally, the Union believed the evaluation decision-
making process was political, noting that group meetings 
often changed the initial recommendation of the immediate 
supervisor. The president informed me: "Bosses with less 
experience come out with lower EA appraisals. It makes a 
big difference if your boss has influence and goes to bat 
for you." 
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The Boss as Quarterback 
The Union officers often stated that immediate 
supervisors played a large role in determining cell 
position. When EAs failed to advance, the Union's concerns 
covered three categories. Managers lacked knowledge about 
how the appraisal plan worked. Ken: "Supervisors don't know 
what's happening in the system and don't know how to use and 
don't understand the AP system." Knowing the rules of the 
game, made for greater success in a plan with limited and 
unequal rewards (Pugh and Hickson, 1989). Second, 
supervisors made errors in determining cell position. Dave: 
"Some bosses do not use performance factors and don't do a 
good job with the AP form and system." 
The first two problems could be circumvented, but a 
lack of influence was fatal for gaining rewards. Ed: "New or 
weak supervisors are at a disadvantage because they lack 
influence, support, and experience to get their 'share' of 
rewards." The Union's beliefs indicated that managers held a 
key role in obtaining cell movement for their employees 
through adequate knowledge and influence, again pointing to 
the charade of appraisals. Performance was mediated by the 
manager's position and "doing a good job" was often not 
enough to gain movement. Managers resisted this belief 
because the responsibility for rewards shifted from the 
individual to the supervisor. Managers sought control but 
not in such a high risk situation as that created by 
evaluation techniques. 
It's A Mystery 
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The Union leadership and eight representatives were not 
involved in directly creating appraisals, but acquired a 
good deal of information by asking questions and filing 
grievances. They thought the process was filled with 
confusion when efficiencies were calculated and in 
determining who actually appraised EAs. They did not like 
what they saw as "forced distribution" of employees, and 
they thought deciding cell placement before the APs were 
completed, was the wrong sequence. Appraisal forms, they 
argued, should be completed, then meetings held and cells 
assigned. Ed, the president, informed me: "AP forms are 
completed after the rank order and cells are assigned. The 
form should be used by the boss as ammunition to get moves." 
To the EAs, it was illogical to assign cells and then 
prepare write-ups to justify positions. For management this 
was a convenient, rational sequence. Once cells were 
assigned and the universe balanced, APs were written to 
match the individual's placement. Some managers admitted 
this. Bill: "I don't appraise EAs. I write the AP to fit 
the cell placement." John J.: "Some APs are written to 
justify appraisals. It becomes a selling job." Writing 
appraisal forms first created problems when the language was 
too positive or negative for the person's cell assignment. 
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The Union then questioned the purpose, fairness, and value 
of the document. As Garfinkel (1967) discussed, managers 
wrote forms for their rational purposes which did not fit 
the information needs of employees or representatives. This 
kind of discrepancy fueled the illusion that appraisals 
reflected workers' achievements. 
The Union president recognized that movement within the 
universe (e.g., attrition and hiring) opened chances for 
positive cell changes. This belief reinforced the 
evaluation system as an allocation system, and not a 
merit/achievement based plan, although many employees still 
held to the myth of the importance of performance. When 
employees grieved their appraisal cell, the arguments 
stressed the overlooked achievements of the EA. Several 
years ago, the grievance director, Terry, presented an 
appraisal grievance for Bill, who was rated near the top 
third of all EAs. Terry said, "I don't feel the manager 
gave Bill credit for his training efforts or his overall 
helpfulness. You can't just look at spec production." 
During several recent bargaining sessions the team continued 
to voice dissatisfaction. Ken: "There are too many 
misrankings. The plan is too rigid, and errors are not 
fixed even when they are obvious." Ken's reference to 
"rigid" concerned the slow movement allowed in the plan. 
Employees with either very good or poor performance were 
unlikely to move much during the annual review. The norms 
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of movement called for gradual upward steps even though as 
individual had superior achievements. This again pointed to 
the insignificant role actual achievement played in cell 
movement. If this were truly an equity-based plan, behavior 
should have been most important for placement. The equity 
of the appraisal plan was a myth. 
Progression Concept 
The Union bargaining team repeatedly argued for a an 
automatic wage progression system to replace the judgment 
based, merit system, expressing their concern for equality, 
rather than management's desire for equity. This area 
remained a fundamental disagreement between the parties. If 
management eliminated the merit plan, they would in effect 
terminate the appraisal process as practiced in the 
engineering unit for over 25 years. The Union leaders 
thought management had control in this area and wanted to 
retain it, thereby restricting movement and merit increases. 
Managers feared that an automatic progression format would 
destroy or weaken the employees' motivation to work, 
ignoring other factors (e.g., work itself, advancement, 
recognition) that moved people to achieve organizational and 
personal goals (Herzberg, 1959). As I mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, Union officers repeatedly argued to reduce 
manager's discretion in assigning appraisals and granting 
increases. They did not trust or agree with managers' 
perceptions and wanted to reduce the uncertainty of a system 
which relied so heavily on judgmental decision-making 
(Thompson, 1967) . 
Non-supervisory Employee's Views 
Disappointment in General 
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Twenty-three technical-professional, non-supervisory 
employees out of 40 responded to my brief, open-ended 
questionnaire (Appendix 2) about the impact of appraisals. 
The predominant finding was their belief that the system 
failed to reward for achievements and left many employees 
unhappy. The reasons included difficulty in comparing 
unlike groups; use of a political allocation system, not one 
based on achievement, i.e., extensive use of politics and 
"brown-nosing"; lack of a sponsor; short service; no room 
for movement; and limited technical knowledge. These 
comments highlighted the mythical nature of evaluations, but 
did not explain why practices continued when they were not 
directly legitimated. I have contended the system has been 
reproduced because subordinates are relatively satisfied by 
the overall reward arrangement and do not believe they have 
any power to change the plan created by managers since their 
previous complaints have never altered practices. 
Roadblocks to Success 
Employees offered a number of interesting viewpoints 
about what they believed was important for movement, but 
lacking in their performance profile. They said their 
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appraisal position prevented further movement: they were at 
the top and could not move higher in the current job 
category. This statement disclosed the restrictions of an 
allocation-driven plan situated in a bureaucratic 
organization. Opportunities varied by position of the 
employee and declined because there were less openings at 
the top. Another barrier was the allocation limits imposed 
by managers to produce a bell-shaped distribution. Other 
similar comments touched on the lack of open positions, and 
a shrinking universe which made movement even more 
restricted because of the 100% balancing point. The plan 
simply placed a limit on the number of employees who held 
top ratings. 
Type of work and perceived value of work were noted as 
other reasons why advancement was blocked. Employees 
recognized that some job assignments were seen as more 
important and difficult by management and therefore deserved 
a larger share of limited rewards. These "higher" valued 
jobs were referred to as "spec" writing and dealing with 
customers, involving 90% of the EAs. The "lower" valued jobs 
were "service and support" which handled cost-reduction case 
work (e.g., write-ups, investigation of ideas), cost-
estimating, and quality-control assignments. Short service 
was another reason for limited movement: people did not 
expect to be rated at the top if they had short service. A 
secretary said: "If you're new, you can't expect to be 
outstanding right away." 
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some cited lack of a sponsor and being of the wrong 
gender (male) and color (white) as impediments to movement. 
According to the company affirmative action plan, managers 
made efforts to hire or promote qualified individuals into 
jobs that were underutilized compared to the degree the 
protected group existed in the labor pool of the geographic 
area. The company was not under a court-ordered quota 
system, which would mean that a specified number of future 
opportunities must go to members of protected groups. The 
comment by employees about the impact of gender and race 
reflected a popular myth for lack of movement, and a curious 
one for at least two reasons. The highest rated woman was 
in cell 3 (1 was top, 8 was bottom) and the highest rated 
minority person was in cell 2. If the statements about the 
"advantages" of being a woman or minority were true, you 
would expect greater representation of these classes in the 
higher appraisal categories, but this was not the case. 
Secondly, when managers discussed performance with me, they 
focused on the specific behavior of the person, not his/her 
race or gender. When managers made such a reference, it was 
incidental, and a way to supply demographic data to identify 
the person. For example, when John W. discussed some of his 
EAs who deserved to advance, he mentioned Hermina, a female 
minority, but John never spoke of her ethnic background or 
202 
her gender. He simply said, "Hermina is one of my EAs who 
should be higher. She's constantly working and producing. 
What a workhorse"! The supervisors noticed and tended to 
discuss performances before demographic variables. 
The discussion of the previous section highlighted the 
variables of current appraisal, type of work, seniority, 
sponsorship, and race and gender as factors affecting 
appraisals. These perceptions were shared by all the 
principal actors, i.e., managers, union officers, and 
subordinates, yet all parties continued to accept the 
appraisal plan. Why? The myth of the value of good 
performance remained strong because it provided a way to 
accept and live with a system containing unequal rewards in 
the face of subjective evaluations. Managers needed this 
myth to maintain the power and control of their roles; the 
Union's existence was sustained by all the problems 
generated by the system; and subordinates found hope for 
rewards and reasons to continue participation. Without this 
myth, the entire control-reward system would collapse! 
Use of AP Forms 
Employees said the appraisal forms were negative in 
effect and contained distortions. The APs were "used by 
management to justify salary levels, were repeated for each 
employee, and were made to fit the final appraisal." Some 
reported that supervisors completed the form and merely had 
employees sign it with little or no discussion. One of the 
203 
continuing complaints was that managers filled in the AP 
forms after the cell positions were decided and so fit them 
to the rating. Employees believed that the AP should be used 
to decide an employee's position, but that this was not the 
actual practice. Rather, APs were finalized after appraisal 
levels were decided and the rank order was completed. Chuck, 
a manager, confirmed this sequence: "The AP form is often 
done after the rank order and cell assignment are finished." 
The order of appraisal production was a puzzling sequence. 
The parties were aware of this pattern, adding another 
example of the "window dressing" nature of the evaluation 
system. Setting aside an argument for a "correct" sequence 
for managers to produce an evaluation, the subordinate fully 
expected the boss to complete the form before deciding an 
appraisal. The parties openly admitted this order was not 
used, adding to the myth of appraisals and the continual 
questioning of what counted in the organization. It was as 
though employees wanted to understand the rules of the game, 
so they could have a fair chance at the rewards. 
What's Important 
I had a sample of employees rank 15 qualities according 
to the value they felt supervisors placed on these variables 
in rating performance. A lower mean rank value reflected 
greater perceived evaluation impact, while a larger number 
indicated less perceived value to managers in assessing 
people. Table 4 presents a listing from most important 
attribute to least important of qualities which employees 
perceive managers use in ranking them. 
Table 4 
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Employee Perception CN = 15) of Value Managers Place on 
Employee Behavior 
Factor Mean Value Rank 
Production and Quality 5.39 1 
Job Knowledge 6.26 2 
Attitude 6.52 3 
Cooperation with Mgt. 7.25 4 
Complexity of Work 7.61 5 
Flexibility 7.65 6 
Attendance 7.78 7 
Follows Rules 8.35 8 
Problem-solving skills 8.39 9 
Social Relations with 
Managers 8.61 10 
Self-Confidence 9.13 11 
Seniority on job 9.13 11 
Communication skills 9.35 13 
Customer Relations 9.96 14 
Attractive appearance 11.10 15 
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The mean scores ranged from a low of 5.39 for production and 
quality to a high of 11.1 for attractive appearance. 23 of 
30 employees responded to the questionnaire. 
Table 5 reflects the frequency with which certain 
factors were cited as having a high impact (rank 1, 2, or 3) 
and a low impact (rank 16,15,14). 
Table 5 
Employee Perceptions of High and Low Impact Behaviors 
High Impact 
Production and Quality 
Social Relations 
Attitude 
Complexity of Work 
Job Knowledge 
Problem-solving 
Low Impact 
Social Relations 
Appearance 
Customer Relations 
Communication Skills 
Frequency Ranked 1, 2, or 3 
14 
8 
6 
5 
5 
5 
Frequency Ranked 16,15, or 14 
9 
9 
6 
5 
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One could hypothesize that the above perceptions 
resulted from the appraisal history of the respondents. 
Those with good ratings thought that "production and 
quality" were important, while those at the lower end of the 
scale supported the use of social relations and appearance. 
Although production was cited as important to managers, 
respondents know, in practice, social factors mediate the 
final appraisal. Clearly, employees believed managers 
assigned the greatest importance to an individual's 
production and quality, values consistent with managers' 
views discussed earlier. Job knowledge and attitude 
followed and fell within the high impact factors, and 
employees believed that managers valued a productive and 
knowledgeable worker with a positive attitude. 
Qualities ranked at the bottom were "customer 
relations 11 , which was surprising considering all the 
attention this factor has received in company publications 
and training courses, and "attractive appearance.'' This 
response was probably due to the emerging status and non-
specific nature of customer relations. Employees did not 
know what this variable meant because of its recent 
emergence as significant. Prior to divestiture, the first 
priority was production and quality and most members were 
socialized under these old values and did not see the 
importance of customers. Secondly, production was still 
seen and rewarded as more important than customer relations, 
which received lip-service in the new engineering 
organization. 
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Informally, male employees told "stories" that some 
women were promoted due to physical attractiveness and use 
of sexual favors. These stories persisted in the face of 
demonstrated managerial skills or appropriate educational 
background. However, women did not occupy a number of 
positions disproportionate to their representation in the 
labor market. Women were found in staff manager jobs, and 
of the 34 manager positions, 6 were held by women. All 
these assignments were in the bottom 2 of 4 management 
levels. The accounts were unfounded, and even if true, not 
very favorable to women who filled just over 17% of the 
decision-making positions. The stories probably started and 
persisted as a way to explain the speaker's failure to 
progress in the organization. It may be a face-saving 
device (Goffman, 1952) to justify the storyteller's 
persistent, unenhanced status as a non-supervisory employee. 
I was always amazed at the anecdotes circulating in the 
unit. Besides the allegedly undeserved success of women, 
topics included office romances, illness and other personal 
problems (e.g., divorce and drinking problems), defects in 
moral character, value as an employee, and degree of 
financial resources. The storytellers stimulated the group 
and clarified issues (Deal and Kennedy, 1982), but some 
managers saw this behavior as a waste of time and evidence 
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of poor "work habits!" Consistently, the low impact factors 
included social relations with supervisor, appearance, 
customer relations, and communications skills. According to 
these figures, employees thought managers devalued personal 
relations, physical appearance, dealing with customers, and 
communicating. 
These conclusions were not consistent with beliefs 
expressed via stories from some employees who said that 
"golfing or bowling with the boss will gain you a higher 
appraisal." It was interesting to see that actors thought 
production, knowledge, and attitude were more important than 
appearance and social relations. This position helped 
explain the frustration and disappointment of those in a 
system that did not adequately reward the expected, commonly 
held-to-be-important behaviors, but used an allocation 
system based on manager's needs, political methods, and 
cueing for movement. These comments were consistent evidence 
that the appraisal system had a mythical nature where 
beliefs did not match practices. 
Other Factors 
Non-management employees reported other factors, which 
I had not included, as most significant for appraisal 
status. A persistent theme here was the negative impact on 
movement, compared to what worked for placement. This led me 
to conclude that the practices created "losers" who produced 
the following accounts to justify their unsatisfactory 
status (Scott and Lyman, 1968; Goffman, 1952). 
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Many long-service employees thought their greater age 
favored younger employees for promotion, while others 
believed that supervisors looked at an EA's current level 
before evaluating performances. There was a great inertia 
against advancing people a level because there were so few 
moves to spread throughout a large universe. Linked to this, 
EAs believed that the quantity of available slots affected 
their chance for upward movement. 
Finally, employees, hinting at the presence of an 
organizational paranoia, thought that seeking transfers 
through the bidding system indicated they were not 
interested in the job, and did not deserve to advance. This 
factor was interesting because it exposed a belief in 
loyalty not expressed too frequently. Divestiture caused a 
breakdown in old values like loyalty and security, which the 
company supported through consistent promotions, salary 
increases, and "lifelong" employment. The norms changed and 
productivity, profits, and customers became the primary 
goals of the company, leaving employees afraid to show any 
sign of "jumping ship. 11 
supervisory Views of Evaluation Factors 
After the previous group of engineers and EAs ranked 
evaluation factors, I reasoned it would be useful also to 
collect managers' perceptions about the same factors. In 
another section to follow, responses of these two groups 
will be compared. 
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Table 6 lists attributes from most to least important, 
according to supervisors who evaluated within the 
organization. A discussion of these data follow the tables. 
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Table 6 
Manager Perception of Weight Managers (N 25) Place on 
Employee Behavior 
Factor Mean Value Rank 
Production and Quality 3.38 1 
Job Knowledge 3.77 2 
complexity of work 4.08 3 
Flexibility 4.35 4 
Problem-solving skills 5.31 5 
Attitude 5.38 6 
Customer Relations 6.38 7 
Communications Skills 6.58 8 
Self-Confidence 9.00 9 
Attendance 9.46 10 
Follows Rules 11.10 11 
Cooperation with Mgt. 11. 60 12 
Seniority on job 13.00 13 
Attractive appearance 13.90 14 
Social Relations with 
Managers 14.60 15 
The mean scores ranged from a low of 3.38 for 
"production and quality" to a high of 14.6 for "social 
relations with managers." (The lower means= higher 
rankings). 25 of 28 managers given questionnaires, 
responded. 
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The following table reflects the frequency certain 
factors were cited as having a high impact (rank of 1, 2, or 
3) and a low impact (rank of 16, 15, or 14). 
Table 7 
Comparison of High and Low Impact Behaviors 
High Impact 
Production and Quality 
Job Knowledge 
Complexity of Work 
Flexibility 
Attitude 
Problem-Solving 
Low Impact 
Social Relations 
Appearance 
Seniority 
Cooperates with Management 
Follows Rules 
Attendance 
Frequency Ranked 1, 2, 3 
14 
14 
13 
12 
10 
8 
Frequency Ranked 16, 15, 14 
23 
16 
14 
3 
3 
1 
Managers placed the greatest importance on task 
completion factors: production and quality; job knowledge; 
complexity of work; flexibility; and problem-solving skills. 
Not surprisingly, these same factors fell into the high 
impact category, with "production and quality" and "job 
knowledge" at the top of the list. These factors were 
achievement directed, something the employee "earned" and 
was rewarded for accordingly. 
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Factors rated at the bottom of the list referred to 
non-task or context factors and included social relations 
with managers, employee appearance, seniority, cooperation 
with management, and following rules. This was again 
consistent with the low impact variables, where social 
relations with managers and attractive appearance were cited 
most often as having little impact on performance 
evaluation. 
There were a number of points worth noting about the 
low impact group factors. Supervisors were often criticized 
for "playing favorites" with employees with whom they golfed 
or bowled. One manager said supervisors had little choice 
but to rank a factor like social relations low or else they 
would confirm a number of negative comments from employees! 
Another 3rd level supervisor, "jokingly" commented that, 
"Charlie would be a good candidate for the staff manager's 
job because he golfed with me. 11 These comments, those from 
grievances, and from informal discussion with employees 
disclosed that social relations with managers actually had 
far greater impact on performance appraisals than managers 
openly confirmed. They believed in fairness and rewards for 
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production, but they knew the system used subjective 
factors, including social relations and liking the employee, 
to determine the individual's appraisal. As performance 
differences between candidates became less distinguishable, 
there was a greater use of subjective factors, such as those 
reported in the low impact area. These variables were quite 
powerful when the appraisal process moved from objective, 
concrete factors (e.g., production and quality) to 
uncertainty, lack of performance knowledge, and into the 
area when political variables like friendships, repayment of 
favors, and coalition formation came into play. There was a 
difference between what I observed and heard during informal 
conversations with managers and what they reported was 
important in judging performance. 
Other Factors 
Managers added a number of other factors, not listed 
among the choices I provided, as significant in determining 
evaluations. In contrast to the additional factors from non-
supervisors, managers' comments were positive, i.e., they 
enhanced chances of upward movement, rather than prevented 
employees from progressing. The difference announced the 
diverse orientations the two groups took. Non-supervisors 
were less powerful and more dependent on their bosses for 
career success, while managers, although not happy with 
their appraisals, thought they had more control of the work 
situation. 
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Managers thought that EAs who trained others and shared 
solutions contributed to the success of the entire 
department. Linked to this was teamwork where the employee 
had "organizational integrity" and built group cohesiveness. 
Also cited was cooperation to share workloads and job 
information. Another dimension was relationships, a highly 
subjective item which assessed how well the employee worked 
with peers and customers. Supervisors favored those who were 
self-directed and easy to manage, touching subtly on the 
importance of control. A third factor dealt with how the EA 
used time, matching interview data which cited good work 
habits as desirable. 
The next variable, professional manner, was a curious 
item because the EA universe is never referred to as a 
"professional" grouping, due to less technical nature of 
their job, lack of an engineering degree, and existence of a 
union. With this as background, supervisors wanted workers 
who acted maturely, required little supervision, and 
"conducted themselves as professionals." This was in the 
sense of appearance and attitude, not the classical notion 
of professional, which deals with a specialized body of 
knowledge, acquired through formal education and examination 
by a licensing group (Larson, 1977). After reviewing these 
factors, it became quite clear that all were subjective in 
nature, difficult to contest, open to debate, and very 
useful for managers to control the work and appraisal 
situation. 
summary of Shared Engineering organizational Beliefs 
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The data revealed many values, some of which were 
founded in actors' experiences and were not mythical. 
However, a number of beliefs persisted in the face of 
contradictory organizational practices. There were three 
main categories of beliefs that operated in the culture of 
the Engineering organization: achievement, fairness, and 
avoidance. 
Achievement 
Members believed that accomplishing organizational 
goals was the common method to attain success, giving 
everyone a chance to advance in appraisal level, salary, and 
hierarchical position. They saw the opportunity structure 
as open to all who achieved. This was similar to the 
explanation Turner (1960) used when he discussed the 
difference in ideal-type perspectives taken by British and 
American schools toward allowing students to compete for 
college entrance. The British model is "sponsored", 
identifying those most likely to succeed, and admitting 
those "selected" students. The American model is 
"contested", allowing more students to enter the race and 
then eliminate themselves because of performance. The 
second approach is class-centered, competitively fair, and 
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declares the American dream of success through hard work. 
The ''contested" perspective explains the persistent belief 
that the evaluation system is fair, recognizes performance, 
and rewards employees. 
This myth was contradicted at YZ&Z by those who thought 
they, despite having achieved all that was asked of them, 
had not advanced. Traditionally only 10% of the EAs 
advanced a cell each year, assuming that new members entered 
the unit. The allocation method more accurately described 
the practices of this organization, and not recognition of 
achievement. This discrepancy between the belief in 
achievement and the attainment of success after contributing 
represented the core contradiction of the appraisal plan. 
The company's reward system promised graduated levels of 
incentives for contributions but continuously fell short of 
that goal in the eyes of managers and subordinates. The 
system did not deliver expected rewards because of 
limitations in funds and company-defined restrictions in the 
number of top appraisal positions. The existence of limited 
rewards created a competitive climate among actors where 
teamwork was given lip-service, but rewards were based on 
individual variables such as supervisory influence, 
seniority, nature of assignment, and appraisal history of 
employee. The myth of equity dominated the belief system 
and proved frustrating to all participants. Opportunity to 
advance depended on non-production qualities like influence 
of one's manager and structure of individual assignments, 
and was differentially distributed. 
Fairness 
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The actors said that good work, achievement, and effort 
should be rewarded with money and promotions. This was 
based on the powerful value of equity or distributive 
justice which held that rewards should follow and be based 
on the individual's contributions (Kerbo, 1983; Mahoney, 
1983). All parties supported this unattainable 
organizational belief. Managers tried to promote their 
"best people"; the Union grieved an employee's appraisal 
when he/she thought individual efforts were not recognized; 
and individuals consistently assessed the status of their 
"psychological contract" (Schein, 1980) with the department 
and then adjusted their personal efforts, i.e., 
contributions, to match their perceived rewards. The data 
indicated that most employees were not satisfied with the 
level of fairness or rewards. Lou, a staff specialist, said: 
"Employees know appraisals are "BS." You get the same old 
story -- 'I tried to move you, but I couldn't.' Once I was 
told I had excessive long distance calls. My boss said the 
top group could only have 10-15% in it, and there was no 
room for me." Gen, a supervisor of clerical employees said: 
"Employees feel the system is biased with little chance to 
advance." Judy, a secretary: "You can have a high rating for 
years without any impact. Appraisals did not mean much 
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because there's no money tied to them." Bill: "Appraisals 
create very negative morale problems. Only 2 or 3 out of 30 
people can move." Reno: "People don't feel they're rated 
right." 
Employees sought fairness in a system driven by this 
belief because the approach reflected a fair chance at 
obtaining a reward. This was similar to people waiting 
patiently in line to buy football tickets. This might not 
be enjoyable, but it was orderly and progress to the 
"window" could be estimated with some accuracy. What 
disrupted the sense of fairness was faster than expected 
movement and "jumping" beyond others in line. This was like 
the anger and frustration caused by "line crashers'' at the 
box office. Workers did not mind the wait, as long as 
progress was fair and based on achievements. However, quite 
often this very fairness was missing. 
Avoidance -- No Pain or Loss 
A powerful and persistent belief and practice was 
avoiding confrontations and feedback. This was seen in the 
practice of not taking away past salary increases, even 
though an employee's performance level had dropped. 
Approximately 10 of 300 EAs dropped a level each year, yet 
no one "lost" money, but merely did not receive a raise. 
Bob, a service manager, said: "We try not to hurt anyone, so 
we keep the positions the same." Regina, a staff manager, 
told me: "Managers don't want to drop a person because of 
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the negative impact on salary. They want to avoid 
confrontation." In times of layoffs or downgrades, those 
affected by the downgrades had their salary protected for 1 
year and then reduced over a 3-month period. In the last 4 
years, only 3 new EAs out of approximately 125 hired were 
"relieved" for performance or attendance deficiencies. This 
was one value actually consistent with organizational 
practices. 
The implication of this non-punitive norm may have been 
dysfunctional for both subordinate and company. The worker 
was unhurt financially in the short term, but was deprived 
of data which might improve rewards during a career. The 
company, by paying a salary not commensurate with its reward 
structure, furthered the claim that appraisals were shams. 
This practice also decreased the likelihood that production, 
quality, and customer satisfaction indices would improve by 
avoiding discussions to "turn around" the worker. The 
practice of problem avoidance contradicted the company's 
goal of production and service, but it made the workers more 
controllable by not irritating them with feedback. 
comparison of Evaluation Factors from 2 Perspectives 
Table 8 lists the factors based on the mean value of 
the two groups, and the rank order of each factor, referred 
to earlier in tables 4 and 6, providing a view of the 
relative, perceived importance of each factor. 
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Table 8 
Rank Order of Behaviors Valued by Workers vs Managers in 
YZ&Z CorQoration 
Factor EAL En gr Managers Rank (N = 15) CN = 25) Difference 
Production 1 1 0 
Job Knowledge 2 2 0 
Complexity 5 3 2 
Attitude 3 6 3 
Flexibility 6 4 2 
Problem-Solving 9 5 4 
Cooperation 4 12 8 
Attendance 7 10 3 
Follows Rules 8 11 3 
Self-Confidence 11 9 2 
Communication 13 8 5 
customer Relations 14 7 7 
Seniority 11 13 2 
Social Relations 10 15 5 
Appearance 15 14 1 
(1) Managers and non-supervisors perceived a number of 
variables the same way -- some of high and some of low 
impact. The low impact factors were seniority, appearance, 
and self-confidence. Complexity of work was rated moderately 
significant, and the high impact factors were job knowledge, 
production or quality, and flexibility. These variables 
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differed in rank positions by o - 2 ranks. (2) Another 
cluster of factors showed differences of 3 - 8 ranks: 
communications skills, customer relations, problem-solving 
skills, social relations, attendance, follow rules, 
cooperation, and attitude. On the surface the members 
reported a good deal of agreement on what was important for 
evaluation. To some extent this showed the high degree of 
shared understanding of the organization's success values. 
The communications devices (e.g., grapevine, meetings, 
appraisal sessions, grievance meetings, bargaining sessions, 
and publications) socialized the members to know what the 
company officially said was important job knowledge, 
production/quality, and flexibility. Seniority and 
appearance received lower marks. However, as discussed 
above, non-production, i.e., non-achievement, factors like 
acceptability of person and boss' influence were more 
significant in determining evaluations than the talked-about 
variables like achievements. The production factors were 
objective in nature and verifiable, offering little room for 
supervisory judgment. Without this discretion, managers 
would lose control over subordinates and the labor process, 
a situation completely untenable to them. So although the 
parties talked about achieving results as the means to 
rewards, managers actually used judgments of multiple 
variables (e.g., seniority, past appraisal, allocation 
limits) to determine the most deserving EAs for upward cell 
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movement. The managers retained control by talking one way 
but acting on contributions and rewards in another way. This 
was further evidence about the fabricated nature of the 
entire evaluation process. 
Finally, an interesting phenomenon occurred when ranks 
between the two research groups (EA/ENGR, and Managers) were 
compared. The subordinate group in the Engineering unit 
(EA/ENGR) differed the most from the perception of their 
supervisors. Between managers and their subordinates, only 
two factors (job knowledge and production) had the same rank 
position. It was clear that the subordinate sample of EAs 
and engineers understood the impact of some of the 
evaluation factors differently than did the Manager group. 
This was surprising and puzzling because the EA/ENGR and 
Manager groups resided in the same organizational setting. 
Why did the rank discrepancies occur in the above 
patterns? I suggest two explanations that cannot be 
validated from the survey data, but provided a rationale. 
First, a number of the respondents in the EA/ENGR sample saw 
themselves in conflict with supervisors over work procedures 
and did not share a common "management" definition of the 
situation. Secondly, the Manager group may have responded 
in terms of some ideal or "right way" of weighing appraisal 
factors, which caused them to differ from their subordinates 
who answered from a desire to expose what was wrong with the 
system, emphasizing more of what should be present, rather 
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than merely rating a group of neutral factors. Other 
written remarks on the survey returned by the EA/ENGR sample 
indicated that a majority of the respondents were displeased 
with the system, mainly because it did not recognize "good" 
work with cell advancement or other promotions. 
The power relations between managers and subordinates 
created conflict and divergent interests. Employees sought 
security and a small measure of autonomy, while managers 
wanted to control the work environment so they could deliver 
production and profits to the company. The parties saw the 
"world" differently because they stood on different 
plateaux. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF APPRAISALS 
The previous chapters have analyzed the setting of the 
organization, the control strategies, and the belief systems 
of the actors. This chapter examines the individual and 
group actions managers took to produce appraisal decisions 
and the products of those actions such as AP forms, 
documents, and a "rank-order" list. The analysis will answer 
the question, "How are performance appraisals produced?" 
The Big Picture 
To understand the overall evaluation process and the 
discussion which follows, I will describe the phases of the 
general appraisal process as they involve managers. In the 
first phase, the immediate supervisor assesses employees' 
performance, through feedback from engineers who assign 
work. The supervisor judges the employee's worth, comparing 
performances against departmental goals and situational 
variables like unplanned workload and unforeseen problems, 
such as the introduction of a new service. Managers apply 
their interpretation of shared performance objectives; rank 
their employees from "best" or most productive to "last" or 
"poorest;" integrate information about current cell position 
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and time as an EA, and finally judge performance to produce 
their departmental list. 
In the second phase, all the supervisors under a 
Business Line Manager (BLM) meet to "combine or blend" their 
individual lists into a "subbranch" rank-order. The size of 
these combined lists range from 16 to 135 EAs. Managers told 
me, "there is usually agreement because we know most of the 
EAs discussed." However, past performance and reputation 
often haunt an EA during this phase. John w. (a manager) 
told me about Al, a union officer who worked for him about 6 
years ago. "Al was smart, but he spent too much time on the 
phone running his extermination business. I had to keep an 
eye on him, because he never seemed to push to get work 
out." Because of a reorganization, Al was transferred to 
another supervisor who, according to John, "took a liking to 
Al, and was fooled by him." Louise began to rely on Al for 
training new EAs and for coordinating assignments. During 
subbranch meetings, John argued that he had EAs who deserved 
to move ahead of Al. John, however (according to Louise), 
seemed to "get his way" for a number of years because of his 
long tenure, knowledge of the engineering unit, and 
argumentative skills. But Louise kept pushing Al she 
ranked him as the number 1 EA in her departmental listing 
and finally was able to move him into cell 2 over John's 
objection. I believe her success in moving Al up was due to 
several factors: her department moved to a subbranch 
separate from John's; his arguments began to lose weight 
since he had less direct contact with Al; and John's 
comments sounded like "a personality conflict", dating to 
1986 when John wrote several memos about Al for alleged 
incidents of harassment. 
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I label the third phase, "the group meetings", because 
all managers meet to decide a final rank-order list. This 
is the most difficult and tense period because managers 
compare and select EAs for cell placement from work groups 
outside their area. 
Phase 1 -- First Level Manager 
Supervisors observe behavior and received performance 
input from their engineers on EAs. Reno: "I look at what the 
EA does for me. Performance is based on whatever we see. 
sometimes a picture book is used because EAs are not known 
by name. If EA does something special, it gets 
communicated, so he may go up." Arlin: "The basis of 
evaluation is perception, not statistics. With this method 
you can't prove who's the top EA when you get into group 
meetings because we don't provide statistics." Chuck: "I use 
the observation of work habits, punctuality, 'BS-ing', and 
who's on phone too much." Ed B.: "I don't keep efficiency 
records anymore because I rely on engineers who have direct 
contact with EAs." Armed with these data managers make 
judgments on the contributions of each individual against 
departmental goals. Gen made an insightful comment: "We use 
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objective standards, like production and quality, but I 
interpret the application of the criteria." Judy: "My boss 
makes a judgment about my work, so it's not objective. He 
doesn't count the letters I type." Reno: "We can justify 
any action we take for moving people." Arlin: "We have no 
formal way of judging. Even when we assign weights, it 
still reflects my perception of the situation." Bob: 
"Evaluations reflect a person's opinion and who says they're 
right because personalities come into play. I don't even 
use numbers of cost reduction cases because they vary in 
degree of difficulty." Eddy: "When my engineers and I tried 
to rate EAs, we had a number of ties, so we used 'tests of 
significant differences'. We look at spec delivery, 
training, and how the person is used as a resource." 
Employees are ranked from top performer to bottom 
performer, based on a judgment of contributions. Managers 
also make an estimate of the appropriate band. This decision 
is based on the current appraisal cell, a judgment of what 
band the current behavior fits, and an assessment of which 
employees deserve to move the most. Eddy: "The managers know 
the current cell, so in working on new appraisals, we 
project new levels. Cell definitions vary each year because 
of the people reviewed and the work conditions. Movement is 
relative to what other EAs did that year." Two supervisors 
commented on the impact of appraisal history. John W: "We 
sometimes use last year's rank as a criterion. The EA who 
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was higher keeps that position." Kurt supported this view: 
"You look at past appraisals because you don't turn the pile 
upside down." Bill: "We back into appraisal. We use 
history of person, seniority, performance, and job 
circumstances. In a more mature department (more service), 
there's less movement." In essence, supervisors produce a 
placement "wish list" for their EAs, based on individual 
interpretations that were informally shared by all 
supervisors. They had acquired these performance definitions 
from talking to their peers and bosses. Bob told me: "I have 
discussions with my BLM before the group meeting. I learned 
about the procedure when I asked by boss to tell me how 
things worked." 
The immediate supervisor who should know his/her 
employees well, used observation and informal standards to 
make the initial evaluation decision. Thus, the element of 
illusion entered the process at the beginning, pointing to 
the mythical side of appraisals which many believe result 
from accurate assessments of objective data, i.e., 
accomplishments. 
Phase 2 -- Department Manager Review 
After each supervisor appraises, rank orders, and 
assigns a proposed cell for EAs, all the supervisors in a 
subbranch meet with their manager to produce a composite 
rank-order, trying to balance all appraisals at 100%. Bud: 
"In the past our goal was to balance at 100% more than focus 
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on real performance differences. We try to group similar 
performers. We don't use a fixed model of performance to 
determine placements, but we look at what was accomplished. 
we focused on those we knew. We didn't vote much." 
Each cell level is worth a specific percent of a 
standard rate of pay. For example, the top number 1 cell 
has a value of 118.6%. Cell 2 equals 115%, cell 3 equals 
110%, and so on through cell 8, which is valued at 85%. 
This group of managers uses a common technique to equally 
allocate the number of possible upward moves among the 5 or 
6 operations managers, allowing each supervisor to reward 
his/her own people, based on his/her judgment. Arlin: "We 
determine how many we can move and then allocate." John J.: 
"Before the group meeting, we were told how many upward 
moves were possible." Bill: "In our subbranch meeting the 
supervisors put their moves in a priority listing. The 
allocation of moves is based on the department's balancing 
percent and the number of people in the department." 
There are never enough slots available to satisfy all the 
wishes of supervisors, leading to a number of rules and 
procedures to distribute limited rewards. 
Final Phase -- Business Line Manager Review 
In the past, the former 3rd management level met to 
combine their subbranch lists to produce one rank-order 
list, which was then divided into 8 groups or "cells" of 
performance. The method of "forming cells" was accomplished 
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by drawing lines through the total list so that all the 
assigned bands averaged to 100%. This process was imperfect 
and created artificial distinctions between individuals, 
based solely on the need to balance appraisal. Chuck 
mentioned: "I had a case where a BLM drew a line between 2 
of my EAs who were tied because of balancing constraints. 
one moved up, and one stayed at the same level and so was 
angry. The next year I was able to move the second person 
up because he performed well and was seen as a victim of the 
system by the other managers." Again it is evident that the 
evaluation process is a sham because contributions are 
devalued and replaced by the managers' need to balance a set 
of appraisals rather than determine achievements. 
These managers calculate how many EAs can be located in 
each cell in order to reach the 100% point. They discuss 
candidates when a few people are vying for the one spot that 
will place them in a higher cell. Most 3rd level managers 
do not know the work of EAs and have to rely on the input of 
the 2nd level. 
Bud, a Business Line Manager (3rd level), told me the 
usual practice at these meetings is to share the 
opportunities for promotion, i.e., the number of available 
moves. The BLMs believe that the candidates are so similar 
and their performance is generally so unknown to these 
managers that the most reasonable approach is to share 
moves, which are often carried over from the previous year. 
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As a result of the procedures, some managers do not end up 
with an equal distribution of moves because of past "debts." 
ouring the 1989 EA review, subbranch managers (BLMs) agreed 
to balance each of their groups at 100% as a way to bring 
those groups above 100% "into line", or to have them make 
progress toward the 100% goal, producing a wide variation in 
appraisal activities. Large subbranches which brought in 
new EAs had room to advance more people and still balance, 
while smaller groups had no opportunity to move EAs because 
their appraisals already averaged to 100%. However, in one 
case things worked out differently. Phil, a BLM with 16 EAs 
and no apparent chance to move his people, made a deal with 
Bud, who had over 135 EAs, to "borrow" 2 of Bud's many 
moves, so Phil could advance 2 "very deserving" employees. 
For the most part, the 3rd level acted as tie-breakers 
or overseers of the process. Occasionally they had first 
hand knowledge of performance, which allowed them to take a 
stronger position in placement decisions. This again 
demonstrates the impact and significance of visibility 
within the organization. 
Rules and Allocation Practices 
Managers use a number of general, often unspoken rules 
and some specific practices. They think their best 
performers should be rewarded ahead of employees who are 
merely good performers. The problems arise when individual 
managers disagree on who deserves the top positions which 
are worth more money. 
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The group meetings allow managers to present their 
candidates for top positions, listen to others, and reach 
consensus on their overall rank-order list. Supervisors 
agree they will not get all they want, but that all should 
get something. Discussion of candidates, including personal 
observations and challenges to suggested moves, is common at 
all meetings. A number of managers recognized and commented 
on the importance of talk or the supervisor's presentation 
style in creating a cell move for an employee. Bob: "Some 
supervisors raise their voices and push their candidates 
ahead." Kurt: "The supervisor who speaks better, and sells 
their person who is known (to other managers), gets cell 
movement." Eddy: "Since we can't prove performance, we have 
to present the EA, using the boss's skill and eloquence." 
Ed: "Managers with the best vocabulary get their people 
moved, and these may not be those who did the best job." 
The Union leaders recognized that the smooth talkers move 
their people ahead. Through this bargaining, or "give-and-
take" process, coalitions based on long-term working social 
relations and shared perspectives are formed which move some 
EAs, while others, possibly equally deserving, remain at 
their current levels. These comments indicate the illusion 
of equity surrounding the production and administration of 
appraisals. They generally do not reflect contributions but 
the influence of other non-performance variables (e.g., 
manager's influence and presentation skills). 
Decision-Making Conventions During Group Meetings 
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Specific techniques (see Appendix 5) include voting by 
secret ballot, use of seniority, and flipping a coin. Arlin: 
"I know I want to move someone if they're good for years, 
but haven't moved." Bill: "I use tenure as a basis of 
appraisals. I'd place a 4-year person above a 1-year guy. I 
give preference to the one who's been producing longer." 
There were few specific rules, such as rejecting double 
moves and allowing the incumbent to retain his/her position 
before a "newcomer." Bill went on to say: "When we decide on 
unknown EAs, we look at last year's rating to break ties." 
Kurt: "You look at past appraisals because you don't turn 
the pile upside down. History dictates cell movements." 
Regina: "Managers accept incumbency as a reason to keep 
someone in level over a newcomer." Rules are carried over 
from year to year and applied when needed. Modification of 
rules are very common and emerge when old rules no longer 
unravel roadblocks during the rank ordering process. Ed: "We 
developed rules at the group meeting, but they don't work on 
newer EAs, so we changed the rules (to fit the situation)." 
Kurt cited a specific case where rules were modified. 
"Rules changed as we went along. When we got stuck i.e., 
the rules didn't work -- we'd try a new rule. Once we put 
some engineers in a higher cell because we were told more 
money was available." 
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Managers also talk about other specific techniques they 
use during group meetings to complete the rank-order 
process. Voting is a popular approach. Bob: "After a 45 
minute discussion, we turned to voting as a way out, a way 
to move on." Chuck continued this feeling: "Sometimes we 
use voting just to get the session done." John J.: "When we 
were at a deadlock, we voted." Regina: "Voting is tried, 
but is unsuccessful because of division along party (BLM) 
lines." Eddy: "There is voting by party lines. Those who 
are undecided just flip a coin when it's time to vote." 
Additional criteria emerged if, for example, 3 EAs have 
similar performance records, undifferentiated by the 
presentations of their managers. More specific criteria like 
attendance or number of cost reduction cases or total 
dollars saved will be suggested. Bob: "When people are even, 
we look at attendance or a person's willingness to do 
extra." Chuck added: "In selecting EAs for moves we discuss 
'going above and beyond', letters about the person, and 
quality of teamwork." As mentioned before, time on the job 
is a factor. Kurt: "The more consistent EA would get moved, 
because he's performed over a longer period." Regina: 
"Seniority is a factor. You must put in your time." 
Managers whose EAs had such qualities support the new 
rule, while others counter with a factor like the amount of 
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volunteering demonstrated by their candidate. One way out 
of this dilemma was offered by Eddy who described how he 
applied "a test of significant differences" to judge which 
person was "better" than another. This involved discussing 
and agreeing on factors such as training which add 
significantly to department results or customer 
satisfaction. These arguments tend to be circular since no 
single factor is acceptable to all managers because the 
interaction reflects a win-lose pattern. 
Eventually some managers wear down after long meetings 
and concede on variables that do not favor their employees. 
Supervisors also engage in types of behavior during meetings 
that can be classified as "bargaining", compromise, or "give 
and take" because, as Chuck put it simply, "You can't always 
have the moves you want." The following behavior 
represented this approach. Ed: "At the meeting managers get 
worn out and give in on pushing their people. There's a 
feeling to just put the EA somewhere." Regina: "People are 
slotted because of their boss's personality. The one who 
sticks to his ground gets a move for his EAs." 
A number of political tactics are used. Chuck: "Part 
of the meeting activity is reading other managers for what 
they're trying to do." Ed: "I don't like the current system 
of managers talking people into positions where they don't 
belong." Gen saw an adversarial relationship: "It's a dog 
fight -- (placement) depends on how you make your case. You 
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feel like a lawyer because you must prove your case to get 
your candidate a top spot." John J.: "EAs are ranked 
depending on the selling job of their boss. This requires 
honesty, which I don't find. There's a 'buddy system' used 
in voting which is not honest." John w.: "During group 
meetings, managers don't listen to each other's arguments. 
They come up with reasons to shoot down the points made." 
Reno: "All managers under a BLM merge by a 'give and take' 
process. We say things we can't prove. we trade a cell l 
person for a cell 3 (move)." 
Managers also noted the uncertainty and lack of 
structure surrounding these group meetings. Kurt: "The 
group meeting has no structure. You start by looking at 
last year's placement. When it comes to deciding a level, 
it's like 'darts in the wind' because so many factors come 
into play: bargaining between supervisors; how well the EA 
is known; the status of the EA group -- whether it is 
growing or declining; and the money available (for raises)." 
Regina: "There is little discussion about stated job 
performance, because there is no agreement on criteria used. 
What defines the cell are the people in it, not a specified 
(formal) criteria by band." Reno: "We don't have a 
regimented system; there are no uniform rules." Again the 
source of these rules was experience, trial and error, 
bargaining, and convenience -- the need to produce a rank-
order list within a certain time period. A number of 
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supervisors said that, after awhile, "getting the list done" 
became the primary objective, replacing the original goal of 
accurately assessing contributions {Blau, 1967). Because the 
task of appraising performance is so subjective and the 
setting of the group meeting is often so confrontational, 
the convenience factor becomes very powerful in pushing for 
a decision on appraisals. Managers wanted to produce some 
form of an appraisal list and remove themselves from the 
tense situation produced by the group setting. 
Group meetings also purge or check individual biases 
and perceptions against norms of production, customer 
service, and manageability. Gen: "Group meetings 'iron out' 
the different emphasis {of managers). No one with an 
attendance problem is likely to get an outstanding rating." 
Just as supervisors believed in rewarding the largest 
contributors, they also supported allocating moves to "share 
the wealth." Arlin: "We feel we should share these moves. 
The system depends on trust among managers." John J.: "It's 
a numbers game. Only so many people can be in the top 
categories." Kurt: "People have to wait their turn. Many 
may deserve a move, but only 2, for example, get it." Bill: 
"We work with the idea of sharing moves -- all departments 
get a fair share of moves." However, comments from managers 
and union officers along with data on distribution of moves 
indicated that allocation is not completely equal for all 
business lines. This varied because some groups are 
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considered more valuable (e.g., High Tech group) than others 
(e.g., Services group) and because supervisors had unequal 
ability to influence the allocation of moves. During the 
1988 rate review for EAs, the Union filed a grievance on the 
"unfair distribution of cell moves", because they were 
concentrated in departments with experienced, "influential 
supervisors", according to the Union president. The 
grievance committee prepared a cross-tabulation of moves by 
departments which supported their argument that rewards were 
not evenly distributed. 
However, after the 1989 review, I calculated the 
following Chi-square (Table 9) to determine if there were a 
statistically significant relationship between appraisal 
categories (high, middle, and low), and BLM or subbranch 
groups. The Chi-square (X2) value was 9.353, df = 12, and 
P.5o = 11.34. The differences between observed and expected 
were not large enough to conclude that the results were due 
to random error. I found that cell placements were not 
related to the department or subbranch in which one worked. 
This strengthened managers' arguments that they sought 
equity and in fact allocated moves evenly. 
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Table 9 
1989 Aeeraisal Distribution of 
Cell Placement by Subbranch (BLM} 
subbranch High Middle Low NA Total 
Cells 1,2 3,4,5 6,7,8 
lNO 16 46 35 0 97 
2VO 15 61 58 3 137 
580 1 10 6 0 17 
6LO 5 27 18 0 50 
8BO 1 5 11 0 17 
TOTALS 38 149 128 3 318 
Two additional Chi-square calculations, however, 
supported the argument that cell position was related to 
service as a EA, a factor managers admitted to, and to 
gender, a variable I did not ask direct questions about, nor 
an area that managers talked about. Table 10 tested for a 
relation between cell position and length of service. 
service 
0-3 
4-7 
8-10 
11+ 
TOTALS 
Table 10 
1989 Appraisal Distribution of 
Cell Position by Service 
High Middle Low 
0 2 48 
0 17 25 
0 26 17 
38 105 37 
38 150 127 
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NA Total 
2 52 
1 43 
0 43 
0 180 
3 318 
x2 = 134.16, df = 9, and P.OOl = 27.88. There was a 
relationship between service and cell placement -- the more 
senior EAs occupied the high cells (1 and 2), while the 
shorter service EAs held the lower cell positions (8, 7, and 
6). The observed differences were significant. 
The second analysis (Table 11) tested for a relation 
between cell position and gender of EA. 
Table 11 
1989 Appraisal Distribution 
of Cell Position by Gender 
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Gender High Middle Low NA Total 
Male 38 136 100 3 227 
Female 0 14 27 0 41 
TOTALS 38 150 127 3 318 
x2 = 15.528, df = 3, and P.oo1 = 13.82. There was a 
relationship between gender and cell placement -- men 
occupied the higher cells (1 and 2) in a significantly 
different, i.e., higher, manner than women. 
Overall, managers share moves, use interpretation, 
observe and judge behavior, measure contributions, employ 
multiple judgments, publicly discuss candidates, consider 
past performance, and produce a list of relative performance 
which they accept, at least partly. 
The following table summarizes conventions (Appendix 5) 
used by managers during group appraisal meetings. 
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Table 12 
summary of Grouo Decision-Making Conventions 
Used by Managers of ZY&Y 
Method 
* Voting 
* Seniority 
* Flip a Coin 
* Present 
qualities 
- attendance 
- cost reduction 
* Picture Book 
* Form 
Coalitions 
* "Give and 
Take" 
- allocate 
- bargaining 
* "Give In" 
* Make New Rules 
Situation Used 
* Break 
performance ties 
" " " " 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
* Limited Slots 
* Don't 
recognize EAs 
* Uncertainty, 
lack of rules 
* Limited 
rewards (moves) 
* Long, tension 
filled sessions 
" 
" 
" 
* Ineffective or 
lack of rules 
Outcome 
* Placement, but 
inaccurate 
according to 
actors 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" ti 
" 
" 
" 
* Mistrust, poor 
listening, check 
of biases 
* "Old" data 
selected 
* Create 
decision without 
agreement 
* Satisfy, not 
maximize goals 
regarding cell 
placement 
* Most deserving 
EA may not 
receive reward 
* Cells 
assigned, 
supervisory 
mistrust 
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AP Form -- The Record of Performance 
During the first quarter of each year, managers 
complete part A of an AP form (Appendix 4} which describe 
the job tour and lists departmental goals. Some supervisors 
carefully review this information, but most did not because 
the language was general and could fit almost any EA tour. 
After the discussion the employee and supervisor sign the 
form. When the year was over, supervisors complete Part B of 
the AP which describes the EA's performance. Of course many 
situations and priorities change since Part A has been 
completed. The manager recalled the circumstances through 
notes, production reports, memos, recollection of 
observations, or feedback from others. Chuck, Arlin, and 
Eddy work in the same subbranch and told me they developed a 
questionnaire to use with their engineers in order to 
evaluate EAs. This is an effort to make the appraisal 
process more structured and grounded in shared 
understandings of performance levels. 
The AP form was described by managers as a ritual, 
existing primarily for appearances. According to Kurt: "The 
AP does not match the cell assigned. They aren't read and 
exist as a formality." It is not used to produce or 
determine a performance band, but as a record of performance 
that provides legal documentation and feedback to 
individuals. Bud, a 3rd level manager, saw it this way: "The 
AP form is not a selling tool, but a tool of discussion." 
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Arlin added: "A good AP write-up may not be linked to a 
higher cell." The AP is rarely used to "present" candidates 
for placement, but as a device to offer feedback, facilitate 
discussion, help an employee develop skills, and to justify 
cell location, which was determined prior to and 
independently from this document. Chuck: "The form is often 
done after the rank-order and cell assignments are finished. 
EAs were mostly negative about the APs. One employee 
reported: "Management can use them how they wish." Another 
said his contained "negative comments only." A third said, 
"The AP was made to fit my rating." The implication of these 
practices is to render the form important as an evaluation 
tool since it is a clear fabrication and symbolizes the sham 
of performance appraisals. Managers thought that employees, 
knowing the impact of the AP, generally ignored its 
contents, often declining a discussion and instead choosing 
to merely sign the form on Part c, which lists the 
performance level for a specific year. 
Supervisors use language they describe as general, 
cautious, and safe to avoid having to defend the lack of a 
higher rating to employees or to the Union. Reno: "EAs 
compare their APs and find the same words used in most 
cases. Managers do this to protect themselves." John W: "I 
put little information on the form because EAs and union 
reps use it against us. The statements are general. I 
cover myself against challenges." This creates an 
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interesting dysfunction and contradiction: the AP, intended 
to facilitate communication, feedback, and employee 
development, actually inhibits and conceals information as 
managers protect their judgments through the use of non-
specific, generalized language. Some raters used a set of 
terms and expressions which they apply to all EAs whom they 
appraised. Kurt: "I noticed I began using the same words on 
APs, which read the same even though EAs described were 
placed in different cells." Chuck: "An on-going concern of 
mine is 'am I using adjectives consistently?' I don't want 
to use words that sound alike." Inability to make finer 
distinctions for fear of grievances prevents supervisors 
from offering more specific, written comments. Bill: "I 
can't be too critical in what I write because the Union can 
take you to task. I try to be uniform in APs since people 
will compare them." After this Bill told me he relies on 
informal, verbal comments to correct problems because he is 
less restricted when talking rather than committing his 
position to paper. Some managers did verbally give more 
direct, specific comments that were later defended as 
misquotes or interpretative differences. 
Two Views of APs 
Garfinkel (1967) raised a number of valuable questions 
which can be used to analyze organizational records such as 
AP forms which managers had to complete for every EA. These 
must be kept for 3 years, shared with the employee, and 
remain available to the Union officers when processing a 
grievance. 
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The first question was, What's on the AP"? The form 
(Appendix 4) contains the following information: the 
employee's name, title, supervisor's name, and department 
number; a section for the boss to describe the principal job 
responsibility; an area to list the major assignments of 
"unusual importance to the organization"; a space for 
supervisors and EA to sign, indicating the job expectations 
were discussed but not necessarily agreed on. On page 3 the 
supervisor "describes how well the principal purpose of the 
job tour has been accomplished, documenting any significant 
deviations in performance." In part 2 of this page, the 
manager is told to "document specific accomplishments for 
each major objective." Page 4 begins with a request to 
"briefly list other significant accomplishments not covered 
above." The employee had a space to sign indicating "he/she 
had an opportunity to discuss results prior to 
organizational appraisal sessions. It does not indicate 
agreement." The final section of page 4 contains the 
employee's cell placement, appraisal period, supervisors' 
approvals, and EA's signature, acknowledging the employee 
has had a chance to discuss his/her appraisal, but not 
necessarily to agree with cell placement. 
What problems are there in using information on the 
AP?" Most of the information appears as written narratives 
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rather than descriptive scales, making the document subject 
to more interpretation. Also comparisons between EAs are 
difficult because the form reflects the individual style of 
the supervisor. Some managers write forms that show 
measurable performance differences. Chuck: "A consistent 
concern of mine is 'am I using adjectives consistently? I 
don't want to use words that sound alike." 
The comparison problem really concerns the employee and 
the Union reps when they review APs for possible 
inconsistencies. Ken, an active rep, complained to me about 
the time involved for him to study, analyze, and make sense 
of the forms. Routinely, the APs create few problems for 
managers because they have little need to compare their 
words after the documents are written. They become 
uncomfortable during grievance or arbitration hearings, 
however, when they have publicly to defend and justify what 
they write. 
What information was unavailable from the record? 
Employee receive a general sense of their performance 
against departmental goals, but no idea how they compare 
with other EAs. This is curious because the managers rank 
employees to determine cell placement. Employees see their 
cell positions, but do not know where they rank in the band. 
The form does not systematically contain an explanation 
about the person's developmental needs. Some supervisors 
commented about that deficiency. Regina: "Since appraisals 
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are always tied to money, the objective of development is 
last." Reno had similar thoughts: "At first EAs accept the 
development theme, but then they get mad." 
The organization has a number of "good" reasons for 
creating "bad" records. As managers repeatedly told me, 
they were very guarded in what they wrote. Reno: "AP forms 
are used carefully to meet the cell position assigned to the 
person. We don't want to hang later. We are careful to 
imply nothing. Words don't match performance." supervisors 
created the AP to meet company policy requirements and not 
as a document convenient for union scrutiny. Managers had 
to complete the form, not provide a format for broad 
comparisons among employees. Their tactic is also to have 
the forms completed as quickly and conveniently as possible 
because of the number involved. Kurt: "It's ridiculous to 
rate 30 EAs I don't directly observe, let alone write 30 
APs. Do you know how long that takes?" Some managers 
routinize the task. Eddy: "Some managers find it difficult 
to write so they use phrases like "met expectations", 
instead of making specific comments." Judy: "My boss 
xeroxed an appraisal form for two employees who performed 
differently." The records were "bad" from the perspective of 
those trying to analyze data, but "good" for supervisors who 
must complete the form within a period of time. 
"Is there uniformity in the APs"? Managers act 
uniformly in their cautious, non-committed style of 
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completing the form to protect themselves from being 
"trapped" later by questions. The contents are not uniform, 
on the other hand, when assignments and accomplishments are 
compared, because individual managers describe assignments 
from various perspectives due to different departmental 
goals. 
"What are the 'prevailing rules' of practice?" 
Managers write the forms after the EAs are assessed, ranked, 
and assigned to cells, so their descriptions of 
accomplishments can thus match the cell selections. If 
supervisors complete the entire form prior to the group 
meetings which produced cell placement, they will risk 
writing documents at variance from their appraisal band. 
EAs can be described in glowing, positive terms, and yet 
their cell positions may be low (8,7) and inconsistent with 
the verbal descriptions, inviting challenges from employees, 
who then ask, "Why is there such a discrepancy between your 
words and my cell position"? 
Performance Evaluation Models 
During the research process, I saw that an interesting 
comparison could be made between popular appraisal models 
commonly held by the managers and intended to guide their 
behavior and the actual practice found in the Engineering 
organization. I located two common evaluation models being 
used in the research setting (Scott and Dornbusch, 1967; 
Skenes, 1989) that reflect the "management" evaluation 
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concept and were so similar I combined them into one 
paradigm illustrated as the "formal model" below. Following 
this description of evaluation theory, I analyze the 
practice of evaluation models in the engineering 
organization. 
Formal Model -- What is Supposed to Happen 
In the first step, managers set performance goals. The 
rational objectives of the work group determine the 
important activities. For example, the department decides 
it has to produce 50 specs per week to make a 10% profit. 
The next step requires establishing performance standards. 
Managers clearly define and communicate expected behavior 
for job performance. Managers then collect and record 
performance data through observation and feedback from other 
raters. Raters assess behavior by comparing employee's 
behavior to the performance standards, noting situational 
factors, to determine an evaluation. Supervisors compare the 
evaluations of employees and assign individuals to a variety 
of performance levels, reflecting a diversity of 
contributions and achievements. After appraisal forms are 
completed and levels assigned, the supervisor provides 
feedback for development and salary administration purposes. 
The discussion is to be positive with career planning as one 
focus. Managers learn this idealized approach through 
company training courses, professional and company 
publications, and informal discussions among their peers. 
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I..nf ormal Model -- What Actually Happens 
Instead of selling goals to EAs, managers tell the 
employee what upper management wants. John described the 
process: "I review each EA's responsibility with them. 
Financial goals define department goals. I tell my people 
what the goals are, but don't get real buy in, just 
acceptance." 
The norms of performance are implied, varied, and 
subjective. Managers had a number of comments to illustrate 
this situation. Eddy: "Cell definitions vary each year 
because of the people reviewed and the work conditions. 
These definitions depend on the OM's perceptions." Bob: "I 
use subjective factors." Chuck: "It's hard to know the 
situation surrounding each spec, so hard data alone is 
almost useless." Ed. B.: "Now the criteria are subjective; 
they used to be objective -- you know, figures to back up 
hunches." 
To produce data on appraisals, managers rely on a 
variety of information sources: observation, feedback from 
peers, mental and written notes, and impressions. 
Supervisors and employees had a number of views. Chris said: 
"One problem is they (bosses) can't always see you, so you 
have to tell the boss what you're doing." Chuck: "75% of my 
opinion is based on what engineers tell me." Ed B.: "I 
don't keep efficiency records because I rely on engineers 
who have direct contact with EAs." 
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supervisors admitted to and support the use of 
individual methods to evaluate performance. Ed B.: "Work 
varies so managers have to interpret what produced the 
results." John W: "Each manager uses his or her own 
standards. There's wide variation in what's considered good 
performance. Some stress numbers (efficiency, on-time 
delivery), others, personalities." Reno: "Evaluation 
methods vary according to the values of the boss -- what's 
important to him. I hate to be had, so I check honesty of 
people." 
The appraisal process is marked by imperfect knowledge 
and supervisory interpretation, so political tactics 
permeate the group decision-making process. Ed B.: "At the 
meetings, managers get worn out and give in on pushing their 
candidate." Bud: "We try to group similar performance. We 
didn't use a fixed model of performance to determine 
placement, but we looked at what was accomplished." Eddy: 
"We try to anticipate what others (managers) will do. The 
group meetings turn into complete shit because managers do 
not know other EAs. In the present system, managers talk 
people into positions they don't belong in." Bob: "Some OMs 
raise their voices and push their candidates ahead. After a 
45 minute discussion, we turned to voting as a way out to 
move on." Kurt: "Managers who speak better, and sell their 
person who is known by others, gets cell movement for their 
candidate." 
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Managers reported that this phase contains a variety of 
behaviors. Some just announce appraisals, while others 
discuss the AP form with EAs, who also display a range of 
actions from just signing without discussion to skipping the 
interview completely. Chris: "The appraisal session is a 
telling session because evaluation (the level) has been done 
and approved." Kurt: "Giving out cell moves is like 
throwing bones to a dog. People want to know why they 
didn't move up or why they dropped. Some don't even read 
the forms, just sign them because no money is involved." 
Bill: "Appraisals don't mean anything. They do not reflect 
the cell one is put in. Some EAs said, 'just let me sign 
the form'. Others just want to know their cell." one EA 
reported, "The boss writes everything and you sign"; while 
another said his boss "completed the form and discussed it." 
An engineer who thought he hadn't advanced higher because he 
"didn't play politics or socialize", said he "read and 
signed the form even though I disagreed that it contained 
all the facts the appraisal was based on." Regina: "People 
look at money, not appraisals (level or write-up)." Karen: 
"Some refuse to sign the form, maybe 20 out of 400. People 
want to get feedback so they can react to comments." 
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Figure 5 on the next page illustrates and summarizes 
the broad process of appraisal construction actually used in 
the Engineering organization. Three general phases produce 
appraisals. A group of contextual factors (e.g., task 
variation, size of universe, informal standards, and 
existence of union) produce a good deal of uncertainty about 
performance criteria. This is further complicated because 
individual supervisors have unequal influence and knowledge 
about workers' contributions. This uncertainty leads to the 
use of a political process (e.g., coalition building, 
voting, long meetings, and unequal influence of supervisors) 
to actually assign EAs to performance cells. This model 
contradicts the commonly held myth that individual effort 
and achievement are recognized and used to assign 
subordinates to appraisal cells. 
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Figure 5 
Model of Appraisal Production Actually Used in ZY&Y 
Factors Internal to Unit 
* Tasks Vary in Complexity 
* Large size of Appraisal Universe 
* Informal Evaluation Standards 
* Presence of Union 
Uncertainty 
* Performance Criteria Vary 
* Managers' Influence is Unequally Distributed 
Political Process 
* Coalitions are Formed Along Department Lines 
* Managers Vote to Break Ties 
* Long Meetings Wear Out Managers 
* Power of Managers' is Unequal 
Assignment of Appraisal Cells 
257 
Additional analysis indicates that the political 
process consists of a number of separate variables which 
impact both the actual behavior and individual judgments of 
managers. Because of this process, an individual's 
evaluation placement can be described as a dependent 
variable, affected by a number of other factors. The 
specific independent variables involved in this political 
process include the following: 
1. Number of Available Openings -- advancement of 
employees to higher bands depends on the number of available 
positions. If the universe of employees has become stagnant 
due to a business slowdown, there will be less movement of 
employees. 
2. Interpretation of Contributions -- employees' 
efforts are measured against the perspectives of a large 
variety of raters who see the organizational world 
differently. 
3. Uncertainty -- raters can't always know what to do 
to capture a valid picture of performance. Since managers 
have an unequal knowledge of employee's behavior, it is 
impossible for all supervisors to be judging the same 
behavior. 
4. Political Tactics -- uncertainty over procedures 
and lack of agreement "factor" the use of negotiations, 
voting along party lines and "give-and-take" behavior in 
order to structure the group meetings to favor a limited set 
of candidates (Pfeffer, 1978). 
5. Supervisor's Influence -- each manager provides the 
initial input about each employee and then bargains, using 
varying degrees of ability to influence peers. Those with 
greater verbal skills obtain a larger share of rewards for 
their employees. 
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6. Goal Displaceaent -- the primary goal of evaluation 
assessing performance -- becomes secondary to producing a 
rank-order list, which then represents an account of 
performance for that year. Accuracy -- the correlation of 
performance and cell placement -- is distorted as the 
primary task of the group sessions becomes to complete a 
rank-order list (Blau, 1967). 
7. Favoritism -- social factors, such as the ease of 
managing people, their willingness to work, and attitude 
filter manager's subjective judgments of the individual's 
behavior. Someone who is "liked" is generally perceived to 
be a better employee. 
8. Job structure -- the nature and demands of job 
assignments vary creating the opportunity for some employees 
to have more time or resources to perform more successfully 
(Kanter, 1977). 
Table 13 summarizes the political nature of appraisal 
construction. 
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Table 13 
Political Process Model of Appraisal Construction 
Independent variables Features 
I 
Number of Openings Few -- Many 
I 
Interpret Contributions Agreement -- Disagreement of 
shared understanding 
I 
Degree of Uncertainty Great - Small Knowledge of 
Work 
I 
Political Tactics High -- Small use 
I 
Boss' Influence/Knowledge Influential -- Ineffective 
I 
Goal Displacement Convenience: Easy - Difficult 
Time Use: Much - Little 
I 
Favoritism Like 
--
Dislike Employee 
I 
Job Structure High -- Low Opportunity 
I 
Variable Mediated Work Behavior, Habits, 
Production 
I 
Dependent variable Appraisal Band Placement 
(Cell) and AP form 
Conditions Affecting Appraisal Construction 
The evaluation process of this organization is marked 
by several subtle variables which give it a special 
appearance. These variables also affect the group decision-
making process. The nature of relations within the system 
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can be described as contractual (Etzioni, 1961), producing a 
set of work performances based on expectations of rewards. 
Employees are involved in the unit because they are paid to 
be involved. Work relationships are marked by constant 
examinations and negotiations over the terms of the 
"contract." The rewards are mainly financial (e.g., raises, 
promotions) and secondarily status symbols (e.g., awards, 
plaques). 
The opportunity structure changed as noted earlier, and 
now increased restrictions on one's chance for promotion 
from EA to engineer without adequate formal education. The 
EA assignment was described by some managers as a "career" 
assignment, meaning that people expected to spend their 
entire company life in the EA slot. The process is also 
heavily influenced by halo effects from previous years which 
tie in nicely to the "cueing" system of appraisals. The 
previously used labels keep employees in certain performance 
tracks, allowing them movement toward the top levels over 
time. Many are disappointed because they never move up or 
movement is very slow -- sometimes a single cell advance 
took 10 years. Bob: "Those stuck in the same band for 10 
years don't believe or accept the system. They feel if 
they're doing the job, they should move up. The system takes 
too much time to move (employees)." 
Evaluations represent a summary of a sample of a whole 
year's performances, based on the employee's degree of 
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visibility and skill in managing his or her own impression 
on raters. This imperfect sample is used and becomes an 
official part of the employee's record producing a sense of 
unfairness or lack of recognition. When managers write 
summaries, they create performance abstractions which are 
incomplete pictures of behavior, but taken as valid and 
become part of the historical record of the EA, used·during 
next year's evaluation process. Here they will affect the 
new abstraction, producing a somewhat closed and distorted 
loop of observation, feedback, and appraisal placement. This 
process also detaches, strains, and separates the 
relationship between a number of groups: boss and 
subordinate because communications are guarded and 
manipulative; bosses and their peers because it requires 
trust to conduct performance-based evaluations, and 
manipulation to gain in a politically-based, allocation 
system; and groups of subordinates who compare themselves to 
others and feel they deserve to be rated higher than those 
they saw as less productive, knowledgeable, or senior than 
themselves. The process is embedded in the use of verbal, 
informal communication rather than formal, accurate feedback 
because managers fear reprisals or grievances from taking 
strong, firm positions on a subordinates' performance. 
System Limitations 
The appraisal system contains a number of factors which 
limit movement within the appraisal plan. The current EA 
262 
plan has 9 distinct cells, each with a percentage value 
ranging from 80% (cell 9) to 118.6% (cell 1). The salary 
administration portion of the plan "funded" the salary 
increase needs by providing enough money to grant raises, if 
the entire universe has appraisal percentages which balance 
at 100% The system thus is a "relative" appraisal approach, 
comparing EAs against each other, rather than strictly 
evaluating the employee's performance against a set of 
individual standards. This produces a highly competitive 
structure in which someone gains a cell when new members are 
added or someone else moves downward. Although participants 
expected to move from lower to higher cells over time, there 
are relatively few upward moves, due to the forced 
requirement to balance appraisals at 100%. During the 1988 
rate review, about 340 EAs were appraised and only 38 had 
upward cell movement, while 6 individuals dropped one cell. 
Over time all the actors accepted these artificial limits as 
a legitimate part of the plan. The small number of movement 
chances helped the mass of employees accept their lack of 
advancement which became reserved for a select few. The 
majority of workers were actually protected because it was 
not the end-of-the-world to maintain one's status quo, and 
the company provided job security and good benefits to most 
employees which compensated for the lack of rapid movement. 
Another less obvious system limitation concerned the 
time spent annually to do the appraisal. Although managers 
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are familiar with the process, they find themselves 
negotiating over who should claim the limited seats open for 
movement. Although the consequences of placement are 
significant (e.g., salary increases, grievances), managers 
are traditionally required to complete the task in about one 
week, condensing the time to do a more adequate job into a 
short time period. This produces a more politicized 
product, open to grievances and dissatisfaction and mistrust 
among managers. Long sessions "wear down" managers, and they 
"gave in and stopped arguing for their candidates." The time 
constraints have dual consequences. They help managers make 
difficult decisions about distributing limited rewards by 
drawing tight deadlines. But the constraint also is 
dysfunctional because it distorts the analysis needed to 
evaluate the contributions of employees. Instead, context 
factors like time limits help produce appraisals rather than 
in-depth reviews of actual performance. 
The formal criteria to judge performance of EAs have 
not changed since the first contract in 1967. These factors 
include "performance, ability, potentiality, level of 
knowledge, judgment, ingenuity, initiative, experience, and 
current salary." These elements are not formally defined in 
the contract and remain vague and open to interpretation and 
application according to manager's perceptions. 
The system is marked by a great deal of variation in 
standards, work assignments, and supervisory perception, 
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resulting in high levels of uncertainty. The goals of the 
unit vary each year depending on the demands of customers. 
These shifts send mixed messages to employees about the 
value of their efforts. The uncertainty has implications for 
both supervisors and subordinates. Managers use the 
dynamic, complex situations to keep employees off balance 
and controllable. Workers, wanting to succeed in the 
organization, continued their efforts, hoping to present the 
right or needed behavior at the moment, insuring their value 
to the department. Though uncertainty appears dysfunctional 
at first glance, it also provides managers a tool to keep 
workers in check. 
The large size of the organization with, more than 600 
employees and 300-plus EAs, fosters inaccuracies in judging 
the relative worth of individuals. The system calls for 
placing all the EAs in a rank-order from number 1 to the 
last EA, but no manager has information on all employees, so 
varying degrees of inaccuracy creep into the system. 
Supervisors have from 15 to 30 employees to appraise, so 
they develop additional techniques to manage the evaluation 
task. Some managers may "copy" the same performance goals 
for all their employees, even though they differ, just as a 
convenient way to handle the same task for 30 employees. 
Consequently, the formal aspect of the appraisal is 
fulfilled, while the stated purpose of differentiating 
performance for rewards may become lost. 
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Knowledge of performance is incomplete and unequally 
distributed among managers, who reported their task is 
easier for the professional engineer group because that 
group contains only about 90 people and their behavior is 
more widely known, due in part to their more dominant 
position in the occupational structure. The use and 
distribution of appraisal data are critical issues for the 
evaluation system. As mentioned above, information on 
performance is unequally distributed in the organization: 
not all raters (e.g., supervisors, and engineers) share the 
same data or interpretation of situations. EAs perform and 
manage their visibility differently, which becomes a factor 
in their cell placement in contradiction to the official 
organizational practice of judging work performance. This is 
another indication that appraisals are illusions of actual 
contributions. 
The presence of a labor union influences the appraisal 
system in several ways. The Union is a legally sanctioned 
body which is granted a number of rights by labor law. The 
first and most encompassing right is the company's 
obligation to bargain over changes in "wages, hours, and 
working conditions," before implementing change. 
A great deal of uncertainty in decision-making resulted 
from the need of the company to bargain. Management may wish 
to introduce a more "efficient" appraisal or salary 
administration system, but must convince the Union of its 
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benefits from their perspective. The company's bargaining 
team (of which I have been a member for 4 years) tries to 
predict the impact and acceptability of proposals, although 
never certain of the Union's reaction. The Union and company 
in this setting have struggled for years over the best way 
to appraise EAs, with the company retaining the right to 
appraise and grant salary increases based on a number of 
merit factors. However, the Union attempted annually to 
alter the administration of salaries. 
Looks Are Deceiving 
The appraisal system is, on the surface, a merit-based 
equity system, providing unequal rewards due to each 
employee's contribution to production, quality, customer 
service, etc. The Union has sought an equality system, so 
all members share the same rewards. The plan has had a game-
like quality because rewards are unequal and limited, and 
the employees seek ways to gain the most from the 
organization. Behavior is often aimed at improving how one 
is perceived, i.e., as more or less powerful, rather than at 
accomplishing the department's goals. 
A climate of futility engulfs the actors because 
neither good nor poor performance is logically rewarded. 
Individuals who believe they perform well, and have that 
feeling validated by their immediate supervisors, may not be 
rewarded according to their expectations. Other EAs who 
perform poorly are not negatively affected either. They do 
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not have money taken from them even if they fall into a 
lower performance band. It is also rare for a long-term 
employee to be terminated for poor performance. The 
organization lived with its problems. Forces keeping this 
constant are a growing, profitable work unit which has not 
faced serious pressure to reduce non-productive employees. 
This discussion provides another dimension of 
contradictions (contained in the Marxist notion) where the 
company thinks it must perform certain actions (e.g., 
provide unequal rewards, give feedback) to help production 
among workers; but, at the same time, these devices 
undermine the credibility of the organization since these 
tools are not used fairly and consistently among all 
workers. In addition, the application of appraisal 
techniques produce effects contrary to those intended by 
managers. Employees compare their rewards and feedback, 
find them inconsistent with their perceptions of personal 
contributions, causing subordinates to reduce efforts 
instead of increasing motivation to accomplish 
organizational goals. 
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Table 14 summarizes the situational variables reviewed 
in the preceding section. 
Table 14 
summary Overview of Context Factors in Evaluations, 
ZY&Y Engineering Unit 
Factor 
uncertainty, lack of 
knowledge 
Opportunity Structure 
Halo Effects 
Summary, abstraction of 
behavior 
Limitations - 100% 
balance 
Little time to complete 
evaluation process 
Vague performance criteria 
Variation in assignments, 
standards 
Size and Knowledge factors 
Union Presence 
Value Contradictions 
Consequence 
Political Tactics 
(e.g., voting) 
Use of more Formal 
Education 
Slow Movement; establish 
a "cue" pattern 
Distortion; detaches, 
strains relationship 
Allocation of moves 
before performance review 
Errors; increased use of 
political tactics 
Large use of 
interpretation, judgment 
Uncertainty, greater use 
of perceptions 
Seek shortcuts; data 
lacking or weak 
Constrains actions; 
Forced to bargain 
Demand information 
Equity VS Equality; 
Performance not 
recognized 
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Decision-Makinq Models 
A key goal of this research project was to explain the 
construction of appraisals as products of managers making 
decisions, using shared understandings of performance 
standards and behavior. A model of organizational decision-
making {Table 15) proposed by Thompson {1967), frames an 
explanation which fits the research setting. Thompson 
argued that the types of decision strategies managers used 
are dependent on 2 situational variables: goal agreement --
the extent members of the dominant coalition agreed on the 
problem or situation (e.g., increase profits, appraise 
fairly); and certainty of method the degree the coalition 
agrees on accomplishing the goal or solving the problem 
{e.g., consolidate departments, use peer evaluations). 
Table 15 
Thompson's Decision-Making Models 
Goal Agreement 
,..--
certainty of Method Strategy 
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aigh High Computational (Rational) 
r.,ow High Compromise (Political 
Bargaining) 
aigh Low Judgmental (Insight) 
r.,ow Low Inspirational 
(Leader) 
Each of these four strategies was used at some point to 
explain decision-making in the ZY&Y engineering unit with 
emphasis on appraisal decisions. 
9omputational 
There was high agreement on both what should be 
accomplished and how this should happen. For example, 
supervisors agreed employees should be paid accurately and 
in a timely manner, and they held that completing weekly 
time-tickets was the best way to do this. The appropriate 
leadership style was to "compute" or develop a routine 
procedure to collect, verify, submit, and store the 
timesheets. 
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political Compromise 
Here we found low agreement by managers on the problem 
or goal, but high certainty on the available solution 
techniques. Managers were not certain if they should stress 
high productivity (e.g., more "specs") or high quality 
(e.g., specs with few errors). They however agreed that 
classroom training would solve the problem. Thompson 
suggested that managers in this situation adopted a 
compromise or bargaining strategy to gain consensus for 
identifying the problem. 
Last year during protracted discussions at staff 
meetings, the six BLMs reached an impasse on how to appraise 
EAs to improve the "battle ground" climate of previous group 
meetings. The subbranch managers did not know if they 
wanted fair treatment (e.g., 100% appraisal balance) within 
each BLM group, or whether they wanted to reward members for 
the complexity of work and relative contributions of each 
subbranch. The decision was complicated by past injustices 
and the need for fairness now. Larry: "Years ago we 
accepted that the High Tech group would balance over 100% 
because they were formed by pulling the best EAs from other 
groups, but now we should seek fair treatment for everyone. 
If we don't limit the upward moves, High Tech will get even 
more out of line, i.e., appraised average over 100%." Ed 
J.: "The good, deserving people just don't work in High 
Tech. We have a number of good people in Power also." 
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Ken, the High Tech manager, was the target of these 
gentle attacks, but he kept resisting these rational 
arguments. "If you limit my moves, I won't be able to 
reward EAs who really contributed last year." The curious 
element of this conversation was that 7 of 8 BLMs agreed and 
yet they couldn't quite get Ken to concede his point or 
accept their perspectives. Ken agreed in principle that 
"all EAs should have a fair chance at receiving cell 
movements", but he was slow to accept that his subordinates 
(OMs) would have fewer cell moves. Eventually the coalition 
of 7 "convinced" Ken that equal treatment should come before 
his equity claim that he had more deserving EAs. 
Judgmental 
When managers agreed that appraisals were a means to 
develop employees and compensate them fairly, but did not 
concur on how to achieve these appraisals, the judgmental 
model was used. Many of the comments in the previous 
sections indicate managers wanted to treat people fairly 
rewards should match individual contributions -- but they 
had a low degree of certainty about how to achieve this 
equity situation because there were so many ways to evaluate 
(e.g., observation, feedback, voting, work habits, job 
knowledge, various supervisory perspectives, and amount of 
seniority). Faced with this uncertainty -- "we can't prove 
performance" -- supervisors made judgments using their 
professional experience in comparing performance against 
273 
shared expectations. This was the dominant decision-making 
mode of the managers. 
Inspirational 
Thompson described the use of this style when there was 
low agreement on what must be done and a low level of 
certainty on how to accomplish the goals. In this high 
uncertainty situation the manager made an "inspired" choice 
based on his/her own personal experience and insight. This 
approach could be further described as one based on hunches 
or intuition. This method was also cited by Peters and 
Waterman (1982} as the decision-making style of members in 
organizations with strong, clear, and articulated cultures 
when faced with uncertainty and incomplete information. 
Managers in the research setting also faced conditions 
of low goal agreement and confusion over ways to proceed to 
solve problems. The very conditions related to appraising 
EAs were often unclear and complex. Supervisors used to ask 
me what the appraisal time period covered -- they were not 
sure because it shifted during several previous reviews. 
There was a random quality to observations. Managers 
discussed issues in hallways, and at desks of other managers 
in whom they confided. The need for meetings to discuss 
appraisals spread informally, and ad hoc groups formed to 
solve issues related to rating EAs, comparing performance 
across department lines and deciding how fairly the most 
deserving employees were treated. 
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Thompson's models address a number of key issues about 
managers and organizational circumstances which operated in 
the engineering organization. The essential process of this 
group's life is decision-making to cope with uncertainty 
produced by incomplete knowledge about situations, including 
performance, or limited capacity to process information. 
Decision-making conditions really deal with processing and 
assessing data. Parallel to Thompson's work, one can 
identify the decision-making modes reported by Daft (1986). 
In lieu of computational, there is the rational approach 
which mechanically identifies and solves problems. The 
Carnegie model, developed at Carnegie - Mellon University, 
is another term for bargaining or coalition formation, to 
identify and select the problem. Daft uses trial and error 
in place of judgmental to illustrate using many small 
decisions, checking results, and then trying new ways to 
eventually solve a problem when managers were unclear about 
which method would work. Finally, the inspirational 
strategy can be compared to the garbage can model described 
by March, Cohen, and Olsen (Daft, 1986). There is great 
uncertainty and a random quality to problems and solutions. 
Decisions are a result of the interplay between problems, 
solutions, actors, and choices, and often occurs "through 
resolution, oversight, and the flight" of problems (Pugh & 
Hickson, 1989). 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
This study gave me an intensive, detailed look at an 
organization and a chance to describe the context of, the 
beliefs underlying, and the process itself of performance 
evaluations. This chapter summarizes my insights .through 
the following sections: Features of Appraisals, What Do 
Appraisals Mean?, Contradictions, With These Problems, Who 
Wants Evaluations?, General Applications -- What Learn About 
Organizations. 
Features of Appraisals 
On Credit 
One of the most captivating aspects of evaluations is 
its similarity to a credit-investment exchange drawn from 
the financial world. The company's appraisal system treated 
the subordinate like an investor who risks his/her labor 
capital (e.g., ideas, productive activity, customer service, 
problem solving-skills, etc.) instead of money throughout 
the year in hope of receiving a return (i.e., a raise or 
promotion) in the future. Key features of both the 
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appraisal cycle and investment activity involve risks and 
uncertainty. The worker believes that "correct" behavior 
throughout the year, although never guaranteed, will lead to 
satisfactory rewards. As a result the employee works "on 
credit", engaging in activities (e.g. staying late, 
volunteering for committee work) that he/she expects to "pay 
off" in the future, annual review. 
Managers bear little risk in this cycle and there is no 
FDIC insurance to secure the subordinate's investments, 
which may be assessed differently than the subordinate views 
them. The worker has few alternatives in this exchange and 
must hope that his/her efforts will be appropriately 
recognized by managers. Lack of recognition or feedback, 
even negative, heightens the employee's investment risk. 
He/she extends performance "credit" during the year, 
building reward expectations that may not materialize. 
Managers are like friends without lunch money who take a 
"catch-you-later" attitude to paying back on "loans", i.e., 
worker skills and efforts. Since the appraisal system lacks 
more immediate rewards, a year-long credit extension exists. 
This is another version of the carrot-on-a-stick cliche: 
employees keep chasing and reaching for rewards, which, 
although close, remain just outside their reach. 
This credit arrangement completely favors the company's 
interest. A worker is never sure his/her performance will 
be rewarded, but continues to behave as though the 
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investment will pay off. Really, what choice does the 
employee have? He/she could demand more timely rewards and 
performance reviews to monitor the status of the credit-
reward exchange, but holds back comments, sensing little 
power. A key insight about the appraisal process is that, 
while the actors believe that performance (reflecting a 
"computational" decision) really counts for placement, in 
practice the more significant variables are the political 
forces, in the form of "judgmental" decisions, which come 
into play to determine an individual's cell level (Thompson, 
1967). 
Controlling Workers 
The appraisal system remains a tool to control the work 
and indirectly the behavior of employees. Although the term 
is not applied to appraisals, there is a similarity between 
appraisals at work and grade reports in school. Both 
devices allege to reflect the achievements of the individual 
through a written report, but in fact both devices also 
reflect the compliance (Edwards, 1984), timeliness, work 
habits, interpretation, attendance, and social skills of 
actors. The report card controls behavior and acts as a 
reminder of the subordinate's position -- he/she has limited 
input which is given after the appraisal is completed, not 
allowing for changes. 
Because appraisals aid the control process, workers use 
energy to create a more favorable impression (Goffman, 1959) 
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of themselves. Besides the expected cooperation and hard 
work, some actors use obedience, i.e., following rules to 
gain power and seize a measure of control (Hamilton & 
Biggart, 1985). Appraisals reflect the power relationships 
between managers and worker because both parties struggle to 
do things by their own agendas -- company needs vs worker 
interests. The manager uses the threat of an unsatisfactory 
appraisal to withhold general increases and the worker tries 
to conduct him/herself in the most favorable light to 
produce a good report card so he/she will receive the 
incentives. 
Myths -- Things Are Not As They Appear 
Appraisals represent organizational myths -- beliefs 
that do not operate in actual practice. Many members still 
believe that hard work will produce high levels of reward, 
while at the same time accepting the political nature of 
organizations with its favoritism and bias. The myth 
persists despite situations where most employees experience 
discrepancies between performance delivered and annual 
rewards, i.e., increased compensation and promotions. The 
evaluation procedure, however, seems to invalidate the 
expectations of the "psychological contract" (Schein, 1983) 
existing in the organization's culture. That is, employees 
believe that good work will be adequately rewarded, but in 
actuality the majority of subjects expressed dissatisfaction 
with the match between their efforts and the company's 
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ability to provide rewards. Simply stated, managers cannot 
meet their end of the contract -- productive efforts are not 
always recognized because they use a system of relative 
performance in a situation with limited resources. The 
potential for compensation is always there, but employees 
feel their efforts are simply not rewarded. Employees 
fulfill their ends of the bargain -- the contract -- but 
feel the company does not meet its part of the deal. After 
a while, employees make assessments of how much effort they 
should give to match what they are receiving. This 
"checking" behavior is quite common in utilitarian 
organizations described by Etzioni (1961) in his work on the 
kinds of involvement used by different types of formal 
organizations. 
I can offer two reasons why workers, despite 
dissatisfaction, persist in this myth. First, individuals 
generally hold assumptions that one's rewards should match 
one's contributions (Kerbo, 1983). Workers are achievement-
driven, living in a political-economy that honors and 
rewards success in which one measure is the level of one's 
financial compensation. Money is the essential commodity in 
this social world and those who strive for productivity 
should be rewarded. An overriding belief in equity binds 
workers to the myth of appraisals -- where performance will 
be fairly and objectively measured, resulting in appropriate 
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returns. This belief maintains the credit-investment trap 
discussed above. 
second, if workers were not to cling to the myth that 
rewards match performance, they would lose their reason to 
continue in the work situation. Employees need to retain as 
much autonomy and control as possible to manage the work 
situation. Without this sense of control over one's ability 
to achieve rewards, the employee would jeopardize the 
psychological contract (Schein, 1983) created earlier. The 
experience of members in this organization attests to the 
continuing strength of the appraisal myth, which managers 
use to motivate workers to produce, follow rules, and to 
continue investing their efforts for a future, uncertain 
attainment of rewards. 
Window Dressing 
Formal evaluations also turned out to be a sham in 
which managers ask for production and quality and promise 
rewards (e.g., salary increases and promotions), but 
generally fail to deliver or uphold their end of the 
bargain. Further, appraisals provide "window dressing" for 
what really occurs. The causal observer would see a program 
to annually review an employee's performance and discuss 
his/her developmental needs. The job requirements and 
achievements are recorded in some version of an appraisal 
form. As described above, the "store window" looks 
inviting, a setting likely to offer challenging work and 
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growth experiences. However, once past the facade of 
appraisals, one sees a number of discrepancies between the 
talk of managers and their practices. First, many employees 
do not have a clear idea of what their jobs demand -- some 
managers do not formally discuss expectations but take-for-
granted that workers know what the job demands. Second, no 
interim review occurs because conducting one requires time 
and effort which managers believe they need to devote to 
production aspects of their jobs. They also do not like to 
confront employees and make judgments about their behaviors. 
Appraisals appear to be reward and development tools for 
employees but they actually are devices which induce 
defensive behavior. In light of this confrontation problem, 
appraisals are actually used to appease workers and conceal 
the uncertainties in the task of evaluation by using broad, 
general language constructs which provide no development 
plan because specifics are missing. Appraisals are also 
cover-ups and fraudulent because managers mysteriously reach 
a decision on an employee's work and then ex post facto 
construct the form to coincide with the performance band to 
which the subordinate has already been assigned. The form 
is really the window dressing, giving the appearance that 
the evaluation was based on this document after some 
sequence of objective measurements and steps were taken. 
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mio Knows What? 
A large amount of uncertainty surrounds the evaluation 
process. No one in the exchange knows for certain what 
behavior is important at a specific time because of a number 
of competing variables. What are the job standards? What 
is the company stressing now? What conditions did the 
person work under? Who is the supervisor? How much 
influence does he/she have with his/her peers? I was 
surprised to see the extent evaluation standards shifted 
among supervisors, departments, and time periods. 
Production remained the driving concern, but the evaluation 
norms were so numerous and open to interpretation by 
individual managers that both parties were confused. The 
engineering organization is very complex, resulting in the 
use of a plan which lacks clear direction. The most formal 
aspect of the EA plan is the AP {Appraisal Program) form. In 
practice, the system is actually informal, where performance 
is frequently "talked about" and thus open to interpretation 
of shifting standards. Evaluation decisions rely on the 
shared verbal understandings of the behavior that defines 
each of 8 performance cells. At times the criteria are so 
undefined and subjective that its products -- AP form, and 
rank order list -- seem unreal and meaningless because the 
sources used to produce it are so untenable. 
Supervisors do not use a written set of descriptions to 
classify performance into bands. They repeatedly reject the 
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notion of having a fixed, written set of descriptions. 
After some reflection, it became clear that the bands used 
for assigning evaluations to EA represented a cultural 
~roduct fashioned by the organization's members -- a 
relative, flexible set of norms that are commonly, although 
not completely, shared by managers. These common, informal 
understandings were produced by sharing experiences, 
difficulties, and decision-making, especially in the group 
meetings where multiple judgments are discussed and a rank 
order list is fabricated after a good deal of negotiation. 
The AP form represents a collection of judgments, 
depicting higher levels of abstraction. Managers observe 
behavior and make judgments about the value of that 
performance. These initial appraisals form the basis for 
discussions which are farther removed from the actual 
behavior. The account on the AP form is taken as the 
employee's indisputable performance, or what really 
happened, rather than an impressionistic, interpreted 
abstraction. This is similar to the process, described by 
Tuchman (1978), which substitutes the account-of-what-
happened for the original event. Along similar lines, the 
form is the focus of uncertainties about performance. 
Managers are unsure of their observations and the 
application of performance criteria, so it follows that 
formalizing these perceptions actually produces a collection 
of uncertainties or unverifiable judgments. 
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A major problem for managers was the impossible task 
they faced in knowing and appraising 300+ EAs who work under 
unique conditions but must be compared to each other. The 
debate raged over whether appraisals were objective, i.e. 
fair or subjective, i.e., biased. My conclusion is that a 
claim of objectivity is naive, mythical and a belief which 
reinforces the actors' idea that diligent effort will be 
seen, recorded, and rewarded. Instead I found evaluations 
were the interpreted perceptions, judgments, and biases of 
actors in superior positions. This argument was fully 
developed in Chapter 7, "The Social Production of 
Appraisals." Managers, even when they invoke the argument of 
multiple supervisory judgments, cannot know all dimensions 
of an employee's performance that are necessary to do a 
complete appraisal. Even with abundant information and the 
ability to process it, managers filter the data through 
factors like experiences, perceptions, and biases to arrive 
at an "evaluation-in-process", i.e., a pliable judgment 
which is subjective, and really not verifiable, rather than 
an objective appraisal which can be measured. To use a 
research metaphor, I found appraisals were of a 
"qualitative" rather than a "quantitative" nature. 
A major reason for assessment difficulties was the size 
of the evaluation universe -- over 300 workers -- making 
knowledge of their achievements impossible to determine. An 
unexpected revelation was the widespread use of something 
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known as a "picture book" -- a collection of photos of all 
members in the engineering organization which is produced 
every 5 to 7 years. The book is used to link names with 
faces so managers can evaluate the employees. This practice 
demonstrates the unequal distribution of knowledge managers 
possess about EAs and the impossibility of rating 300-plus 
employees in the same job category. Another surprise was 
the connection between the past year's cell position and the 
next year's placement. Uncertain where to begin the 
process, managers use performance history and current cell 
to determine where the individual belongs now. The fallacy 
of this procedure should be evident: if the system were 
filled with errors in the past, any current rating, 
dependent on the former cell, would be also inaccurate and 
simply compound previous inequities. 
Managers did not observe all performances, did not use 
uniform methods to record what they saw, and relied on the 
reports of engineers to help account for judgments. In the 
face of this knowledge-poor environment, managers used 
techniques (e.g., coin-flipping, voting and verbal 
presentation) to appraise employees which may not be 
consistent with the observations and judgments of other 
managers. During the group meetings two curious activities 
tended to occur. When more "hard" data are available, they 
will be used to decide cell placement. When less 
quantitative data are evident, the raters will use more 
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subjective items like impressions, compounding the 
uncertainty that already exists. One would expect that, 
when only subjective variables are applied, the group would 
push for more tangible variables like attendance. The 
managers become caught in a cycle of increasing 
subjectivity, although on the surface management thinks it 
is conducting the appraisal process as "objectively", using 
measurable data, as possible. Both managers and subordinates 
probably would pref er a computational approach to reaching 
evaluation decisions (Thompson, 1967) if such were available 
because this would minimize use of subjective criteria, 
which Caplow (1964) has argued has been unavoidable in 
appraisals. 
Let the Games Begin! 
Appraisals also display the features of a competitive 
games. The entire performance-evaluation cycle shows members 
defining, interpreting, and reacting to work situations to 
increase their gains and minimize their losses. This is 
like betting on a horse race -- you have a limited amount of 
money or labor (e.g., ideas, energy, time) to speculate 
(invest) on one of many unknowns (e.g., horses or 
performance choices), hoping to win (raises, promotions). 
The organization had limited resources for members and some 
distribution methods had to be set-up to handle the 
available rewards. Managers and subordinates in fact often 
cooperated to the benefit of each party (Buroway, 1979), but 
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there was always an exchange process where each side, i.e., 
manager and subordinate, tried to gain rewards and eliminate 
losses. Frequently, the process operated as a non-zero sum 
game where everyone could win. Managers wanted production, 
while subordinates seek recognition and compensation. on 
the negative side, managers want to end down-time and 
inconvenient appraisal methods, while the workers tend to 
avoid complex and difficult assignments whose rewards were 
uncertain, not timely, and inconsistent. Linked to this 
process is the strong belief, especially among subordinates, 
that they are entitled to advance in the system. Managers 
talk about the desirability and benefits of a merit plan, 
but in practice they recognize the value of using seniority 
or experience. I conceptualized this as a cueing system 
where actors take their place in line and move along each 
year, as other actors leave the "line". An additional 
consequence of entitlement is that average performance is 
rewarded, not fitting the perceived value of those 
contributions. 
The actors are driven by actions and decisions which 
are convenient, pleasant, or non-confrontational. This is 
evident in the attention given to producing a rank order 
list, rather than assessing actual performance, which 
becomes a secondary issue, overridden by the task of 
producing a piece of paper containing relative performance 
ranks. Ironically, most of the discussion in the 
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organization centers on the need to identify and reward 
individual performance, while the key activity and problem 
are to produce a rank order list. These activities take on 
the quality of games in which competing groups of actors try 
to maximize their gains in the manner of Crozier's findings 
(Pugh and Hickson, 1989). 
The game-like quality of appraisals also shows the 
existence and consequences of competition, a taken-for-
granted component of most games. The idea of competition is 
either assumed or rarely verbalized, but its value provides 
the basis of the appraisal plan. Placing employees into 
bands of relative performance rests on the idea of pitting 
individuals against one another for limited rewards in the 
form of cell advancement, salary increases, and promotions. 
This driving zero-sum process contrasts with the much 
verbalized concept of teamwork or collaboration, which 
receives a lot of lip-service, while the plan in actuality 
continues to predominantly reward individual effort. 
The unequal distribution of rewards establishes a win-
lose interaction and ground rules. Since the number of top 
spots are limited by company definition, some employees will 
win while others will lose in the evaluation game (Crozier, 
1964; Pugh and Hickson, 1989). The actors engage in a wide 
set of techniques (e.g., "brown-nosing", volunteering, 
transferring to powerful managers and highly visible 
departments) to win the game or remain ahead. 
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Making the Right Choice 
Decision-making styles were exposed during the games. 
Appraisal decisions were political because of the high 
degree of uncertainty in the organization. The conditions of 
uncertainty described above led to the use of political 
tactics to decide appraisal levels. Much of the process is 
rooted in coalition building, negotiation, subjectivity, and 
give-and-take behavior. These activities were too widespread 
to be classified as an aberration of the normally orderly 
sequence of decision-making steps. Group meetings to 
discuss appraisals are just one example of the indirect, 
informal, and unscripted way the Engineering organization 
produces appraisal bands. Evaluations reflect the political 
nature (i.e., on-going power struggles) of organizations in 
a concentrated time period, using a wide range of commonly 
shared procedures and conventions described in Chapter 7. 
Another discovery was that managers used verbal 
presentation of candidates during group meetings rather than 
utilizing the written AP forms or other such supporting 
documents. There may be several reasons for this 
preference. First, it is more convenient and faster for 
managers to talk about their candidates than to write about 
them. Second, supervisors adjust their strategies for 
advancing people when they see how the meeting is 
proceeding. Verbal exchange is a more adaptive and flexible 
approach than committing one's position to a written form. 
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Third, most of the supervisors use an aggressive style, 
creating a setting with a poor listening climate. Some even 
admitted that "we are not listening carefully to the merits 
of other's candidates, but are concentrating on what we will 
present about our employee." Some managers are not too 
adept at written skills but have developed confrontational 
verbal skills which they rely on during group consensus 
meetings. As additional evidence of managers' problems with 
formal, written skills, recall the difficulty they reported 
about writing AP forms to reflect differing performance 
levels. Supervisors had to depend on non-specific words to 
diminish the chance of grievances. Even with this caution, 
some forms contained the same words, while employees were 
situated in different performance bands. Managers present 
and push employees they want to reward, and since no one can 
prove whose performance is best (because standards shift or 
don't exist and decisions are based on managers' 
interpretation), supervisors use voting, coin-flipping, and 
calling-in favors. 
As the meetings stretch over several days, and more 
impasses are reached, fatigue sets in and a number of 
supervisors concede in trying to move their own candidates 
and thus allow other managers to gain moves so that the 
group meeting process can end. This is further evidence of a 
politically driven allocation process which places the 
managers' needs to create a rank order ahead of their stated 
goal of evaluating the relative contributions of their 
employees from "top" to "bottom". 
291 
The decision-making strategy desired and the one 
actually used differed significantly. Managers and 
subordinates preferred what Thompson (1967) called a 
"computational" approach which depends on high levels of 
agreement on performance standards and methods to complete 
evaluations. The problem remains because there is no 
agreement on standards or review methods and the differences 
are rooted in power struggles and political differences. 
Because of these factors, managers have to use bargaining 
techniques to trade the rewards of some employees for the 
moves they really want, i.e., their highest priority 
employees, by sacrificing deserving but not high priority 
candidates. This last group of decisions involves 
management judgment which makes the voter uncomfortable over 
his/her decisions and leaves the majority of employees 
dissatisfied because the evaluation does not match the 
worker's view of his or her contributions. This might be 
referred to as "distorted evaluation perception", an 
organizational malaise produced by parties seeking gains in 
a political system of limited resources. 
There are different activities involved in evaluating 
performance of individual employees and the tasks needed to 
assign people to performance bands. Managers individually 
did not have a problem appraising their workers. The real 
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problem came when all the supervisors got together to 
compare their EAs. Disagreements surfaced over who had done 
a better job compared to a larger group of EAs. The real 
problems surf aced when managers had to select good 
candidates for a limited number of upward moves. 
conceptually, the first stage of activity is judging 
performance against departmental goals to reach a conclusion 
about someone's contribution for the year. 
The second stage shifts the focus to selecting the most 
deserving employees from a large pool of candidates, through 
the use of negotiation, coalition formation, and 
presentation skills. The first stage is mainly an 
individual effort by the manager, while the second phase 
involves a group experience, requiring the presentation of 
many individual, diverse and private perceptions to a group 
intent on personal agendas. Decisions that a supervisor 
reaches individually "may not hold up" when presented to the 
group. Managers feel a loss of power and trust during these 
group, consensus-seeking meetings. 
A summary statement on the informal model of the 
appraisal process developed will help place a number of the 
factors in a clearer perspective to offer a theory of 
evaluation, begun in the last section above. In simple 
terms there are four parts to the evaluation system of the 
Engineering organization. 
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How Are Appraisal Decisions Made? 
I. The first stage is assembling all the data on 
behavior that constitute the employee's performance, 
including meeting departmental production goals; cost 
reduction; and problem solving. This aspect constitutes the 
data to be judged, measured, or evaluated. 
II. The second phase consists of the manager's 
individual assessments of the individual's work, production, 
social skills, and all work-related behavior. This process 
may be aided by organizational products like company 
guidelines, training courses, or even appraisal forms (APs), 
but a key feature is the individual manager's judgment of 
behavior, based on shared values, which he/she interprets 
and applies. 
III. The third phase, the political process, is crucial 
in the production of appraisal positions and consists of a 
number of separate variables which influence both the actual 
behavior and individual judgments of managers. Performance 
can actually improve in terms of goal achievement, for 
example, but individuals may nonetheless not advance due to 
political factors. An individual's evaluation placement can 
then be conceptualized as a dependent variable, affected by 
a number of other items. The specific independent variables 
involved in this political process are detailed in Chapter 7 
and include the following: number of available openings, 
interpretation of contributions, uncertainty, political 
tactics, supervisor's influence, goal displacement, 
favoritism, and job structure. 
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IV. The outcome of these factors produces the final 
phase of the evaluation process -- the placement into a band 
which reflects a collection of those defined by management 
to exhibit similar performance. Cell placement is the 
bottom-line, the most significant and tangible measure of 
attainment in the appraisal process. Regardless of the 
verbal or written feedback given to employees, the key 
factor is the evaluation category to which the employee is 
assigned. This cell reflects a position in one category of 
the stratification scheme and determines the employee's 
chance for and size of a salary increase. Almost any comment 
or action other than a cell move tells the individual that 
he/she or their manager was not good enough to obtain a 
reward for them. 
Class Differences A Contrast of Interests 
One of the most arcane aspects of evaluation programs 
is the way they represent social class differences, 
reflecting a political judgment by a member of the 
administrative (capitalist) class concerning the work of the 
operative (worker) class (Kerbo, 1983). The administrative 
group sets the agenda, makes and enforces rules, evaluates 
performances, and decides salary increases. The worker 
group implements objectives, interprets rules, performs, and 
receives feedback. The first group is interested in 
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obtaining productivity and making profits, while the second 
group seeks to maximize their economic condition so they can 
"make a living" and raise a family. For the latter, work is 
a means to an end -- economic survival. The administrative 
class views work as an end itself and the worker as a tool 
to achieve goals. Appraisals mark and record these 
differences and collection of judgments, separating the 
administrative and worker classes. It should be noted 
generally that, in Western capitalist organizations, workers 
do not write evaluations of their supervisors, but take 
direction and utilize little autonomy and discretion in 
contrast to the formal authority universally shared by and 
expected in managers. These groups exhibit the qualitative 
differences noted above which are symbolized by the 
evaluation system and specifically seen in the appraisal 
form where a permanent record is created. 
Social class issues are also apparent when you consider 
their impact on movement vis-a-vis education, race, and 
social interests. The casual observer of the engineering 
unit would say "we have a middle-class organization. These 
workers earn between $21,000 and $42,000 annually, own 
homes, drive new cars, and send their children to college." 
A closer look reveals that differences exist in social 
interests and that appraisals help construct and maintain 
these shared understandings. 
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I did not find overt decisions based on race or 
education, but in contrast, saw managers make efforts to 
advance both those with relatively less formal education and 
also women and minorities. Work performance was considered 
before educational attainment, gender, or racial status when 
movement was decided. In fact evaluations were used to 
bolster the evaluation chances of these groups by minimizing 
the significance of education, while emphasizing the 
worker's achievements -- further evidence about the 
judgmental, socially constructed nature of evaluations. 
However, when interests are considered, the impact of 
appraisals on class issues becomes more pronounced. The 
"interests" factor is clearly demarcated between managers 
(administrators) and subordinates (workers). The first 
group produces appraisals which affect the financial 
conditions and lifestyle of the second group. Managers 
establish and implement policy decisions and direct and 
evaluate the work effort of subordinates. This group has 
different social interests than the worker group, namely 
maintaining control and making profits, while the worker 
class seeks to gain more autonomy over the work situation 
and to increase their economic status. Managers give lip-
service to empowering the worker but they remain in the 
director's chair regarding all significant decisions, while 
subordinates exercise an advisory role. Formal evaluations 
highlight, emphasize, and center these distinctions. The 
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flow of appraisals is downward to the subordinate who can 
complain but not change decisions because that is 
"management's discretion". The worker only indirectly 
"creates" an evaluation by his/her ability to manage 
impressions which are judged by those in power -- the 
managers. Subordinates express unofficial opinions about 
managers but these are qualitatively distinct from the 
formal documents produced by managers who are authorized by 
their position to judge subordinates (Scott and Dornbusch, 
1967). Appraisals thus point out class differences between 
the powerful and powerless. They draw a definite boundary 
of separation between the parties even though their 
lifestyle, income, and place of residence may not differ 
significantly. 
What Do Appraisals Mean? 
Appraisals have different meanings for the several 
groups in the engineering unit. Managers see them as a way 
to control workers for productive effort, so they have an 
instrumental nature and are a tool of control. For 
subordinates, evaluations are "tollways" to rewards on which 
they paid tolls (e.g., gave effort and ideas, took orders, 
gave up autonomy) in order to gain increases and promotions. 
Sometimes these "roads" carry them down long, rough paths 
which do not always take subordinates to their expected 
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destinations. However, appraisals continue to be viewed as 
a negative but necessary conduit to financial and career 
movement. Under the current merit system, evaluations are 
entrenched as a way to measure relative worth of 
individuals. 
When the presence of the Union in considered, I found 
its officers acting as a protector against "wrong" 
appraisals, i.e., those contrary to the talked-about 
observations of others in the department (e.g., peers, 
engineers, other managers). The Union officers placed more 
attention on and used the AP forms to a greater extent than 
did managers, who viewed this document as a formality 
required by corporate policy. Also managers were aware of 
this form's impact and intentionally used non-specific or 
useless descriptions, further rendering the document and its 
discussion, a management-driven ritual. The Union leaders 
always requested these documents for grievances and 
arbitration cases, confirming management's fears by taking a 
literal interpretation of the words used to record 
performance. Their intent was to compare APs, reveal 
management inconsistency, and demonstrate the company's 
gross misuse of the appraisal system. Evaluations were 
"battlegrounds" and evidence of poor management, which the 
Union was happy to use to make their case against the 
judgment of managers. Appraisals represented tangible 
products on which issues of control, power, conflict, and 
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favoritism could easily be focused. They provided the Union 
officers with rich material to show their members why their 
presence was vital for the protection of workers. Appraisal 
forms and performance bands created on-going evidence of the 
discrepancy between managers' opinions and the real value of 
subordinates. 
Oddly though, the parties saw both the descriptions on 
the AP form, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7, and 
supporting statistics, as real. This means managers and EAs 
accept and use these products as accurate reflections of the 
match between performance and cell position, even though 
these two groups expressed doubt over the validity of 
performance levels, especially those indicating acceptable 
performance. After the process is over, participants tend 
to take the products for granted, without a great deal of 
on-going questions. 
The existence of a union places pressure on managers to 
create written appraisals, discuss them with EAs and to 
assign performance ranks. Because appraisals are the 
continuing subject of a debate, managers are forced to be 
more careful in how evaluations are constructed and 
communicated. This monitoring process is almost completely 
missing from the appraisals completed for managers 
themselves. I contend this difference is due to the Union. 
I believe that appraisals done of managers by their 
superiors are even more inconsistent and mysterious than 
those done on EAs. 
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The subjective nature of appraisal decisions are clear 
in the case of managers who reported that "I haven't had an 
appraisal in 30 years" or that "I got mine walking down the 
hallway". Upper management, not forced by union pressure to 
follow formal review procedures, begin with good intentions 
to appraise and offer feedback to develop other managers. 
This "talk" contrasts with the inconsistent treatment which 
follows. Other problems, projects, and needs of the 
business block and derail the evaluation procedure for 
managers. There are no job standards or they are so poorly 
communicated that they are dysfunctional. The appraisal 
bands for managers include groupings such as "far exceeds" 
(objections) and "fully meets" (objectives). This is a 
clear example of the mythical nature and sham-like quality 
of appraisals because some managers have never formally 
discussed their expectations. The understandings are taken-
for-granted by both parties making the process a ritual of 
organizational life rather than a device to reward 
performance. 
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Contradictions 
After intensely studying the problem of appraisals for 
several years, I realized they created a number of classic 
Marxian contradictions where a procedure required by the 
capitalist system produces an outcome that opposes or 
contradicts the original objectives of the organization 
(Goldman and Van Houten, 1977). 
Bureaucratic organizations need to motivate large 
number of employees for high productivity and profits, so 
they use appraisals. Workers however compare their efforts 
and the recognition given and when these two variables are 
not commensurate, the worker withdraws his/her involvement 
and reduces efforts (i.e., motivation). Appraisals aimed to 
increase production actually reduce it when employees are 
dissatisfied due to individual evaluations. Appraisals are 
also intended to give feedback so workers can improve and 
experience personal development. However, little feedback 
and development, if any, occurs because the primary emphasis 
is on establishing groups of relative performance. The 
process, aimed at insight and communication between boss and 
subordinate, actually produces less knowledge because the 
practices conceal information, not reveal it. 
The Union reps' perceptions of these forms caused 
managers to exercise caution and employ techniques, such as 
general descriptions, to control potential adverse effects 
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of APs during future comparisons. The overall effect is to 
render the appraisal form a largely ceremonial and useless 
document. The APs are an appraisal convention that manages 
appearances in the system of interactions. Through the 
documents both parties appear to be doing their jobs: 
management -- appraising and developing, while the Union 
protects workers by citing management errors through 
specific words and phrases which do not, in their view, 
match the individual's performance. This is one example of 
ritualized conflict between managers and union officers. 
Managers, cautious over possible confrontation (e.g., 
grievances), use non-specific language for convenience and 
consistency. The evaluation of a large number of employees 
requires a good deal of time which could more profitably be 
used to perform other managerial duties. 
Related to the feedback contradiction, the company 
stressed employee development through appraisal techniques. 
Although the allegation of development was seriously 
challenged above, employees seek more movement and 
advancement which the organization cannot deliver. Promises 
of "development" raise false expectations in workers who 
then slow their efforts once the development myth is 
recognized. The illusion of personal development linked to 
advancement results in subordinates who are hard to control 
and direct toward department goals. Employees now raise the 
question: Why should I take that more complex assignment? 
What's in it for me? 
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The organization also uses appraisals to reward 
employees and make them happy. Edwards (1984) pointed out 
how different rewards gain compliance from different types 
of employees. This procedure, instead of making workers 
happy and compliant, produces dissatisfaction when workers 
compare their performance-reward equation to that of their 
peers. Those who feel underevaluated reported 
dissatisfaction and lower motivational levels. The 
timeliness of the reward is also a factor. Employees who 
wait each year for advancement are dissatisfied to a larger 
extent than newer actors. What the company defined as a 
reward (e.g., higher performance band) is transformed to a 
neutral or even a negative outcome, largely due to the long 
waiting period and feeling of entitlement -- a sense that 
the reward is deserved because of seniority and not 
individual performance. 
Another significant finding is that the control aspect 
of appraisals is subtle or concealed, because, while the 
plan is aimed at rewards and development, for the most part 
employees are caught in a system which they know fails to 
adequately recognize their achievements and is marked by 
little change and slow cell movement. The plan produces 
caution in employees who constantly compare their rewards 
and those of peers to perceived accomplishments and 
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complexity of work to determine if the "contribution-reward" 
equation balances (Etzioni, 1961; and Thompson, 1967). 
Instead of employee development, the evaluation system 
produces overly careful employees with low motivational 
levels. This outcome is similar to the findings of Kanter 
(1977, 1979) where she reported on the widespread phenomenon 
of "powerlessness" which also accounts for low motivational 
levels. Limited information and advancement chances plus 
blocked careers produced a powerless group of employees, 
i.e., the majority of the 300-plus EAs. It is ironic that a 
system so driven and concerned with eguity and fairness 
actually produces inequities by basing rewards on allocation 
methods and political factors instead of on contributions, 
skill, and knowledge. 
Finally, evaluation procedures are aimed at identifying 
future managers and inducing workers to be more like those 
in authority positions. However, the inadequacies of 
administering evaluation programs such as lack of standards, 
negotiated judgments, and advancement by seniority and 
allocation methods rather than actual performance produces a 
separation, both in ideology and physical proximity, of the 
workers from the managers. Turning to a broader impact, the 
appraisal process separates managers and subordinates, 
revealing structures of power and stratification. 
Appraisals represent the power relations existing in a 
complex unit. Management assesses performance in support of 
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organizational goals in order to control profits and costs 
and to keep people on tasks through an equity system of 
matching contributions and compensations. Fisher and 
Sirianni (1984), in attacking the traditional view of 
organizations as instruments of efficient production, note 
that organizations are also "tools for the pursuit of 
personal, group, and class interests." These researchers 
point out the tension between the organization's "production 
and political" systems. I found the evaluation process 
points out this very tension. 
The evaluation process exposes the uncertainty and 
inequity of managers' decisions, giving subordinates a great 
deal of material for criticism and conflict. The interests 
of the parties are revealed and so polarize the actors 
instead of bringing them closer together. In fact some 
former subordinates promoted to professional or managerial 
positions still share views consonant with their former 
levels. They think the company is not looking after the 
interests of workers but is more concerned with making 
profits. So a device aimed to identify workers for 
promotion to managers actually creates and solidifies 
negative feelings about the agenda of the engineering 
organization. 
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With These Problems, Who wants Evaluations? 
There are appraisal problems from all the perspectives 
of the key actors. In the face of this, one can ask, "Why 
have evaluations?" I pose several answers to this 
persistent question. 
The first reason appraisals persist is the existence of 
a strong set of myths. Subordinates continue to believe 
that appraisals provide tangible evidence of one's 
achievements and worthiness for promotion. This is the 
equity myth where individual's are rewarded according to 
their contributions. This belief fuels individual effort, 
personal achievement, i.e., the American idea of success. 
Workers want success and evaluations off er on-going signs of 
recognition that things are progressing well. The second 
part of this myth is the manager's persistent position that 
appraisals control workers. They insist on it as a tool to 
reward and motivate, while at the same time complaining that 
correct evaluations are difficult to do. They insist on the 
efficacy of appraisals while at the same time holding that 
good people continue to perform regardless of the situation. 
Another way to explain the persistence of appraisal is 
tradition. Organizations have always used some means to 
measure performance for reward distribution. Subordinates 
want it as a gauge of where they stand on the "path to 
success" to reach the American dream. Managers want it as a 
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control and motivational tool in the highly uncertain world 
of human behavior. 
A related finding dealt with the position taken on the 
possibility of change. If managers didn't accept the 
benefits of change in employees, they would lose a major 
reason for their existence -- controlling and guiding 
workers so they could be more productive. If changing 
employee attitudes were unlikely and motivational levels 
were fixed, what value do evaluation systems offer? 
Management believes and acts as though performance change is 
attainable through supervisory feedback, but individual 
managers reported that their efforts to change the work 
habits of individual employees, after repeated feedback over 
by as much as a five year period, failed to alter the 
individual's behavior. I attribute this lack of change to 
"the structure of interaction" (Boudon, 1981). Rewards and 
punishments are either not available or not applied through 
the appraisal-feedback cycle. There simply is very little 
reason for employees to alter behavior because nothing 
really bad will happen to them (i.e., no downgrade, salary 
reduction, or termination). 
The second reason evaluations continue is that they 
maintain the power game in which managers and subordinates 
each simultaneously seek to maximize their gains, while 
controlling losses. The appraisal is the barometer of how 
each side is doing. Managers are challenged to be accurate 
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while workers manipulate their resources to come out ahead 
in the report card game. Managers invoke the use of 
multiple judgments and unique work situations to gain the 
upper hand in the contest, while subordinates obey, present 
themselves as favorably as possible, using skills and 
knowledge. Without appraisals there would be no reason to 
play this control-manipulation game. If no one were keeping 
score, what would be the point of playing? Both parties seek 
to win the contest. Managers want productive efforts, while 
subordinates seek rewards 
The third rationale for appraisals is tied closely to 
the second. Curiously, actors in the unit continue to 
accept the products of the evaluation plan (e.g., AP forms, 
rank order lists, and cell assignments), while recognizing 
that the process produces a great number of inaccuracies due 
to size of the universe, shifting performance criteria, and 
the large degree of uncertainty, exemplified by managers' 
need to rely on a picture book to identify whom they are 
appraising. Appraisals however provide a broad range of work 
rules and expectations which guide the efforts of actors and 
make sense out of doing tasks assigned by others the 
worker will be measured on certain performances, so these 
become important (Blau, 1967). Without the rules or 
pretense of judging work, there would be a conclusion that 
"nothing counts." In addition, appraisals support the need 
for order in the organization. Although problematic, 
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evaluations attempt to control, interpret, and reward 
behavior. They send the message that managers care what the 
subordinate does, providing a sense of order to the vast 
number of tasks performed during the year. Without 
appraisals the participants would be taking a leap toward 
chaos. What would guide their behavior? Personal agendas? 
What would happen to the need for consistency in large 
bureaucratic organizations? 
General Applications -- What Learn About Organizations 
Many of the conclusions discussed above can be 
generalized to a broad range of organizations. This research 
illustrates that knowledge in organizations is unequally 
distributed (Tuckman, 1978; Becker, 1986). Engineering 
managers did not share the same data on employees. These 
differences were due to context factors such as size of the 
universe and physical layout of the work facility. Managers 
were "bounded" (Cohen & March, 1972), i.e., limited, in 
their ability to observe and understand all behaviors 
occurring because other work tasks had to be completed. 
Organizations contain shifting sets of priorities; and 
evaluation tasks, although constant, are generally not a top 
priority compared to customer satisfaction and profit-
making. 
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This research also supported Kanter's (1977) work on 
the impact of job structure on opportunities and power. A 
key element of a powerful position and one that enhances 
one's chance for a higher evaluation is the degree of 
visibility the position affords the actor. It is necessary 
to be visible for one to receive recognition for 
performance. Behaviors gain value when they are critical to 
the organization and are visible (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1974). Size impedes the equal distribution of performance 
knowledge; and supervisors adopt techniques such as voting, 
coin-flipping, trading candidates, and sharing the 
allocation of moves to manage the great deal of uncertainty 
surrounding the unit, especially that created by appraising 
individual contribution. 
Another generalized finding is that appraisals 
symbolize one of the dominant values of our culture 
success -- which is measured by hierarchical movement and 
financial rewards. Appraisals focus on accomplishment as a 
report card or road map of the individual's success in 
society. One dimension of social class is economic power 
(e.g. place of residence, income) which is also influenced 
by one's formal appraisal. Employees, like athletes, seek a 
new, better contract for next year because of their 
contributions for the past "season." 
Through evaluations we again see a process which is 
intended to motivate subordinates and make prof its but which 
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in actuality produces contradictory outcomes like withdrawal 
of involvement and increase in administrative. This result 
is more evidence that capitalistic structures produce a 
number of contradictions. Related to this condition there 
is the separation between manager and subordinate produced 
by appraisals that are initially intended to increase 
communication. Also the appraisal process stresses feedback 
between the parties to bring about change; however, in fact, 
the production of appraisals actually results in more data 
being concealed as managers seek convenience and a way to 
diminish confrontation. 
The major insight I found was confirmation of the 
mythical nature of appraisals and the foundations of 
organizations in general. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued 
that much of organizational life reflects myths (i.e., 
fictional beliefs) to help the unit meet external needs and 
rules to deal with imperfect internal situations like 
accurate measurement of contributions. The myths create 
programs (e.g., appraisal plans), campaigns, and a unique 
culture which is really a "ceremony" to avoid and suppress 
what is really happening. Evaluation programs purport to 
measure and reward individual contributions, but actually 
are control devices for managers. The process is 
subjective, yet the results (e.g., forms, bands, raises) 
appear to be very objective and are taken as tangible signs 
of achievement. Another insight concerns the idea of 
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egualitv (Kerbo, 1983; Feldberg, 1984; Mahoney, 1983). 
Again, actors in the system talk about the need to reward 
only people who make real contributions, yet the 
organization is moving in the direction of providing equal 
rewards for all members (e.g., equal lump payments). 
Management has an interest in controlling subordinates 
so they undertake programs like the "Tech-Pro Plan", in my 
setting, to create the impression of equity (i.e., rewards 
match contributions) when actually managers try to 
distribute a large segment of raises equally to avoid 
problems and increase ease of administering. Organizations 
continue to reflect differences in verbalized beliefs and 
realized actions. As Caplow (1964) pointed out, evaluations 
are always based on more than skill, knowledge and 
performance, and include the impressions of all actors and 
the political climate of the organization. 
Two other issues for organizations are the social 
construction nature of organizations (Becker, 1973, 1982, 
1986; Goffman, 1959; Blau, 1967) and the decision-making 
style linked to this paradigm. Organizations have an on-
going, dynamic, negotiated quality which is keenly revealed 
in how decisions are made. As I demonstrated in Chapter 7 -
- "The Social Production of Appraisals", managers constantly 
interpret the behavior of subordinates and other managers in 
light of current situational factors (e.g •• , customer 
demand, senior management edicts) to define what is valuable 
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and who contributes to the current goals. A curious 
phenomenon of organizational life is the actors' 
expectations that departments will be run rationally and 
decisions will be made systematically, probably because 
large companies with resources are "expected" to be orderly. 
others (March & Cohen, 1972); Pfeffer, 1978; and Thompson, 
1967; Peters & Waterman 1982) demonstrated that decisions 
are not rational, but based on intuition, experience, and 
past practices while generally ignoring statistical data. 
In my setting, managers faced with uncertainty (e.g., 
multiple standards, incomplete knowledge of performances) 
made decisions on subjective hunches and general 
impressions, rather than by systematically recording and 
counting production results, even though such data were 
available. The overall impression someone creates through 
their production is more significant than the actual numbers 
(e.g., orders written) developed. These judgments are used 
to create a performance band appropriate to what a manager 
perceives. Discussions about decisions are widespread and 
operate to confirm or solidify the constructed decisions. 
Organizations are the setting for more than the pursuit 
of company goals (Fisher & Sirianni, 1984). Evaluations 
reinforce this position by the use of the game metaphor to 
discuss a number of power issues (Crozier, 1964; Kanter, 
1977; Buroway, 1979; Kipnis, 1984; Mechanic, 1962). Actors 
perform in a way to mirror the features of games, seeking to 
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win rewards and cut losses. The contest {Turner, 1960) 
involves gaining more power {i.e., influence over limited 
resources) and making other departments more dependent on 
your group. The nature of games is conflict over competing 
interests and values which is especially evident in union-
management relations. The Union leaders seek the granting 
of higher wages and better benefits, equally to all members, 
while managers via discretion offer unequal raises, 
promotions and rewards, based on actual contributions. 
During bargaining both parties try to shift the balance of 
power. The officers want more explicit control over working 
conditions, as managers protect sacred areas {e.g., 
appraisals and rewards) by fighting over supervisory 
discretion. Organizations provide a context for the pursuit 
of instrumental goals (e.g., profits) as well as personal 
agendas {e.g., financial security and recognition). 
Adapting and Applying Theories 
In this final section I want to accomplish two 
objectives -- discuss how three sociological theories 
informed my study and secondly, apply the findings of 
Scott's {1985) study of peasant resistance to my research 
setting to demonstrate the flexibility and explanatory power 
of sociological theories. 
My research was informed by three general theories 
which, though distinct, utilize overlapping explanations. I 
applied the following theories to account for performance 
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appraisals: power/critical, open system, and social 
construction. Open systems has the strongest application to 
organizations, while the power and critical models address 
both the micro and macro levels of society. Social 
construction is connected to organizations through the 
relatively new field of organizational culture. 
The power/critical theories demonstrate the conflict 
and class differences organizations harbor. To move away 
from the elitist, narrow view of most traditional management 
theories, I used an historical framework to analyze the 
conflict between managers and union officers over the 
administration's evaluation and reward policies. The 
persistent variations among the actors emerges through 
examination of class differences between administrators and 
workers. A contextual approach helps to sort out and make 
sense of the issues. Rule-making activities are shaped by 
the political struggles among members of the administrative 
class. 
Second, the open systems approach discloses how changes 
in the environment place a newly defined emphasis on 
customer relations for appraisal purposes. A problem for 
actors is the shifting nature of performance standards. An 
open organization, reacting to a complex, dynamic 
environment, reveals a high degree of uncertainty which must 
be managed by bureaucratic devices (e.g., voting, use of 
seniority, and concealing of performance data to protect 
managers from confrontations). 
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Closely linked to open systems is social construction 
theory which contends that decisions and structures are 
produced and maintained by members interacting to understand 
and create meaning in their setting. My analysis supports 
the tenets of this theory in a number of areas. 
Participants develop rules and conventions to produce 
appraisals as they struggle to classify large numbers of 
employees. In fact, rules are constantly modified to fit 
the situation managers face in assessing subordinates. 
These practices remain in effect until managers encounter a 
new problem. Group discussions and the impact of more 
powerful members change the procedures. This give-and-take 
process clarifies beliefs about fairness and seniority, for 
example, and diffuses the shared understandings among all 
participants. As Pettigrew (1979) argues, new leaders or 
environmental conditions change the beliefs of established 
organizations which was evident in my setting when the 
company began to emphasize customer relations, producing 
decentralized decision-making at the operative levels. 
Social construction theory parallels my analysis of the 
process to appraise subordinates. To an outsider, it appears 
that supervisors make an objective assessment of their 
employees' contributions and assign them. to an appropriate 
band. Closer examination reveals the final placement is 
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first due to the manager's individual judgment and then a 
public presentation of candidates at a group meeting where 
other managers negotiate the final appraisal placements. 
There is a discrepancy between Blau's (1967) assertion 
that what is easily measured becomes important, since in my 
research, managers continue to value production but lessen 
their emphasis of it, and proceed to use subjective 
impressions, especially when "objective" data is lacking. 
Another divergence between critical theory and my analysis 
concerns managers who agree the evaluation system is faulty. 
The critical theory predicts distinct ideological positions 
for subordinates and managers, yet my research shows a 
surprising convergence of belief about the negative features 
of the plan. This agreement could be due to managers and 
EAs beginning their careers at the same position and the 
dissatisfaction supervisors report about their own 
evaluation treatment. In some ways, second level managers 
have more in common with their subordinates than with their 
superiors. 
My second objective for this section is to explain 
variables by applying paradigms from a different study. This 
type of analysis occurs when I adapt the concepts Scott 
(1985) used in his study of the conflict between rich 
landowners and peasants, focusing on the devices each side 
employed to get their way or to resist domination -- in the 
case of the peasants. 
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First, I will briefly review Scott's salient points and 
illustrate how they apply to the present research to expand 
our understanding of appraisals as control devices in an 
organizational setting rather than a rural community as in 
Scott's study. He argues the peasants in his ethnography 
employ non-rebellious, passive strategies to resist adverse 
changes in technology and exploitation by landowners who 
seek higher profits in a market-driven environment. When the 
landlords raised rents and changed social practices like 
feasts, the peasants resisted by subtle sabotage, evasion, 
and ridicule. Both parties take action to make gains or cut 
losses and do not simply submit to the conditions. 
The two classes of workers in my setting are managers 
and subordinates represented by EAs. The managerial group 
see its legitimate role as maintaining high production and 
prof it levels, an ideology based on the long standing belief 
that managers have a right to "run the business" (e.g., 
making decisions in the interest of the company). The EAs 
are represented by a union which defines its role as a 
protector of the working man/woman, especially in the area 
of wages and benefits. Its "charter" emerges from past 
management injustices (e.g., unfair wage treatment). The 
parties share a common ground -- both need to maintain job 
security in a competitive market, but there is significant 
disagreement over wage administration, benefit programs, 
appraisal judgments, and company policies. 
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one can ask, "Who is heard more in the debates?" 
surprisingly, the Union officers have louder voices or 
managers have very sensitive ears because the company gives 
a good deal of attention to union questions and complaints. 
Their voice is also strong because they have an official 
grievance procedure and the help of free government 
resources (e.g., National Labor Relations Board). The Union 
issues a monthly newsletter, generally criticizing 
management actions without being too specific. This aligns 
with Scott's description of resistance using ridicule and 
non-rebellious approaches (e.g., stealing grain). 
Also, officers use an interesting technique to keep 
managers off-balance. They deride the salary administration 
decisions regardless of the treatment EAs receive. For 
example, one year the company guaranteed to grant raises 
equal to 4.5% of the existing payroll, but in fact delivered 
6.5%. The Union paid little attention to this gain and 
attacked the way managers appraised EAs and delivered 
increases. 
Each side rationalizes its position. Managers say they 
want to reward new, lower-paid employees who are making good 
contributions to objectives, so they divided the universe 
into four experience groups and rated contributions in each 
category. The Union leaders argued this action violated the 
contract which called for treating everyone as a single 
appraisal group. They contend managers use this scheme to 
favor younger, more educated EAs while the Union seeks 
fairness for all employees. Both parties use different 
versions of what constitutes equitable wage treatment. 
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Who is winning the argument? Victories shift between 
the parties depending on the issues. The company 
surprisingly also employs a passive strategy by reacting to 
problems and answering grievances rather than filing their 
own charges of unfair labor practices. In this way the 
union is winning since they shape labor-management relations 
by selecting the topics to debate. However, the company 
holds the ultimate weapon -- economic rewards and job 
security. Managers appraise performance, authorize 
overtime, approve expenditures, choose to apply force 
reductions, and introduce computer programs to produce 
"specs" usually written by EAs. Officers resist by not 
following all the work rules, slowing down "spec" 
production, and by ridiculing managers' decisions to solve 
day-to-day obstacles. The company introduces "Quality 
Improvement Teams", i.e., Quality Circles to indirectly 
involve EAs in meeting the company's agenda. Some 
subordinates participate to a limited degree because they 
believe managers will never use the ideas generated by the 
group, choosing to implement management's plan due to cost 
considerations. Applying Scott's (1985) approach illuminates 
the relationship between managers and employees as one 
marked by the company's effort to dominate workers and the 
union's adjustment to these forces through forms of 
resistance that are non-rebellious and passive, but which 
are abundantly filled with ridicule. 
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The use of Scott's perspective and the critical, open 
systems, and social construction paradigms demonstrates the 
ability of sociology to adapt general explanations to 
material situations (e.g. evaluation systems) and to utilize 
more specific theories (e.g. critical and social 
construction) to account for and "lift the veil" from 
processes affecting those whose contributions are evaluated 
(e.g., student, subordinate, manager, and faculty member). 
Sociology makes a significant contribution toward 
understanding social entities like organizations through its 
broad explanatory power, multiple approaches and 
flexibility. 
APPENDIX 1 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
1. How would you describe the appraisal process around here? 
2. How are appraisals accomplished? 
3. What are the routines or common practices (conventions) 
associated with appraisals? (forms, group meetings, lists, 
4. How are appraisal forms used in the process? 
5. What behavior is evaluated and what is most significant? 
6. How do evaluation methods vary across departments? 
7. What are the rules for deciding on appraisal levels? Who 
selects them? 
8. Who evaluates? 
9. What criteria are used? How do you know who belongs in 
each performance category? 
10. How objective or subjective are the criteria? 
11. What is the basis for granting rewards (salary 
increases, promotions, good working conditions, autonomy?) 
12. What consequences do appraisals have? 
13. What do appraisals mean to employees and managers? 
14. Why do appraisals exist in this organization? 
15. What values are assumed in doing evaluations? 
16. Why do employees accept the appraisal practices? 
17. Do you believe the results of your appraisal system? 
18. What type of system would work better? 
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APPENDIX 2 
APPRAISAL BIOGRAPHY INSTRUCTIONS 
The following questions are part of a research project I am 
working on to complete a graduate degree. Your responses and 
not your identity are of interest to me. However, if you 
wish to discuss your comments, please contact me. 
No individuals will be identified in the research document. 
The university sponsoring this project has formal procedures 
to protect the research subjects, and my methods have been 
reviewed and approved as complying with their standards. 
Please complete this cover sheet before responding to the 
attached questions. You will need to use additional paper to 
answer the questions. 
When you are finished, please return all material to me, 
unsigned, in the enclosed envelope. 
LENGTH OF SERVICE (circle one) : 
1. O - 2 yrs 
4. 16 - 20 yrs 
2. 3 - 7 yrs 
5. 21+ yrs 
JOB CLASSIFICATION (circle one) 
1. Supervisor 2. Engineer 
4. Information systems Member 
6. Professional (PAE) 
3. 8 - 15 yrs 
3. EA 
5. ISA 
7. Salaried-Graded 
Thank you for your help in this research project. 
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Mike Bochenek 
3142 AT-34 
Appraisal Biography/History 
1. How does the appraisal system or process work around 
here? 
2. What is your current appraisal category? 
3. Has there been a change in your appraisal level during 
the past several years? What happened? 
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4. Why aren't you appraised higher than your current cell or 
band? 
5. How has the evaluation process affected your career 
movement or salary treatment? 
6. How are the AP or MAP forms How are the AP or MAP forms 
used in your evaluation? 
7. What changes would improve the appraisal process? Why 
needed? 
s. Rank the following factors by the impact you feel 
supervisors assign to the factors in determining an 
employee's performance (appraisal) level. 
l = most important, an4 16 = least important. (Please use 
each nwnber only once). 
Seniority or time on the job 
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Flexibility; ability to handle a number of jobs at once 
Difficulty or complexity of work 
Attractive appearance of subordinate 
Job Knowledge 
Production and Quality 
Communications skills 
Customer Relations 
Problem solving skills 
Personal (Social) relations with supervisors 
Self-confidence 
Attendance 
Follows rules 
Agrees or cooperates with management 
Attitude 
Other (please specify) 
APPENDIX 3 
PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION GUIDE 
When I selected the problem of appraisals, I began to 
think of methods to collect data. One benefit I had was that 
my job assignment immersed me in evaluation issues from two 
vantage points. First, I heard grievances about the 
deficiencies of the system and saw how managers tried to 
justify appraisals. Second, as an employee I also was 
affected by evaluations. 
To begin a systematic examination of the setting, I 
complied the list below, hoping to collect certain types of 
data. Based on experience, I thought that looking at the 
broad categories of Artifacts, Language/Symbols, and 
Stories/Themes would be useful. As a start, I included terms 
that seemed to belong under each heading. To some degree 
these groupings matched my research questions -- Context 
(Artifacts), Culture (Language), and Beliefs (Stories). 
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Artifacts 
lists 
rules 
meetings 
computer list 
grievances 
interviews 
Language/Symbols 
productivity 
rank order 
cells 
contract 
structure change 
excuses 
justifications 
balance 
performance 
relative performance 
rules 
movement 
percent increase 
dollar increase 
Stories/Themes 
old-timers 
short service 
fast movers 
deadwood 
degrees 
experience 
favoritism 
easy work 
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Initially, I tried to record observations and events 
which fit the above structure, but found this method too 
cumbersome and time consuming as a member of the 
organization, so I focused on settings where evaluation 
activities were concentrated such as, supervisory meetings, 
union-management bargaining and grievance sessions, and 
management training programs. During these events, I made 
notes about beliefs, methods, and issues related to 
appraisals. This was supplemented by formal interviews and 
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individual conversations I had with all types of employees 
in the everyday life of working in the research setting. 
I also used word processing software (MSWORD) to list 
and then sort special language and observations by themes 
that emerged from the data. For example, I selected and then 
sorted quotes from interviews to cluster subjects' responses 
into manageable groupings. I had access to past bargaining 
minutes and the notes I wrote during the past five years 
which were essential to capture the Union's view of the 
problem. I also worked as a facilitator with a group of 
managers to improve the process for evaluating EAs and thus 
heard debates about assessment issues. This was a rich 
source of data on management values. 
I observed meetings, grievance hearings, bargaining 
sessions, training programs, and many informal 
conversations, all of which produced a wealth of data. My 
observation methods became rather informal over time and I 
would recommend an approach that was more systematic and 
which could be achieved through the use of "observation" 
forms. 
Last name, initials 
APPENDIX 4 
Appraisal Program (AP) 
Employee Number 
Title/Rank Organization Number 
Immediate Supervisor Next Higher Level Supervisor 
INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPERVISORS 
At beginning of appraisal cycle or new job: 
1. Type or print all information above. 
2. Following appropriate discussions/planning sessions 
with employee and your supervision, complete Part A, 
Sections 1 and 2 (p.2), and secure "Approvals for 
Part A". 
3. Discuss approved Part A with employee and request 
his/her signature (p.2). 
4. Give employee a copy of form. 
At end of appraisal cycle or upon transfer: 
1. Complete Part B, Sections 1, 2, & 3, using input from 
employee as appropriate. Discuss results with 
employee, request his/her signature following Part B, 
and sign as indicated. 
2. Complete Part C with official Annual Performance 
Appraisal and Appraisal Period. Secure approvals as 
indicated, then share with employee and request 
his/her signature. 
3. Give employee a copy, if requested. 
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2. 
PART A 
1. Describe the principal purpose/responsibility of the job tour. Use 
appropriate documents as reference material. 
2. List major assignments/objectives of unusual or particular importance 
to the Organization or individual job tour (as few or as many as 
necessary). Be specific about the source of information to beeeeeee used 
for evaluation and, as appropriate, performance standards or measures 
for these assignments. 
Approvals for Part A 
Immediate Supervisor's Signature 
Next Higher Level Supervisor's Signature 
(Assistant Manager Minimum) 
Date 
Date 
Employee's signature indicates that Part A has been discussed with 
him/her. It does not necessarily indicate agreement, but that the 
employee has had an opportunity to discuss responsibilities and 
assignments/objectives. 
Employees's Signature Date 
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3. 
PART B 
1. Describe how well the principal purpose/responsibility of the job 
tour has been accomplished, documenting any significant deviations in 
performance (positive or negative) compared to normal expectations for 
the job tour. 
2. Document specific accomplishments/results for each major objective 
listed in Part A, Section 2. 
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4. 
PART B (Continued) 
3. Briefly list other significant accomplishments/results not previously 
covered in Part B, Sections 1 and 2. 
Employee's signature indicates that he/she has had an opprotunity to 
discuss results/accomplishments with the supervisor prior to 
organizational appraisal sessions. It does not necessarily indicate 
agreement. 
Employee's Signature Date Supervisor's Signature Date 
PART C 
Annual Performance Appraisal Appraisal Period 
Immediate Supervisor Date 
Next Higher Level Supervisor (AM Minimum) Date 
Other Required Signatures, as required Date 
Employee's signature does not necessarily indicate agreement, but that 
the employee has been advised of and has had an opportunity to discuss 
his/her performance appraisal. 
Employee's signature Date 
APPENDIX 5 
APPRAISAL CONVENTIONS 
During the interviews, a number of specific shared 
practices or conventions were cited by the respondents, 
providing a picture of the techniques commonly used by the 
Engineering organization to construct performance 
evaluations. Below is an alphabetical listing of these 
conventions and a brief explanation of their meaning in the 
research setting. 
accomplishments, look at - managers focus on results 
allocation determined - in the face of uncertainty, sub-
branches of the unit 
group meeting process. 
decide to share moves to ease the 
annual review - evaluation occurs at least once a year to 
mark significant changes in performance 
AP's written to fit level - a widespread practice is to 
write the AP(appraisal form) after the levels have been 
determined by other means, effectively ignoring the 
appraisal forms. 
appraisals, employers give lip-service to - employees feel 
that managers go through the motion of evaluating them 
without always giving a sincere effort. 
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§J?praisals to administer salaries - evaluations are 
perceived as mainly a device to grant or deny raises 
§J?praisals, back into (salary determines $) - salary is 
actually used to determine the appraisal band, instead of 
the reverse. 
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appraisals, doing for a long time - managers have been doing 
appraisals for so long that they have become 
institutionalized, taken-for-granted. 
balance point of 100% - groups work toward this goal as a 
guide for distributing rewards. All appraisals percents are 
added and an average is compared to 100%. If the average is 
greater than 100%, some individuals must be dropped to 
achieve the 100% figure. 
balance, seek band to place people in - managers seek to 
place people into groups of similar performance, based on 
perceptions, and group discussions. 
bargain - common practice in group meetings where 
supervisors discuss qualities and achievements of their 
employees and listen to presentations of other supervisors 
in order to decide which EA's should advance a level; 
activity marked by give and take. 
BLM intervention - third level of management becomes 
involved to break deadlocks and move process along. 
~ook of pictures to identify unknown EA's - every 5 to 7 
years the organization produces a book with pictures of all 
members of the unit's employees. Managers often use this 
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book to identify who they don't know, but who they are 
attempting to evaluate. This is a clear example of the state 
of imperfect knowledge about performance that exists in the 
unit. 
book of results (track results) - a collection of "hard" 
results like efficiency and quality used to give feedback to 
employees during the year. 
book, numbers - same as above, but falling out of use as 
soft factors like attitude and customer relations become 
more prominent. 
bosses' ability to sell candidate - managers vary in their 
ability to present and sell their employees to peers. 
cell deterained, then write AP - practice of determining 
cell placement before writing the AP form, which some people 
consider to be the incorrect sequence. 
cell history, past; labeling - cell position from last year 
is a key determinant of where EA will end up this year; it 
is a point where the current "race" begins. 
cells assigned after appraisal - usual sequence is to 
appraise performance, then to determine what cell this 
behavior fits. 
·coalitions foraed - during group meetings, some peers form 
coalitions along business lines to support candidates for 
movement. 
competition used - a subtle, rarely verbalized belief that 
forms the basis for the evaluation system. 
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confrontation avoided - managers try to avoid problems with 
employees because these discussions are uncomfortable for 
both sides. 
consistent use of adiectives - supervisors try to apply 
similar words to describe performance to avoid 
inconsistencies that might lead to grievances. 
criteria, non-specific - the unit uses widely held, but 
non-specific evaluation criteria, applied somewhat 
differently by each manager. 
data, sul:>jective used - supervisors stress different factors 
according to the situation of their individual departments. 
discussion goals - used by managers to stress what's 
important and what will be used to evaluate performance. 
engineers rank EA's - engineers are not systematically used 
as sources of feedback on EA's to rate their performance. 
This has become a practice in the last 2 years since an 
organizational restructuring. 
feathering - the practice of seeking smaller distinctions 
between performance within the same general performance 
band. It lessens the impact of both raises or drops in 
performance. 
feedback - comments or memos about performance used to 
correct behavior or establish reasons for cell assignments. 
Sometimes the descriptions are too general to be useful to 
employees - no clear action is prescribed. 
forms. sign - employees are asked to sign the AP form to 
establish a record of their awareness of their status. 
giving in - after long, tense group meetings some 
supervisors concede their positions to move the meeting 
along. 
group agreement - managers seek consensus among peers on 
performance levels as a way to legitimate the final rank 
order. This agreement is reached after a series of group 
meetings where managers present candidates, and object to 
those offered by peers. 
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incumbent priority - when 2 EA's are equal in performance, 
the incumbent will have preference for moving ahead, or 
retaining his/her position. 
interpretation, individual - managers use their perceptions 
and judgments to decide on the appraisal group of their 
employees. 
judgment on complexity of work - one of the judgments 
concerns the complexity and difficulty of the person's 
assignment. 
judgment, multiple - consensus and final rank order 
positions are shaped by the multiple or varying decisions of 
managers. This practice is a common defense to grievances 
on appraisals. 
justify extremes - managers explain and account for their 
decisions to a greater degree for candidates at the top and 
bottom of the rank order. 
knowing your fellow managers - experience with peers 
influences coalition building and cell placement. 
knowledge of a lot of EA's - managers who know the 
performance of many EA's can have more influence in 
assigning cells. 
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lines for cells drawn by BLM's - during the past few years 
the third level managers (BLM's) had the final slay on where 
lines would be drawn, in the rank order, to determine cell 
placement. 
list in priority order of moves - each year supervisors 
identify in a priority sequence they want to advance. These 
are the people most likely to advance if openings are 
available. 
list, rank order - a list of names, produced annually, 
reflecting the relative performances of the appraisal 
universe. This list is the basis for assigning employees to 
cells, and is important to the union in identifying 
grievance situations. 
listening, poor - the quality of paying attention during 
group meetings, as managers focus on selling their 
candidates. 
lists adjusted - rank order lists are adjusted (changed) at 
various stages of the process. Part of the activity is to 
combine lists of all supervisors who report to the same 
boss. 
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money availability - knowledge that additional funds are 
available for raises can change the performance position of 
some employees. Some employees may be left in their current 
cell because movement to another level will not provide them 
a larger increase. 
moves, shared - a common practice is to share the number of 
moves available, especially when move candidates are 
identified for movement than the group can accommodate 
because of the 100% balancing requirement. 
negotiation among peers - there is give and take among 
managers regarding movement so that all can gain something 
for their people. 
notes to record feedback - use of written documents and 
computer reports (quality, production, attendance) to 
evaluate performance. Once more commonly used because it 
was more available. 
notes, mental - use of memory and impression formation to 
determine appraisal. More convenient for managers to use 
because it requires less effort, but criticized by the union 
because method lacks ability to measure, weight, or verify. 
This is a more common device because the engineering 
assignments have changed from filling orders to satisfying 
unique needs of customers. 
performance , history of - appraisal history is used to see 
where candidate deserves to move now, and it often 
represents old baggage the employee cannot drop. In the 
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absence of recent data, some managers cite ex=periences from 
prior years. 
performance , look for unusual - in evaluatil'llll.g performance 
data, managers look for activity that is unus:ual or stands 
out to distinguish the employee. This might be 
participation in committees, or diligent work:. habits (rarely 
away from the desk) • 
performance questionnaire - managers use a qtaestionnaire to 
collect the observations and judgments of the!!ir engineers on 
EA's in the department. This is a recent praiactice because 
managers have less contact with EA's since a restructuring 
change the levels and hierarchy of authority 2 years ago. 
performance spread among EA's examined - somea supervisors 
not only place subordinates in relative perfc:::>rmance 
positions, they also note how great the diffearence is 
between positions. This might be compared tc:::> a "qualitative 
standard deviation". 
performance to responsibilities compared - a very common 
practice is to compare what the individual hems achieved or 
contributed versus the goals of the departme:r.nt. This is an 
area of key activity in the process. Once t:tnis completed, 
managers try to decide the relative value of the 
contributions. 
performance definitions shifting each year - definitions of 
what constitute each band of performance is J':"lot written and 
changes somewhat every year. Managers prefer this 
arrangement because their work conditions vary throug:m:iout 
the year. 
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predict where (bow> levels will turn out - each year 
managers, relying on the person's appraisal history, -try to 
predict what level the individual will fall in this r-eview 
period. Evaluations do not occur in a vacuum, but al..,.,,ays 
with a concern for the consequence of what cell will -this 
appraisal produce. 
presentations - managers present data on employees in a 
public arena containing other supervisors. Superviso:rs sell 
the achievements of their candidates, aiming for cell 
advancement. The success of these activities depends on the 
argumentation and presentation (verbal) skills of man agers. 
read motives of supervisors - a subtle activity of ma nagers 
to gauge how difficult bargaining for cells will be, and to 
plan strategies to handle problems. 
review by upper management - a check and balance devi ce to 
insure or at least give the impression of bias elimin_ation. 
Most evaluation decisions of lower level supervisors are 
supported and not reversed by top managers. Occasion~ally 
they have a candidate they want to advance. 
rules - shared and generally accepted practices to ma_nage 
group meetings and determine cell placement. Manager-s use 
similar rules in selecting candidates for both the t04p and 
bottom positions, because these groups are more evid~nt and 
easier to agree on. The rules shift when the focus a.....re the 
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middle ranges because candidates appear indistinguishable, 
calling for rules to separate the likenesses. 
rules changed to fit situation - as situations change during 
and between meetings, managers suggest alterations in 
decision making methods. Entwined in this situation is the 
need by supervisors to sell or convince peers of the need to 
buy into new guidelines. This is a delicate process because 
a guideline that solve a placement dilemma for one manager 
will create problems for other supervisors. 
self-interests of managers; protect own people - managers 
guide their actions around increasing gains for their 
employees. 
seniority to break ties - when a number of EA's are vying 
for a cell move, and managers are at an impasse, unwilling 
to concede, time on the job, or service with the company 
will be used to settle the debate. The selected EA may not 
be the best performer, if there even was a way to determine 
that abstract condition. 
standards , individual - managers apply , generally accepted 
and shared performance norms, but use their individual 
interpretation of these standards to quantify performance. 
statistics used - some supervisors collect and use 
performance data (cost reduction, efficiency) to sell their 
candidates. 
subjectivity accepted - managers accept and do not want to 
change their peer's use of interpretations to appraise 
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employees. 
system, buddy - friendships, team solidarity, and coalition 
formation are used to place candidates. 
temper, stubbornness used - supervisors exhibit entrenchment 
behavior to obtain moves by wearing down their peers. 
visibility - employees who have greater exposure increase 
their chance for movement, by making their supervisor's 
selling job easier. Seeing someone perform is more 
convincing than being told how well someone performed. 
vote by s\lb-braneh, not merit - deadlocks over placement are 
often settled by voting for candidates, even when managers 
don't know the subordinates. Thus voting along sub-branch 
lines, rather than performance or merit, is common. 
weights, assigned - in an attempt to quantify the evaluation 
process, managers assign values of performance to certain 
categories of work. Productivity would have a higher weight 
than cost reduction activity. Several years ago, the 
organization formalized this practice by identifying 5 
performance variables (production, quality, cost reduction, 
customer relations, and problem solving) that managers would 
assign points to in order to decide cell placement. In 
actuality, some managers would still decide on the cell, 
using individual methods, and then create the form, 
adjusting the weights of variables to match the position 
they had already selected. 
words to justify cell placement - managers carefully select 
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adjectives to describe and justify the cell placement of 
employees. New managers would complete the AP form, and 
after cell positions were determined by large group 
meetings, realized or were told that their descriptions were 
too positive or superlative for the low position the EA had 
been assigned. Some supervisors maintain a non-specific 
posture in written from, but are more open and direct 
verbally. 
APPENDIX 6 
SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE 
During the analysis to develop themes and issues from 
interviews and observation, I heard a good deal of 
interesting, rich, and unique language used to describe all 
aspects of evaluations and life in the Engineering 
organization. Below is a listing of specialized language 
grouped by the following six categories: Conditions/Context, 
Forms, Impression Management, Procedures/Rules, Qualities, 
and Reaction/Consequences. 
CONDITIONS/CONTEXT OF EVALUATIONS 
animalistic (how managers acted during appraisal meeting) 
apathy 
bad system 
banging my head (employee has feeling of no reward) 
bottom-line (cell position as main factor in system) 
can't prove who's in top group 
career job (manager's view of EA's job) 
caught off guard {boss wants to know status of jobs) 
comic relief (impact of system) 
different set of measures (for different work) 
dreaded (managers' reaction to evaluation sessions) 
345 
dumb system 
entitled (people feel they deserve movement) 
expect to move up 
exposure (a way to move ahead) 
favoritism 
group goals (shared by EA's) 
job rate ( managers' favor this to standardize salaries) 
jobs are different 
lump sum approach 
my guy is better (managers' exhibit self-interests) 
need competition (for results) 
no agreed on criteria 
no guarantee for movement 
not fair (cell placement process) 
numbers game 
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objective (supervisors' have this illusion about the plan> 
pain, a (appraisals) 
pension training 
pot of money (managers want to control these rewards) 
quota 
relative performance 
rules of the game (accept outcome of the system) 
sense of cooperation in some departments 
slow movement plan 
stepping stone (how EA's see the EA job) 
supervisors see their own world 
system sucks 
takes the right steps (but no guarantee of movement) 
takes too much time to move 
throwing bones to a dog (rewards to EA plan) 
too much negative stuff 
we can't prove performance 
wired (employees feel promotions are predetermined) 
FORMS USED TO COMPLETE APPRAISALS 
ammunition (AP used to get cell move) 
don't buy the form 
don't want to hang later (caution over content of AP) 
formality (how AP forms are seen) 
JIM's (form showing needed correction) 
tailor forms (possible to write form to fit job) 
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 
ability to BS 
blow their own horn 
have to market EA's (manager wants to sell EA) 
snow their bosses 
you have to do a selling job for yourself 
PROCEDURES/RULES TO PRODUCE APPRAISALS 
accepts incumbency (to select person for movement) 
allocation 
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back into appraisals (performance is secondary) 
balance 
bargain 
blend (combine lists from other managers) 
buddy system (use of coalitions) 
buy in (seek consensus) 
carry-over from past years (impact of past appraisals) 
catch-22 (to move up, some must move down) 
checks and balances 
consensus 
cut and dry (appraisals not honest, but automatic) 
348 
darts in the wind (problems in assigning cell position) 
don't turn the pile upside down (rank order remains fixed) 
favorite boy (someone selected for special treatment) 
feathering (a greater spread of appraisal points) 
fill slots (move people just because spaces open) 
finding a grain of sand ( how appraisal process works) 
flip a coin (way to break ties) 
generic wording (to avoid problems with union) 
get worn out (effect of long group meetings) 
give and take process 
group decision-making (determines moves) 
horse race (race to move ahead) 
interpret (judging value of individual's contribution) 
iron out differences (purpose of group meetings) 
it's a game 
lawyer (boss' role in moving candidate to better spot) 
like 2 friends talking (how appraisals should operate) 
managers side with each other 
match people against each other 
mental notes (way to collect data) 
merge 
move off of center (need to decide on cell placement) 
numbers book (use of hard results) 
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supervisor gives in (supervisor concedes in meetings) 
party lines (business lines followed in picking people) 
picture book (needed to identify employees for evaluation) 
push EA's ahead 
put into a pot (no reasons for choices) 
rationalize measurement 
rules 
score (amount of time allowed to perform job) 
selling job (use of AP's) 
selling job of boss 
share moves (how to distribute rewards) 
sharing moves (managers support this idea) 
slots of performance 
slotted EA's into bands 
slotting 
smooth talkers (get moves for people) 
someone gives in 
take turns (putting EA's in top position) 
tests of significant differences (decision making tools) 
those with best vocabulary (get rewards for subordinates) 
throw in the towel (concede candidates during meetings) 
track results 
trade 
vote by party line 
wait their turn (EA's must wait to advance) 
way out, look for (break tie) 
we change the rules 
we drew blood (problems in creating rank order list) 
we have to present the EA's (using verbal skills) 
we use consensus (to select positions} 
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you don't know my person (lack of knowledge makes impasse) 
QUALITIES USED TO JUDGE PERFORMANCE 
above and beyond (normal job duties) 
beyond the call of duty (rewards) 
challenged 
clearly above the rest 
coming on strong (new EA doing well, but no move) 
conduct themselves as professionals 
contributions toward the common goal 
cost reduction (number of cases and amount of savings) 
customer relations 
cut costs 
do many things well 
does the junk work (difficult, old projects) 
don't embarrass the boss 
easy to manage 
emerge from the pack 
get the best from person 
getting the job done 
give me less trouble (helps image of EA) 
good (performance) 
good technically 
how much is this EA worth to me 
inconsistent 
jumps the gun (over-reacts) 
listen to the customer 
make money ( for the department) 
making things go smoothly 
must sustain performance over time 
not being told what to do 
on time (to work in morning and after lunch) 
on time delivery 
on-time performance 
one of the family (being included increases rewards) 
overdues (late work, past due dates) 
personalities get involved (more than just work) 
problems (negative behavior employees can create) 
productivity (worth of individual) 
specs (main product of organization) 
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stand out (few are so visible) 
stick to standards 
take action on problems 
top producer 
total package of contributions 
training (not normal part of EA job, so rewarded) 
what's he done for me 
who does special things 
willingness to do extra 
work ethic 
work habits 
REACTION/CONSEQUENCES TO EVALUATIONS 
abrasive statements (negative) 
appraisals are joke 
appraisals hurt the organization 
bands (created by the evaluation process) 
blending lists is a killer 
bumped (lowered from top, unlikely after attaining level) 
can't always have what you want (managers' reaction) 
can't move the masses (only a few move up each year) 
carriers of bad news (Supervisors) 
chasing the carrot (appraisals motivate) 
clash of chemicals (boss & worker may not get along) 
deadlock (group meeting is at an impasse) 
dog fight (process of picking people for movement) 
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final product (rank order) is shit 
give in 
gung ho (when appraisal's good) 
hands are tied (boss can't move people) 
hit with the data (annual feedback session) 
impasse 
in-group (exclusion is reason for no movement) 
just let me sign the form (people don't want to talk) 
let things go (OM's attitude toward people) 
long service EA's have no choice (about accepting appr-.) 
meeting turned into complete shit (didn't know EA's) 
met expectations (words used to be non-specific) 
nit-picking 
pacify complainers (reason for some rewards) 
past recorded remarks (remains with person) 
pawns (Supervisors use each other to gain moves) 
people are insulted by their appraisals 
people are pegged with the wrong cell 
people are surprised (by appraisal results) 
river keeps flowing (little effect of appraisals on un_it) 
sheriff is in town (helpless when told appraisal) 
soften the blow (about movement) 
spinning their wheels (good work but no advancement) 
stuck in an appraisal band 
swimming across the lake (sign of progress above other:s) 
task to be avoided (managers' feeling about appraisals ) 
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temper corrections over time (take time to fix errors) 
to produce a starting line-up ( why appraisals exist) 
treading water (staying the same) 
unfair (how top rated feeling about lump sum) 
victim of the system (good person doesn't advance) 
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APPENDIX 7 
APPRAISAL ALTERNATIVES 
This section examines ideas to improve the evaluation 
techniques of the Engineering organization. Suggestions 
come from both subjects' comments and the researcher's 
analysis of the setting. It should be noted that a major 
division of the alternatives is very basic - fix the 
purposes and techniques of the existing plan or eliminate 
appraisals completely and turn to automatic pay increase 
schemes. Can appraisals systems be changed to overcome the 
problems discussed above? A simple response is yes, but a 
more difficult question for managers is "Should appraisal 
systems be saved?" and "What are alternatives to 
evaluations?" First I will discuss three broader, more far-
reaching alternatives, followed by suggestions for 
improvements offered by employees which propose changes to 
the existing procedures to improve or fine tune them. 
Researcher's Proposals 
The first alternative is to abolish the existing 
procedures for banding employees in groups of relative 
performance, give all workers a general increase, and 
concentrate on employee development through skill 
assessment, continuing education, and job rotation. This 
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approach will greatly reduce competition between employees 
and concentrate on ways to involve and develop the worker. 
Managers would resist this because their "hammer of control" 
becomes a rubber toy, and the union leaders, despite years 
of criticizing the appraisal practices, would lose one of 
their key rallying points, the poor judgment of managers. 
Workers would benefit the most because wages would now be 
equally, rather than inequitably distributed. Peer 
relations would improve because perceptions of unfair 
treatment would be lessened. Instead of appraisals workers 
would compare relations with supervisors and the nature of 
rotational assignments as new standards of equality and 
fairness. Development reviews would now be the focus of 
boss-subordinate reviews without the judgment of performance 
to filter discussions. 
A second alternative is to have peer-evaluation, using 
a system designed by managers with recommendations from 
subordinates. This is similar to the series of "Focus 
Groups" the company instituted to define problems and 
recommend solutions. The rationale is that insight about 
problems and solutions comes from the individuals directly 
involved with the issue. This solution is a sham because 
managers have the final decision about suggested remedies 
and can easily reject ideas as "not in the best interests of 
the business." Setting aside these issues, the alternative 
could be set in motion by seeking volunteers from various 
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groups of workers, based on job assignment. These groups 
would meet to define the problems with performance 
appraisals, identify causes, and recommend solutions. The 
second phase would reconvene a sample of employees to 
develop ways to try out their ideas, one of which would be 
peer-evaluation, arguing that co-workers often know more 
about the contributions, skills, and knowledge of peers than 
the sanctioned group of raters, i.e., supervisors. This 
approach would directly address one of the major 
shortcomings of the existing system the problem of 
knowledge, in which knowing, reviewing and assessing 
behavior are key factors. This solution, however, is greatly 
restricted by the size of the organization, unclear 
objectives, and an unequal distribution of information. 
Supervisors do not have equal knowledge of what all 
employees are doing, yet are expected to make appraisal 
decisions about some of these "mystery" employees. As 
mentioned earlier, this uncertainty dimension engenders the 
use of negotiations, voting, and coin-flipping. Peer-
evaluation would provide "good" eyewitness data from which 
managers would then make the final decision, based on 
employee recommendations. 
The third alternative is a totally worker-designed 
evaluation plan. The outcome may be the same as in 
alternative number two, but the process would be different 
because workers are free to design their own plan, based on 
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their situation and needs. In this approach management 
would turn over control to the workers, a proposal likely to 
cause conflict since managers will still distribute raises. 
One way around this issue has been mentioned earlier --
grant the same raise or general across-the-board increase to 
everyone. The company is already moving in this direction 
with the introduction several years ago of the "Team Award." 
Another solution to the dilemma caused by the appraisal-
funding split would be the creation of a worker co-operative 
where the roles of managers and worker fuse into a single 
function (Lindenfeld and Rothschild-Whitt, 1982). Under 
this arrangement, employees fulfill two requirements of the 
evaluation role: knowledge of the work, its context and of 
individual behaviors from daily peer-level contact. In 
addition a worker co-op "authorizes" or legitimates the 
granting of raises, normally reserved for managers. This 
arrangement places responsibility and knowledge in a single 
group, reducing some of the separation between managers and 
subordinate caused by the current system. Employees would 
work in groups to discuss and reach consensus on the 
contributions and rewards of its members, producing a 
greater feeling that appraisal decisions are coming from 
peers who know contributions rather than from managers who 
impose judgments and play favorites based on old 
relationships rather than current information. 
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Proposals from Interview Data 
Structure 
Ideas on the arrangement of new or modified procedures 
are grouped into several categories: new groupings, 
restrictions, band changes, techniques, and total 
elimination. 
The first set of ideas concerns new ways of grouping 
the appraisal universe. Currently all employees in the same 
job category - EA or Engineer - are treated as one appraisal 
universe, regardless of service or nature of the work, 
although these factors are informally weighed by supervisors 
during the process. Participants strongly suggest that only 
those who perform the same type of work should be compared 
to each other. This would produce a number of formal 
appraisal categories, causing problems for administrators 
who argue they can more accurately distribute the appraisals 
along a normal curve when the group is large rather than 
when the universe is small. There is a good deal of faith 
in the "normal curve" concept. 
An example of this proposed separation would be to 
remove those classified as EA's, who work in "services and 
support", and are not directly contributing to engineering 
specification production, from the "normal" mass of 
employees who produce "specs". Informally, those outside 
the mainstream of production are treated differently, and to 
many observers, negatively, when compared to the line 
groups. 
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Another idea is to use seniority to group people and 
link them to different pay levels. Some also contend that 
new employees should have a separate category. The reason 
for these suggestions is to treat people fairly. 
Interestingly, participants do not appear to understand the 
appraisal pay plan, because the current plan uses a 
"maturity" or experience curve which does link time on the 
job to potential pay levels, based on appraisal category, so 
the system already has a seniority sensitive variable -
time-in-level. The other significant factor in determining 
the possibility and size of a raise is the appraisal band 
assigned by managers. Both of these variables interact to 
establish a target pay figure. The actual raise is affected 
by a third factor - the total amount of money available for 
raises. The organization traditionally does not have enough 
money available to pay everyone at their target pay 
prescription. During the past several years, the 
"shortfall" amount has reduced projected raises by 
approximately 35%. 
The union does not support the creation of special 
appraisal groups, believing this is a management device to 
manipulate the system to the disadvantage of employees with 
more seniority. In general the union seeks equal wage 
treatment for their members and wants them evaluated as a 
single group, regardless of service, education, or 
complexity of work. 
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Another group of suggestions seek to end or greatly 
reduce the restrictions in the plan. People want to end the 
requirement for the universe to balance at 100%, or they 
want to end "caps" placed on the number of employees who can 
occupy specific appraisal levels. The capping restrictions 
occurs in the clerical universe, where no more than 55% of a 
particular level can be assigned the top classification of 
"A", and in the professional engineer category, where only 
20% can be defined as outstanding. Another denunciation 
of these caps is the claim that managers often fill their 
quota with employees who do not deserve to be in the top 
group. one problem with this argument, in face of the lack 
of formal performance criteria, is the issue of who defines 
top and under what conditions? 
Employees and managers want to end restrictions on 
movement because people feel moves are warranted. However, 
in a system of relative performance, by definition, the top 
is relatively better than the rest of the group, even though 
that difference may be very small. There could be large or 
small perceived differences between appraisal groups, and 
these suggestions seem to respond to the need for greater 
equity. 
Several suggestions dealt with the number of appraisal 
groups or job categories. A number of supervisors supported 
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the idea of moving from 8 bands to 3 nominal categories of 
"top, good, and bottom", because it reflected the way they 
went about the process of placing employees into 8 groups. 
Managers also felt it made more sense to work with J broad 
categories reflecting distinct types of behavior than trying 
to find much smaller differences required in a plan using 
almost J times the number of bands. 
The professional engineers' group did switch 2 years 
ago from a 8 band structure to a 4 category structure. The 
new groups are outstanding, accomplished, other, and 
unsatisfactory. Twenty percent are in outstanding, with 
almost all the remainder in accomplished. There was one 
person in "other", which is intended to be a temporary 
status for a year to identify and work out performance 
problems. The last band is also intended to be short term, 
in effect producing a plan with only 2 bands - outstanding 
and accomplished. This should make it easier to classify 
engineers, because unless someone is outstanding or a poor 
performer, they will be placed in accomplished. These broad 
distinctions make the manager's job easier and leave less of 
a negative feeling in the majority of workers who perceive 
themselves as satisfactory. 
Another idea to aid grouping is to create more than one 
job level for the EA position. One of the earlier problems 
mentioned was the disparity in work performed by different 
engineering departments. This suggestion would assign EA's 
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to different levels based on complexity of work, making it 
easier to compare workers in the responsibility groups. 
While this concept addresses the problem of comparing unlike 
work, it doesn't change the problem of grouping people 
within levels, and would create a reward-advancement 
structure motivating EA's to try to reach the top level of 
EA work, while past hierarchical practices normally placed 
fewer individuals in top positions and more at the bottom, 
producing the classic pyramid form. 
A number of ideas focused on more specific technigues. 
The current system uses a relative comparison approach, 
contrasting the performances of actors against one another. 
An employee may do well, but not progress when compared to 
his or her peers. The first technique is to use an absolute 
system, comparing each person against established goals, 
where it would be possible for more people to be classified 
as outstanding. People believe this technique would allow 
for more recognition and lessen the need for and value of 
political bargaining. In effect they feel this method would 
eliminate the small number of moves possible in the rank 
order concept. This would be like a teacher's ability to 
assign any quantity of grade types, based on ability to meet 
course requirements, rather than on a normal curve 
distribution, which imposes an artificial, but convenient 
limitation on the number of students who can earn specific 
letter grades. 
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Allied to this concept is the suggestion to more 
clearly communicate expectations and provide more frequent 
feedback to allow individuals to adjust behavior to meet 
goals. Managers don't like more frequent feedback sessions, 
because it would require more work on their part and another 
opportunity for disagreement. Union officers have 
complained during several bargaining sessions that EA's 
should haves semi-annual feedback meetings so they can 
correct errors, and eliminate surprises, which usually 
translate to employee dissatisfaction and disappointment. 
To date this idea has been given lip-service, at best, by 
managers who claim to be too busy managing other parts of 
their jobs. 
The individual or absolute comparison approach fits 
with the suggestion to stress employee development during 
reviews instead of concentrating on just an appraisal of 
past behavior. This notion fits the company's current 
emphasis on career development which requires both managers 
and subordinate to assess the individual's strengths, 
weaknesses, and areas of interest. This could lead to a 
better match between employee development and the company's 
needs for specific skills in a changing, more complex 
workplace. 
A final technique is to use seniority for the majority 
of the increase amount, plus a smaller merit adder or bonus 
amount, to recognize special achievement. This alleviates 
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the problem of appraising the majority of people correctly 
because everyone will receive some additional money, while 
the exceptional few will receive extra. This approach 
minimizes the impact of evaluations, but does not solve the 
problem of how to accurately select employees for the merit 
increase. 
The final sentiments in this section reflects 
frustration rather than specific alternatives for 
empowerment. People want to eliminate the appraisal system 
and to end the use of competition which permeates the 
system. These ideas were expressed earlier when employees 
called for measurement of achievement against individual 
goals rather than use of a rank order, and the increasing 
reliance on automatic pay increase or progressions, rather 
than the use of a merit plan. 
In a union environment all of these suggestions are 
subject to the bargaining process. For the past 23 years, 
management has succeeded in retaining a predominantly merit 
based system, but with the introduction of lump sum bonus 
payments several years ago, the company seems ready to move 
toward a greater use of automatic pay delivery rather than 
just merit to reward workers. 
Control 
Participants offered ideas related to control of the 
process in several directions. There was a strong feeling 
that managers should control the rank order and cell 
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position of their own employees. In the past supervisors 
would nominate selected individuals for movement, but this 
was moderated by the political process of group selection 
discused in earlier chapters. Managers feel that because 
they know the work of their people the best, they should be 
the only ones to rate their employees. This approach 
eliminates a check on individual bias, but places the 
evaluation responsibility at the position best situated to 
know what actions were taken and how significant these 
behaviors were for the department. 
A contrary opinion on this issue argued that the boss 
has too much power regarding appraisals and does not have to 
justify his or her decision. This stance, if extended, 
would call for the increased use of diverse opinions from 
many supervisors to factor out judgment errors, which really 
means the positions taken by a minority of managers present 
at the group meetings. 
A popular suggestion, but a difficult one to implement, 
is to restrict performance data to the previous year and not 
prior periods, which happens when managers do no have recent 
knowledge of the individual's efforts. Supervisors could be 
required to list the date of the event to justify its 
inclusion in the performance review. This idea could 
support the formal use of the "critical incident" method, 
which isolates specific, important events during the year 
for special examination. This would tend to require a 
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recent and important action to judge, rather than slipping 
into the use of reputational frames, saddling the individual 
with an old and possibly no longer valid burden. 
Next is the idea to increase the use of documentation 
to support later reviews. This procedure may sound 
automatic, but at least half the managers do not use written 
notes, or numerical data to produce an appraisal. They rely 
on impressions from daily interactions. The use of records 
could provide a more acceptable match between the judgment 
of performance and a performance evaluation. Employees and 
union leaders seem to feel better - that justice is served -
when extensive documentation is used to produce an 
evaluation. 
Subordinates felt that managers are afraid to praise 
and reward people because it might cause workers to slow 
down or put supervisors in a weaken position for next year's 
evaluation process, setting up expectations that all this 
praise will lead to a raise or higher rating. As pointed 
out in an earlier chapter, this inability of the appraisal 
system to payoff on expectations for good work it creates, 
is a major shortcoming and dysfunctional feature of the 
system. The plan is set up to use good work and results as a 
motivator, yet managers are reluctant to use this device 
prematurely because they may have contradictory results in 
subordinates. An interesting and unique suggestion came from 
a manager outside the research site. He wanted the 
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evaluators themselves to be appraised for the kind of job 
they did during and after the group meetings. He felt this 
consequence would help the supervisors do a better, focus 
them more on their task, making for a superior product. 
Tools 
A number of specific ideas were offered to improve the 
evaluation production process. Participants wanted a 
greater use of measures to improve objectivity, and clear 
goals needed for individual improvement. Along similar 
lines, people suggested the use of standard, written 
performance categories for greater consistency. This idea 
is repeatedly rejected by supervisors who want the 
convenience and freedom to use their own shared, but 
individual judgements on what constitutes various levels of 
performance. Related to this could be a report card of 
contributions. What people continue to cry out for is a 
system that recognizes "good performance" and appropriately 
rewards this behavior with salary increases or higher 
evaluations. People are willing to accept a system they 
feel is fair to both good and weak performers. 
A second set of ideas deals with developing managers or 
managing a better program in general. Managers have asked 
for more training on how to do appraisals, but ignore 
suggestions they are not comfortable with. In general 
terms, a supervisor suggested that an outside, professional 
group should develop a set of procedures for managers to 
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use. He was looking for a "deus ex machina" solution which 
is not likely to occur. A final idea in this group seemed 
to have potential - use a consultant or facilitator to 
conduct the group meetings and produce the desired balance. 
A final innovative concept suggested a formal mentor 
system matching good and poor performers. The top 
performers would provide examples, and share secrets to 
success. This idea would have to establish rewards for top 
people to participate, and some poor achievers might not be 
able to change because of the influence of multiple factors 
beyond the control of the mentor. One example could be the 
simple condition of a poor match between employee's 
interests and skills and the demands of the job. When the 
engineering unit was restructured several years ago, the 
engineer's job changed to take on more administrative 
functions along with the traditional task of analyzing 
customer's orders. Many engineers could not and have not 
adjusted to the new demands, and a mentor is unlikely to 
alter behavior learned over a 25 year period, especially for 
a group that is very close to retirement eligibility. 
Rewards 
The existing appraisal system is strongly linked to its 
ability to reward participants. A large focus of activity 
is on the fairness of the work-reward relationship to gauge 
its current state of fairness. In this light managers felt 
they need greater control over rewards to compensate their 
employees and give them an incentive to excel. 
Traditionally, the first level supervisor recommended the 
performance level of his or her employees, but actual 
increases resulted from additional negotiating over cell, 
and money available for increases. Managers feel cut off 
from direct influence on salary increases. 
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A dominant theme throughout the research was for 
management to reward performance, ability, and effort and to 
eliminate the perceived bias, and subjective decisions that 
produce the final cell placements. A specific suggestion, 
cited earlier, is to replace the 8-cell appraisal structure, 
used for EA's, with 3 broad categories of top, good, and 
bottom. Subjects feel that the current structure restricts 
movement because of the requirement to balance all 
appraisals to 100%, limiting the number of moves each year. 
Ironically, the 3-band structure used for the professional 
engineers creates the perception of less movement, not more 
advancements. The advantage, however, is that there is no 
requirement to balance to a specific point. Instead each 
employee "funds" the pool of available dollars, based on job 
level and years of experience. The total available money is 
then allocated by managers to "pay employees the same, who 
performs in a similar manner." Supervisors have less 
restrictions, but hold meetings at various levels to seek 
consistency of pay treatment for employes with perceived 
like performance. An additional advantage is that a specific 
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cell position does not limit the size of a potential raise, 
as is now the case with the EA plan. During the 1989 review 
90 of 92 technical-professionals received a salary increase 
or special performance award, resulting in a much wider 
distribution of financial rewards. The union leaders 
rejected this plan during 1988 bargaining because it gave 
supervisors more discretion for salaries, while the union 
seeks to reduce manager's judgments, and make the plan more 
automatic, and predictable regarding pay treatment. 
Other ideas to improve rewards called for the 
following: each department should receive a "pot" of money 
which the supervisor would use to reward his or her 
employees. The rationale for such an approach centers on 
the concept of greater accuracy of supervisory judgments 
because of the proximity of supervisor and subordinate. 
With this ability, managers could also reinforce the 
contribution-reward relationship that is a main feature of 
large utilitarian organizations (Etzioni, 1961). 
Participants also want general increases and job rates 
that all employees will receive and move to. This will 
eliminate or greatly reduce supervisory discretion about 
raises. This suggestion would also eliminate Individual 
Performance Awards (IPA's) which 50% of the employees can 
receive, based on performance and manager's judgments. 
Employees prefer equal treatment because they do not believe 
management can fairly and accurately access performance. 
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Finally, supervisors want to see the reinstitution of 
"feathering", a procedure that allows for single percentage 
increases or decreases in performance ratings. Now there is 
a single pay point for each cell in the EA plan. If someone 
is in cell 5, the target percent is 100% for example. Under 
feathering, the employee could be assigned a percent within 
the range of cell 5. Individuals could be placed anywhere 
from 98% to 102%, as long as the total of all percentages 
for all 8 cells balances to 100%. Feathering allows more 
movement which is however smaller in magnitude. The size of 
raises is smaller, but during downturns in business, the 
drop in percentage is less difficult to accept. 
The union is opposed to this concept because they feel 
the advantages - larger upward moves, which are more likely 
- outweigh the likelihood of drops in cell position, which 
during normal business conditions, are much less common. 
The largest negative impact occurs if there is a layoff and 
management needs to balance the universe which has lost all 
the employees located in the 85% group. This results in a 
new balance much higher than 100%, so many people must drop 
a cell to again reach the 100% mark. Feathering eased the 
pain of this compression because each step downward was only 
1% instead of 5%. More people must be affected, but the 
negative consequences are spread more widely. 
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Forms 
There was a mixed review on the value and use of the AP 
form. Managers reported a number of problems mentioned 
above, but some report the form is useful if it is 
customized to each EA's job, or shortened for the manager's 
convenience. A broader and more general suggestion seeks to 
replace the negative perspective contained on most forms to 
a document highlighting the achievements. skills. and 
potential of each EA. This approach would fit well with 
the use of general or automatic increases. The majority, if 
not everyone, would be rated at least satisfactory making 
them eligible for a salary increase, thus providing a symbol 
of achievement, which seems lacking in the current plan. 
APPENDIX 8 
SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
The research process is never finished. Each project 
or problem is merely a phase in trying to uncover new 
answers and explanations for the social world. In the 
present study a number of questions arose that were simply 
beyond the scope of the study and could not be answered 
during the course of research. These issues are discussed 
below as ideas to expand research in evaluation processes 
and organizational structures. 
Values and Beliefs 
1. The dissertation has argued that performance 
evaluations were a myth -- they did not mirror workers' 
contributions, but were the products of other subjective 
variables. In the face of this, why was there such a gap 
between beliefs and practices? The majority of the actors 
believed in the value of good performance, saw the unfair, 
unpredictable outcomes, and yet continued to function in the 
organization. 
2. Managers held to the efficacy of feedback on 
changing behavior, yet a number reported little change after 
sharing performance information. Why was there so little 
change from feedback? Were expectations unrealistic? Does 
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the reward system provide incentives to maintain the status 
quo? Would an increase in fear of negative rewards and a 
shift from the value of "don't hurt employes" increase the 
impact of feedback? 
3. Supervisors defended the merit pay plan as the best 
way to reward and motivate people. But, what effect would 
there be on production if workers received group or 
automatic increases? Managers believed people would "cut 
back" and become uncontrollable. It would be informative to 
compare the morale and productivity of equity and equally 
based organizations. An extended comparison with a Japanese 
company would be enlightening. 
4. The organization's culture harbored a widespread 
feeling of entitlement supported by the use of seniority and 
the value assigned to consistent contributions. Researchers 
should investigate what forces produce such a strong 
attitude among the EAs that longevity should translate to 
rewards. This could be linked to the high degree of 
uncertainty in the organization. Tenure was a variable the 
EA controlled by good attendance and by not looking for 
another job. 
structure and Control 
l. The managers rejected the practice of using formal 
performance descriptions, but could more formality move the 
appraisal process from being political to focusing on 
performance and not the construction of the rank order list? 
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2. What additional bureaucratic procedures, like 
requiring a 100% balancing point, could be changed to 
produce a better match between achievement and appraisal to 
diminish the performance myth? 
3. How do the appraisal systems of other technical 
work groups compare to the approach of this engineering 
unit? 
4. What effect would actual increase in decision-
making and power by subordinates have on the unit? How valid 
are Kanter's (1977) conclusions about opportunity structure 
and power? 
5. Can supervisors shift their traditional control role 
from watchdog to resource person? would the organization's 
culture resist change? What conditions facilitate or hinder 
this change? A comparison to a Japanese setting would be 
informative. 
6. The ZY&Y organization used a traditional set of 
utilitarian rewards (e.g., raises, bonuses). What would the 
impact be if a larger set of alternative, more symbolic or 
normative rewards (Etzioni, 1961) were available from which 
the employe could choose? Could the experiences of 
alternative organizations (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979) be 
adapted to bureaucratic arrangements? 
7. Information represented power in the organization. 
What performance impact would occur if more significant data 
were available to all employees? Would additional 
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information increase the subordinate's feeling of commitment 
or acceptance of one's assessment? 
8. To what extent was a technical degree needed to 
perform the professional engineer's assignment? What 
environmental forces were increasing the demand for formal 
education? Who was defining this requirement: the company 
or the academic/professional community? Was a process of 
professionalism active and who was orchestrating such 
activity? 
Process 
1. The production of appraisals and cell placement 
caused problems for managers, in part because the shifting 
rules and individual judgments created so much uncertainty. 
What would happen if formal standards were developed and 
used by the managers? What would the consequence be if these 
performance norms were developed jointly by managers and 
subordinates? 
2. The most stressing phase of the process was the 
group consensus meetings used to combine individual 
appraisals into one rank order. Could a appraisal plan be 
developed that would eliminate the group consensus meeting? 
What effect would this have on the power structure? What 
position has the influence to bring about this change? 
3. What would be the consequences of eliminating the 
evaluation system completely for everyone, except those 
judged to be unsatisfactory? Would motivation and 
satisfaction indices increase if the competitive climate 
were vastly reduced? 
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4. Along the lines of 3 above, it would be interesting 
to study the effect of dropping the evaluation part of the 
plan and focusing on career development instead. Would 
actors accept the termination of appraisals, which they 
criticized, and embrace personal development, which they 
claimed was lacking in the organization? The appraisal 
system provided a convenient focus for member's complaints. 
Where would these criticisms be directed if evaluations were 
eliminated? Would the Union lose status and influence among 
the actors? 
APPENDIX 9 
REFLECTIONS ON THE PROCESS OF 
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION RESEARCH 
The formal research process began in May, 1988 when I 
completed a dissertation proposal, selecting performance 
appraisals at my work organization as a topic. The process 
formally ends when the author has reviewed his work for the 
last time, adjusting words and meanings to reflect his 
latest stage of knowledge about the topic. A number of 
thoughts occurred when I reflected on the written phase of 
the research. 
studying the engineering organization as a participant 
observer made it possible for me to more completely 
understand what took place and what actions meant. This 
role placed me at a clear vantage point to see "the big 
picture" from an historical perspective. When members 
discussed the "quartiling system", I knew this referred to a 
previous appraisal plan, discarded for the current 8-cell 
plan, which managers attacked as too difficult to administer 
compared to an even earlier three-level system of top, 
middle, and bottom. I was not a tourist in some alien 
location, but a comfortable member who knew the language, 
customs, and sources of power and information. I was content 
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in this terrain. I believed I knew the answers to many 
questions I had to ask. 
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However, there was a down side to this apparently 
advantageous position of keen understanding. The researcher 
learned a great deal from living or working in the setting 
and felt he knew the interaction patterns. This could, 
however, cause one to overlook an important or emerging 
process because the once inquisitive, curious eyes are 
dulled by the familiar. The researcher thinks he knows what 
is important and falls into the taken-for-granted trap that 
the sociologically uninformed members experience. Data were 
overlooked or completely ignored because they did not fit 
the patterns which emerged and were verified over the course 
of the research. The frame of reference of the participant 
observer was like a camera's view finder: parts of the 
landscape were selected for inclusion in the picture, while 
other features were excluded because they did not fit or 
appear not to be a very interesting view for the 
photographer/researcher. 
Doing research was at once standing inside a circle of 
activity and observing the events inside the boundary. It 
was a slow, interactive, and reflexive process in which 
planned activity (e.g., survey questions) led to unplanned 
actions -- development and use of new questions to answer 
puzzles that occurred from planned work. Questions were 
posed, insights gained, then new questions asked as the 
search to understand the organization's processes and 
structures continued in another direction. 
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An example of this on-going adjustment occurred when I 
first used my interview questions. I originally included a 
question that asked what were the values of the 
organization, but quickly realized after 2 interviews that 
subjects couldn't tell me this directly. I had to analyze 
their comments and infer my own conclusions. Secondly, 
after several interviews, I recognized the interviews flowed 
more smoothly when I abandoned the strict use of the 
questions and adjusted the questions to each subject, often 
letting their comments guide me to posing new, unplanned 
questions. These interviews proved more interesting and 
insightful, leading to even more questions for future 
interviews. 
The discovery process took the following steps: 
observation and data collection; the grouping of data into 
related themes; looking for meaning and movement to insight. 
This sequence was constantly informed by readings, 
organizational experiences, feedback from my dissertation 
committee and teaching. The last activity provided a useful 
exercise to gain a deeper understanding of organizations by 
deciding how to explain variables that supported research 
hypotheses or questions. The teaching activity cut away a 
great deal of confusion as I attempted to illustrate the 
meaning and application of theory. 
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Participant observation research also places you in a 
unique relationship with your subjects. I knew many of the 
subjects for at least 4 years and some for 20 years, prior 
to the research, so I had established a good relationship 
with most of the people. It became apparent that subjects 
must trust you to talk to you. I assured everyone that 
their identity would be protected, but I don't think that 
statement alone would have convinced people it was safe to 
talk to me. I believe the subjects trusted me because of a 
sense of honesty and integrity we established in prior 
encounters. 
Once people learned I was working on an advanced 
graduate degree, they saw me as an expert who should have 
"the answers". The exposure of participant observation 
intensified this reaction, putting me under pressure to 
perform, make excuses, or play the role of resident expert. 
Part of my full-time job was to advise managers how to 
handle personnel problems, especially those related to 
labor-management relations. Perceived knowledge about 
organizational devices like performance evaluations 
overlapped my formal duties and made it confusing to draw 
clear lines between answering "work" questions and analyzing 
the organization for research purposes. 
There was also uncertainty and frustration over 
wondering if you're doing worthwhile research -- something 
worthy of a Ph.D candidate. You have doubts about the scope 
383 
of your topic, whether you asked the right research 
questions, used the appropriate data collection tools, 
analyzed with the clearest perspective, captured the most 
significant insights, and tested your original questions 
properly. You wonder if this effort will first make a 
contribution to sociology and secondly add to management 
literature in a way to make organizations more human, and 
less manipulative of employees. There are always a number of 
ways to organize, conduct, and complete research. You hope 
that your wisdom and insights pointed you in the direction 
of clear, logical, and sociologically sound research. 
The self-doubts intensified after I submitted the first 
draft of my dissertation. I became very worried that my 
work was not up to standards of other students. I was 
surprised at this stage when I got feedback about having to 
add quotes, charts, and tables. Why hadn't I thought of 
this? During the next round of comments, I was told I had 
too much description and not enough sociological analysis. 
I've made these same comments to my students, but hadn't 
seen the same shortcomings in my own work. I felt bad about 
the comments, not because they weren't valid, but because I 
had made them. I didn't know better? A strange thing began 
to happen. I started to see the committee's comments as 
more helpful, valid and useful as I revised my work. I 
began to stress and expand on the mythical quality of 
appraisals, which a dissertation was supposed to do. I 
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thought about the implications of my findings and tried to 
explain them rather than just describe the variables. Then 
a simple discovery occurred -- I was learning how to write a 
dissertation by making mistakes and receiving feedback from 
my committee members. Experience was an invaluable, although 
painful, teacher. 
Finally, undertaking research for a dissertation 
pointed out a feeling I've had since returning to graduate 
school in 1981 -- the feeling of living in at least two 
distinct worlds. I lived in a work organization and 
participated as a graduate student, while also teaching 
part-time and holding the social position of husband and 
father. Pursuing the Ph.D placed me in a situation distinct 
from everyone I knew outside school. It was a world filled 
with observing, analyzing, and writing about organizations, 
while most people just "worked" without critically examining 
their organization. It was a viewpoint of constantly 
questioning the taken-for-granted world of collective life. 
This dual vantage point produced frustration because certain 
conditions came to light which could be explained 
sociologically, but which I was not in a position to change 
through the application of social science principles. 
Action, rather than analysis, was the preferred mode of 
achievement in our society. Knowing without doing was 
disconcerting. 
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I dealt with abstract variables when I wrote my 
proposal and began my research. I felt removed from the 
"real" world, at least the social world around me as I 
worked with concepts few people understood or cared to 
comprehend. There was a great emotional tension to have your 
"feet" into several worlds operating at such dissimilar 
levels of abstraction. co-workers added to this tension when 
they asked about progress on my dissertation without any 
idea of the tasks involved in its production. Although I did 
not share specific findings with managers, they would not be 
surprised about the mythical nature of evaluations, but they 
might be amazed about the terms I used to characterized the 
process. To offer some sense of the experience, I started 
using a football metaphor. I told people that finishing the 
dissertation was like the Bears having the ball on the 1-
yard line with no limit to the number of downs to score. 
However, for every few inches forward there always was a 
loss of ground or confusion over the next play to call! 
Teaching provided an adjustment device for me to 
translate the reality of individual inquiry through an 
explanation to a captive audience of students. I never 
belabored my dissertation topic, but I used it to illustrate 
qualitative research methods, labor-management conflict, 
decision-making and the impact of the organization's 
structure, values, and processes on actors. Teaching bridged 
the gap between the worlds of work and research by demanding 
that I translate, explain, and impart the meaning of all 
those abstractions I have wrestled with individually. 
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Doing research created a feeling of achievement, but at 
this phase of working to complete the dissertation, it was 
not completely satisfying because specific feedback or 
affirmation was missing. Part of this deficiency was due to 
being a graduate researcher, working apart from professional 
leadership (e.g., dissertation committee members and other 
interested professors) and the informal influence and 
benefit of peers, i.e., other wandering, uncertain students. 
Being a part-time instructor placed another burden on me: 
was I more of a student or teacher as I guided my own 
classes? I would have gained more by pursuing the degree as 
a younger, full-time student, but also realized that 
maturity, specialized interests, and diverse experiences 
made for a better, more open-minded researcher. 
The research process reinforced my earlier point -- it 
is like self-discovery -- never fully completed, but a 
source of adventure, frustration, growth, insight and 
achievement. 
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